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A few states, mostly in the West and South, still retain a preference
in custody disputes for placing young children with their mothers.I In
most other states, legislatures or courts have replaced the maternal
presumption with a rule directing courts to be guided solely by the
child's "welfare" or "best interests."'2 A few legislatures have created
a new preference for joint custody, directing courts to consider favora-
bly requests by a parent for such arrangements, even over the objec-
tion of the other parent.
3
This Article argues that the trend away from the maternal pre-
sumption is sensible, but that the current best-interests standard is
both too broad and too narrow to be acceptable. It is too broad be-
cause the current standard provides too little guidance to courts, given
the resources actually available to them, to enable them to reach sensi-
ble decisions about how a child's interests will actually be best served.
As a guide to more satisfactory decisions, I suggest that judges apply-
ing the current test should adopt a loose assumption that the best in-
terests of preschool children will be fostered by placing them with the
parent, if there is one, who has provided a substantial majority of the
day-to-day care for the child. At least one state supreme court has
already adopted a preference for such "primary caretakers,"'4 recasting
the old maternal preference in a sex-neutral form. On the other hand,
the best-interests standard is also too narrow, because, in some cir-
cumstances, the child's interests are not the only ones worthy of recog-
nition in a custody dispute. I thus recommend that legislatures create
a formal preference for primary caretakers, to advance both the inter-
1. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as ofAugust 1, 1981, 7 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 4049, 4063-64 (table VIII E(2) & (3)) (Oct. 20, 1981).
2. See Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 335, 335-36 (1982).
States with a best-interests standard often include a list of factors to be considered, but do not
identify any single parental quality or any aspect of the parent-child relationship that is to be
accorded dominant weight. As of 1981, 13 states had adopted laws explicitly directing courts not
to consider parental gender in reaching a decision. See Freed & Foster, supra note 1, at 4064
(table VIII E(6)).
3. See Scott & Derdyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 472 n.81, 474 n.87
(1984) (listing two states as having adopted a formal preference for joint custody and twelve
others as having adopted a formal policy covering joint custody, including court-imposed joint
custody; most do not distinguish joint legal from joint physical custody); see also note 322 infra.
4. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981); see also Commonwealth ex rel
Jordan v. Jordan, 302 Pa. Super. 421, 425, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1982) ("We hold . . . that
where two parents are both fit, and the child is of tender years, the trial court must give positive
consideration to the parent who has been the primary caretaker.") (citation omitted).
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ests of young children caught in these disputes and, secondarily, the
legitimate interests of primary caretakers.
The movement to encourage joint physical custody is wise but the
movement to permit courts to impose joint custody is not. Legislatures
thus should deny courts authority to disallow joint-custody arrange-
ments agreed to by the parties, but remove the authority of courts to
impose joint custody over the objections of either parent.
My search for factors present in all or most custody disputes that
might serve courts as guides for decision has grown out of an unease
with statutes that direct judges to place a child where her interests or
welfare will be best served without the guidance of any rule creating a
presumption for, or placing a burden of proof on, either party. Such
statutes place extraordinary burdens on judges, encourage costly and
painful litigation by parents, and probably (though unprovably) lead
in many cases to placements for children that do not in fact best serve
their needs. The first part of the Article traces briefly some of the
difficulties courts face in applying the current standard.
Before recommending the replacement of the current approach
with a new approach directing courts to give weight to one or more
specific factors, the case must be made that considering such factors
will advance the purposes that states should be seeking to serve when
resolving disputes. Unfortunately, while all states and nearly all writ-
ers seem to accept a view that courts should resolve these disputes in
the way that best serves the child's interests, there is no consistent
view on what is meant by "children's interests" or "children's best
interests." The second section of this Article thus seeks to clarify this
notion, offering several conceivable ways of approaching a concept of
children's interests and providing guidance for choosing among them.
The Article then goes on to argue that children's interests, however
defined, need not be the only interests reflected in rules for resolving
custody disputes and that, in cases in which the child's interests do not
point toward a particular placement, it would be wise, on certain sets
of facts, to recognize the strong interests of one parent. Because of the
scarcity of literature on the subject, the discussion of how courts
should think about children's interests, and why and when courts
should consider parents' interests is of substantial length and has be-
come nearly as central to the focus of the Article as the inquiry into
the evidence supporting any particular new rules.
A broad-ranging review of the available research fills most of the
rest of the Article. Over the last two decades research on the family
has flowered in this country. My review includes not only research
bearing on the special consideration that might be accorded a parent
December 1984]
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who has been a primary caretaker, but also research bearing on the
relevance of a parent's gender and the relevance of a parent's shared
gender with a child. On the other hand, the review excludes research
on some other parental qualities of likely importance to children, such
as a parent's mental health or a parent's authoritarian or passive per-
sonality. I am seeking rules that parents, lawyers, and judges can ap-
ply, and apply easily, in all or the great majority of cases.
In the end, there is a disturbing tenuousness about the recommen-
dations I am able to make. The research points with only a quivering
finger toward the rules that I recommend. Indeed, the suggested rules
rest in large part not on hard evidence but on theory, clinical observa-
tion, and even hunch - an educated hunch but a hunch nonetheless.
That very tenuousness - and the fact that I am unable to recommend
even a weak rule of thumb for children beyond preschool age - con-
veys most pressingly the need for more research on the effects on chil-
dren of various custodial arrangements. It also suggests the need for
developing ways of resolving divorce custody disputes without trials
by procedures that help parents reflect sensibly on what arrangements
will best serve their children's and their own needs.5 Nothing in this
Article suggests that courts, even with a new presumption, can reach
wiser decisions than parents. On the other hand, any new presump-
tions will affect not only the decisions of judges who apply them but
also the planning and negotiating of the parents who know they will be
applied. One danger of adopting a preference for primary caretakers is
that it will loom too large in the negotiating process and cause secon-
dary caretakers to yield custody even in cases in which a child would
be better off with that parent. The counterbalancing hope is that in as
many cases or more it can help remind parents of a factor that de-
serves more weight than they might be inclined to give it.
I. THE DIFFcuLTIEs OF THE BEST-INTERESTS STANDARD
Over the history of this country, legislatures and courts have relied
on various preferences or presumptions in custody disputes between
parents - presumptions for fathers and later presumptions for
mothers, presumptions against parents who commit adultery, and so
forth.6 Today, judges in most states are directed to determine what
5. See Schepard, Philbuck & Rabino, Ground Rules for Custody Mediation and Modification,
48 ALBANY L. REv. 616 (1984). Many states are now moving to provide mediation services to
parents disputing over custody.
6. See, eg., Klaff, supra note 2, at 337-42; Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child
Custody, 46 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 647, 649-53 (1977); Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child
Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423, 425-28 (1976-77).
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placement will serve the child's "best interests,"' 7 a standard that
seems wonderfully simple, egalitarian, and flexible.
By not assigning fixed weight to any single factor, the current stat-
utes offer the important virtues of flexibility and adaptability.8 They
encourage judges to assign each parental act, trait, or capacity
whatever weight it appears to deserve on the facts of the particular
case. They also accommodate changes in knowledge. No change in
legislation is needed when new research reveals that linking parents
with children of the same sex or placing children with an alcoholic
parent is more or less wise than previously believed. Judges can sim-
ply adjust the weight they give the factor.
Decisions reached under open and flexible standards, however, are
often regarded as arbitrary or overreaching. Many people criticize
judges who decide custody cases for giving inappropriate expression to
personal or sexist biases. In our peculiarly American tradition, the
decisions are regarded not merely as arbitrary but as discriminatory as
well. The father, if he loses, will believe that the judge was prejudiced
in the mother's favor just because she is a woman. 9 The mother, if she
loses, will believe that the judge gave inappropriate weight to the fa-
ther's better financial circumstances.10 These criticisms have some
merit but reflect deeper, more fundamental problems in the best-inter-
ests standard." For our purposes there are two critical problems.
The first is that to the extent that judges are applying the wrong val-
ues, it is in large part because legislatures have failed to convey a col-
7. See Klaff, supra note 2, at 335.
8. For these reasons, such open and flexible standards are familiar in American jurispru-
dence. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685,
1687-88 (1976). Legislatures commonly adopt them when they trust judges (or some other pub-
lic decisionmaker) to reflect appropriate values in their decisions and believe no fixed rule will
provide sensible outcomes for the varied range of cases that will present themselves. Often
framed in the language of a goal or goals, such standards are common when judges or adminis-
trators must fix relationships for the future. See 0. Fss & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 104-
08 (2d ed. 1984). Thus, judges in criminal cases are commonly accorded broad discretion to
choose among types and lengths of sentences to serve unstated or broadly stated goals. Judges in
school desegregation cases must choose among a variety of equitable remedies. The Federal
Communications Commission decides among competing applicants for a television license under
a loose and general standard. In each context, including the custody context, the decisionmaker
tries to obtain accurate information about present circumstances in order to make loose predic-
tions about the future under the possible alternative dispositions, and then picks among the alter-
natives in an effort to achieve the optimal balance among the values to be advanced.
9. See R. DOYLE, THE RAPE OF THE MALE (1976); M. FRANK, WINIG CUSTODY (1983).
10. See, eg., Polikoff, Why Mothers Are Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S Ris. L. REP. 235, 237-39 (1982); Uviller, Father's Rights
and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 108-09
(1978).
11. The best single article on the difficulties of custody decisions in general and the best-
interests standard in particular is Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in
the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226.
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lective social judgment about the right values. That is the subject of
the next section, in which I try to suggest ways of giving content to a
notion of children's interests in a democratic society. The other diffi-
culty, and the one addressed here, is more mundane but no less seri-
ous. Regardless of what values judges apply, they do not obtain, and
perhaps can never routinely obtain, reliable information about the
child and the parents, and thus they cannot make sensible predictions
or choices.
To be sure, some cases are easily decided: one parent is severely
withdrawn and rarely speaks to his or her child or one parent has been
seriously abusive. It appears, however, that in a large proportion of
families the differences between the two parents in the quality of their
relationships to their children and in their childrearing skills are more
subtle, 12 under any view of children's interests. If the trend toward
fathers taking an increased role in childtending continues, 13 it is prob-
able that the incidence of cases in which the differences are subtle will
grow.
Those who favor the current system believe that, even in these
cases, courts can make the necessary assessments if aided by skilled
mental health professionals who interview family members and ob-
serve each parent with the child.14 Yet, sadly, American courts rarely
have available to them thorough examinations by mental health pro-
fessionals of the sort that those professionals themselves recommend. 15
In many places, including some large metropolitan areas, mental
health professionals of any sort are only infrequently retained by either
party or the court: the government does not provide them and only
the well-heeled can afford them.1 6 In these cases, the judge has to rely
12. See notes 211-27 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Hoffman, Increased Fathering: Effects on the Mother, in FATHERHOOD AND FAMILY
POLICY 167 (M. Lamb & E. Sagi eds. 1983).
14. See, eg., 10 COMMITTEE ON THE FAMILY, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSY-
CHIATRY, PUB. No. 106, DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY AND THE FAMILY (1980) [hereinafter cited
as COMMITTEE ON THE FAMILY]. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act [hereinafter cited as
UMDA] provides for investigations and reports by a court social service agency in contested
cases, on the ground that "[i]t is obvious that custody investigations ... can be useful aids to the
court." UMDA, supra, at § 405 commissioner's note, 9A U.L.A. 205 (1979).
15. See COMMITrEE ON THE FAMILY, supra note 14, at 915. Such standards may be unat-
tainable in the real world. For example, psychiatrist Richard Gardner, in a recent book on
custody evaluations, sets forth his view of the elements of a good examination and then provides
two case studies that he suggests are representative. In one case he spent 18 hours with members
of the family, in the other 19 hours - not counting, in either case, the time to prepare a written
report or to prepare (or actually present) testimony in court. R. GARDNER, FAMILY EVALUA-
TION IN CHILD CUSTODY LIGATION apps. V-VI (1982). Gardner generally charges more than
$2,000 for his examinations.
16. Interviews with judges and staff of Friend of the Court, Detroit, Wayne County, Michi-
gan, January 1981.
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on what she hears or observes in court. She almost never personally
observes either parent with the child and usually hears testimony only
from the parties and from partisan lay witnesses.17
Some courts do have staff workers who make recommendations
regarding custody, but such workers often have only minimal training
in child development and labor under caseloads that permit them to
see the parents and children on only one or two brief occasions. States
might, of course, seek to remedy the inadequacy of examinations by
committing more public funds to providing skilled advisors to
courts,'8 but for the foreseeable future it seems highly unlikely that
states, strapped for funds, will in fact make a greater commitment.
For now, it seems more sensible for rules of custody to be based on a
premise that modest resources, at best, will be available to the deci-
sionmaker. As the West Virginia Supreme Court recently commented
in the course of announcing a preference for primary caretakers in
custody disputes, "[in] the average divorce proceeding intelligent de-
termination of relative degrees of fitness requires a degree of precision
of measurement which is not possible given the tools available to
judges." 19
Even if more resources for advisors could be made available, a
more fundamental question persists. That question is whether it is
possible for anyone to make reliable observations of parent-child rela-
tionships during the divorce period.20 The period shortly after separa-
17. Many of us have an image of custody litigation with high-paid counsel and batteries of
psychiatrists battling for weeks on end - in its extreme form, the fights of the Pulitzers and the
Vanderbilts. While there is little statistical information about those who fight, what little there is
and my own observations in Michigan suggest that most of the cases involve middle-income
couples who may be as angry as the rich, but whose hearings last only a few hours. See K.
Gersick, Fathers by Choice: Characteristics of Men Who Do and Do Not Seek Custody of
Their Children Following Divorce 114 (Sept. 1975) (unpublished dissertation, Harvard Univer-
sity); see also Pearson & Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM.
L. 703, 712 (1983) (mean income of families in Colorado who contested custody between $1260
and $1919 per month). A review by the author in January, 1981, of a sample of reports by
referees in custody disputes in Detroit indicates that the parties only infrequently hired experts.
18. The state of Colorado has, for example, established a Children's Diagnostic Center at the
University of Colorado Medical Center in Denver. The Center, founded in 1955, performs exam-
inations in divorce custody disputes. On average, each case requires 19 hours of contact with
family members and case conferences among professionals. Jackson, Warner, Hornbein, Nelson
& Fortescue, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child Revisited: An Approach to Custody Evalua-
tions, 3 J. DIVORCE 207, 208, 212 (1980).
19. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 361 (W. Va. 1981).
20. Some critics believe that psychological testimony is rarely helpful. Others believe courts
should rely on it heavily. Compare, eg., Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Cus-
tody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1117 (1976) (concluding that psychologists and psychiatrists
are rarely useful), and Litwak, Gerber & Fenster, The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody
Disputes, 18 J. FAM. L. 269 (1979-80) (defending a narrow role), with Benedek & Benedek, Par-
ticipating in Child Custody Cases, in CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (P. Schetky & E.
Benedek eds. 1980), R. GARDNER, supra note 15, and Watson, Child Custody Problems; During
Divorce, Weekly Psychiatry Update Series, Lesson 2, Vol. 2 (1977) (advocating very active roles).
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tion, when most struggles over custody occur, is abnormally
stressful.21  During this period, the behavior of children and adults
toward each other may bear little resemblance to the past or the fu-
ture. As we will see, many mothers report that their nurturing quali-
ties, the qualities we may most want to observe, seem to them
dramatically impaired during the post-separation period when they
are often absorbed by their own emotional needs.2 2  Children often
respond to divorce with fear, anger, loneliness, or guilt.2 3 Even an
expert who recognizes the problem of stress may not be able to deter-
mine how the children or adults would behave in its absence.24
There is, in addition, some evidence that the very process of sepa-
ration and divorce can alter the quality of the relationship of a child to
each of her parents in enduring ways that probably cannot be pre-
dicted at the time of separation.25 These short- and long-term reac-
tions to the divorce period compound the difficulties of making reliable
observations even under the best of circumstances.2 6 The fear I would
The issue here, however, is not whether psychologists or psychiatrists can do a better job than
judges in making observations, but rather whether any of them can do an adequate job, given the
stresses family members experience during the divorcing period.
21. See J. WALLERSTEIN & 3. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENrs COPE wrrH DIVORCE (1980), and the research of Hetherington, Cox, and Cox, both
discussed extensively in the text at notes 91-107 infra.
22. Cf J. WALLERSTEiN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 31 (reporting 30% of mothers and
fathers in a sample volunteering for counseling severely depressed after separation), 36-38 (dis-
cussing parents' diminished capacity to "parent" at the time of divorce).
23. See notes 94-105 infra and accompanying text.
24. I worry that experts do not sufficiently consider the effects of the divorcing period on the
parent-child relationship. For example, Richard Gardner, a psychiatrist and author of a book
about custody observations, see note 15 supra, recognizes in an earlier essay that "[c]ustody
litigation is generally even fiercer and more psychologically devastating than traditional marital
conflict." Gardner, The Psychiatrist as Impartial Expert in Custody Litigation, in ADVOCATING
FOR CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 455, 466 (A.B.A. National Institute 1979). Yet he makes dubi-
ous claims like the following about clinical observations of parents and children during the litiga-
tion period:
The child will put his or her head in the lap of the preferred parent when sitting between the
parents in the family interview. The child will snuggle up to the warmer parent when shy
and embarrassed in front of the stranger called a psychiatrist. These are the kinds of obser-
vations that provide the evaluation with its most convincing data.
Id. at 463. It seems to me that there are many explanations other than the one Gardner offers for
the child's behavior during the tense period of a divorce-custody struggle.
25. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 99-107. There are, of course, other
events, unpredictable in the individual case at the time of separation, that are likely to affect the
quality of the child's relationship to each parent. Most prominent among these is either parent's
remarriage. See, eg., Clingempeel & Reppucci, Joint Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and
Goals for Research, 91 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 102 (1982) (theorizing that the remarriage of
either parent is likely to affect the success of joint-custody arrangements more than almost any
other factor); J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 285-301.
26. For example, studies of young children's attachment to their parents conducted under
"normal" circumstances have often found, to the researchers' chagrin, that a child who appears
in a laboratory setting to have a warm and secure, or a poor and insecure, relationship with his
mother or father on one occasion often looks very different to the same researchers later. See
[Vol. 83:477
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have is that, in the frequent cases in which there were not gross dis-
crepancies in the quality of the relationships of the two parents to the
child, the recommendation of the expert or the observations of the
judge would be unduly colored by the stresses of the divorce process
- by the parents' depression, anxiety, anger, and confusion and the
child's reactions to it.
It is for these reasons that this Article seeks to explore the justifia-
bility of new rules for decision that depend less on case-by-case inquir-
ies. One approach, discussed at least half-seriously by more than one
scholar, would be for courts to flip a coin in cases in which neither
parent was obviously unfit.27 Most people, even parents who lose in
court, would probably find such an approach callous, an evasion of
responsibilities both to children and to "justice. ' 2 The less radical
approach of this Article is to explore the feasibility of a statutory pref-
erence based on some parental quality or characteristic that is readily
identifiable, that is present in most or all cases, and that would suggest
the placement in which a child would, on average, be better off under
some acceptable view of children's interests. The most obvious char-
acteristics to consider, because of their universality and ready identifi-
cation, are parents' genders or shared gender with their child and,
perhaps most promising, though sometimes less easy to determine,
their role as a primary caretaker of the child.
Such new general rules should also rest ultimately on observations
of children and their parents and thus the problems of making case-by-
case decisions may arise in attempting to design such rules. Yet some-
times general rules framed in terms of some factor can be justified
when case-by-case decisions based on the same factor would be im-
practical or impossible to make. Furthermore, a general rule based
upon a factor of demonstrated importance may be desirable not
merely because of the difficulties of individual assessments, but also
because the relevance of a factor to the individual case may never be
brought to the attention of the judge in a persuasive manner. During
a typical trial with lay witnesses, a judge is unlikely to learn the weight
that a parent's gender or primary-caretaker status deserves. Even
judges who begin with a background sense that, for example, young
children and primary caretakers have a special relationship, may find
Lamb, Thompson, Gardner, Charnov & Estes, Security of Infantile Attachment as Assessed in the
"Strange Situation " Its Study and Biological Interpretation, 7 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCIENCES
127 (1984).
27. See, ag., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 153 n.12 (1973); Mnookin, supra note 11, at 289-91.
28. Mnookin, supra note 11, at 290.
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their attention to that factor inappropriately deflected by mid-trial by
a parent's unpleasant courtroom demeanor or by information about
that parent's sexual activities.
29
II. THE GOALS OF A CUSTODY DETERMINATION
When parents fight over custody during divorce, at least three sets
of interests might be served by rules to resolve the dispute: the child's
interest in being in the "better" setting, however that is defined; each
parent's interests in maintaining contact with the child and in guiding
the child's development; and society's interests in preventing the child
from becoming seriously antisocial and, more debatably, in encourag-
ing the development of the child into a "good citizen. ' '30 Current state
statutes typically direct courts to consider only the interests of the
child.31 The parents' separate interests are excluded from considera-
tion, probably because they are assumed to be equal and thus to cancel
each other out or because the interest of any one parent is considered
insignificant when compared with the child's interest. The state's in-
terests are ignored, at least overtly, probably in the belief that those
interests can be adequately served by focusing on the child's needs
alone.32 As we shall see however, because the "best interests of the
29. The high percentage of victories by secondary-caretaking fathers in some states in liti-
gated cases, see, eg., Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards" Legal Standards and Empirical
Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 471, 503-04
(1979), may be due in part to the fact that at trial, in the deluge of evidence of misconduct,
something subtle and invisible like a special emotional tie between a primary caretaker and a
child tends to be overlooked.
Legislatures that list factors that judges are to consider in resolving custody disputes com-
monly list first the quality of the child's emotional ties or relationship with each parent, see, e.g.,
UMDA, supra note 14, at § 402, but, at least in the judicial opinions I am able to find, few judges
rest their decisions on a finding that the child has in fact a closer relationship to one parent than
the other, or that one is a better parent. I am uncertain why this should be so, but there are at
least three possibilities.
The first is that some judges may not believe that emotional ties are important. If legislatures
do believe them important, a generalized rule resting on evidence about emotional ties might
encourage or compel judges to bend to the legislature's will. The second is that most judges care
about emotional ties, but simply cannot discern in most cases which parent has the closer tie with
the child. If this is the case, a general rule grounded in empirical evidence should produce better
decisions. The final explanation is that judges typically do have a hunch about the child's
stronger ties to one parent, but are reluctant to reveal their hunch because of the wound it could
inflict on the other parent. In such cases, judges may rest their stated conclusions on some other
ground that played less of a role or no role in their decisions, such as the comparative financial
positions of the parents. If this is the case, a general rule, adequately grounded, should at least
do no harm, though it may cause pain for the judges who must reveal more about their grounds
for decision in cases in which their hunches run in the opposite direction of the preference.
30. See notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text.
31. See note 2 supra.
32. However, trial judges sometimes allude to the extra welfare costs that placement with the
mother would entail as a reason for placement with the father, without discussing at all how the
child's interests would be adversely affected. See, eg., Saunders v. Saunders, No. V-65-76 (N.Y.
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child" are difficult to define, judges may in practice often think they
are being guided by a child's needs when in fact they are affected by
the needs or goals of the state (much like judges in juvenile courts
who, as they send the teenage mugger to an institution, tell him that it
is being done "for his own good").
There are good reasons for according the needs of children the
dominant place in custody determinations. Divorce greatly disrupts
the lives of children, causing deep and often lasting distress.33 For
young children, the entire course of their development seems at issue.
Moreover, of all family members, children are the ones least able to
protect their own interests.
In this Section, I have set out to accomplish two tasks. The first is
to develop some coherent views of "children's best interests" as a
predicate for appraising factors that might be given weight in a cus-
tody dispute. The second is to make a case for openly taking parents'
interests into account to a limited degree in framing custody rules.
A. Ways of Thinking About Children's Best Interests
In trying to determine a child's "best interests" in a custody dis-
pute, what weight should a court accord to the fact that one of the
parents has been the child's primary caretaker or is of the same sex as
the child? Or to the fact that one parent is particularly warm and
attentive to the child? It is not possible to prescribe how to take into
account any parental quality until we come to grips with what it
means for a child's life to be "better" in one setting than another. We
must identify and prepare to defend some settings or outcomes for the
child that are in some sense "better" than others.
Few writers or appellate courts have tried to define what makes
some settings for a child "better" than others and, of those who have
tried, few have explained why their "better" is better than others. In a
nation tolerant of diverse approaches to childrearing, without a single
national orthodoxy about what sorts of adults children should grow
into, such an omission is understandable. Many state statutes duck
the problem of definition and simply direct their courts to serve the
child's "best interests" or "welfare" without providing any further
guidance. Some statutes list factors to consider, such as the child's
"relationship" with each parent, which sound helpful but do not re-
veal the goals the state is seeking to serve.34 All parents in custody
Fano. Ct., July 8, 1977), revd. on other grounds, 60 A.D.2d 701,400 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1977) (mem.),
discussed in Uviller, supra note 10, at 122.
33. See text at notes 91-102 infra.
34. Many states have adopted some version of § 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
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disputes have had "relationships" with their children. What makes
one relationship better than another?
The writings of most legal scholars and mental health professionals
are also unhelpful. Some advocate careful inquiries by courts into the
parent-child relationship, but, perhaps because they are writing for
others with similar beliefs, either fail to make clear what the court is to
look for or, if they do prescribe some particular factor that they con-
sider especially important, fail to explain why that factor is more wor-
thy of weight than others.35 A few writers, more reflective about the
jurisprudential problems presented, point out the absence of a public
consensus about childrearing and suggest that the absence of consen-
sus makes it difficult or impossible to define "best interests" beyond
some minimum of abuse.36 Robert Mnookin, for example, summed up
with pained eloquence the difficulty of prescribing standards in cus-
tody disputes: "Deciding what is best for the child poses a question no
less ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself. . . .[W]here is
the judge to look for the set of values that should inform the choice of
what is best. . . ?"37 He has no answer to the question he poses and
reluctantly endorses the current standard without adding more con-
tent to it.
The task of prescribing where the judge is to look for a set of val-
ues to guide decisions is indeed difficult, but it is not impossible. The
first and critical task is to identify the appropriate source of values to
guide decisions - to decide whose values are to guide decisions. I
believe that can be done.
The concept of "children's best interests," unlike such concepts as
distance or mass, has no objective content. Whenever the word "best"
is used, one must always ask "according to whom?" The state, the
parents, and the child might all be sources of views, worthy of consid-
eration, about the child's interests and how best to serve them. The
child's view might take either of two forms - the child's stated prefer-
ence as to custody or a view of what we would expect this child, or
Act, which provides that the court shall consider "the interaction and interrelationship of the
child with his parent or parents." UMDA, supra note 14, at § 402.
35. See, e.g., CoMMrrrEE ON THE FAMILY, supra note 14, which discusses at length the
problems of custody decisionmaking, the steps that should be taken in an examination, and some
factors that should be taken into account, but never discusses exactly what values the court
should seek to advance or why those values, whatever they are, are more appropriate to consider
than other values. See especially the discussion of five "broad guidelines that should be recog-
nized and carefully weighed." Id. at 880-92; see also R. GARDNER, supra note 15, at 212-30;
Benedek & Benedek, New Child Custody Laws: Making Them Do What They Say, 42 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 825 (1972).
36. See, eg., Mnookin, supra note 11, at 229, 260-61; Okpaku, supra note 20, at 1152-53.
37. See Mnookin, supra note 11, at 260.
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children in general, to choose for themselves either now or from the
hindsight of their own adulthood. The latter view, through the child's
expected experience, needs more explanation and will be elaborated
later.38 It is this view that I recommend adopting.
Outside of the context of custody disputes, it is the parents' view of
a child's interests that normally controls in our society. Parents have
the authority (shared inevitably with the child as she grows) to make
the important decisions about their child's upbringing, including the
decision about where the child should live.39 The United States Con-
stitution has been read to protect the parents' authority to make such
decisions for their children 4° and might be read to require deference to
divorcing parents' agreements to place custody with one of them.
41
But when parents disagree about custody and fail to resolve their dis-
pute between themselves, the state and its judges can no longer defer.42
Judges, in rare cases, may find that they can draw upon some shared
views of the child's needs revealed by the parents' conduct during the
marriage,43 but, in most cases, the judge will have to look beyond the
warring parents for a source of values to resolve the dispute.
38. See notes 52-58 infra and accompanying text.
39. That parents need no one's consent to take their child with them when they move from
one house to another is so clear in this country that no statutes are needed to confirm their
authority. Rules to cover some unusual situations do exist, such as those that permit parents to
designate by will the custodian for their child or to designate the guardian for their child when
they face prolonged hospitalization.
40. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-04, 607 (1979) (upholding a state statute
permitting parents to commit their children to mental hospitals with the concurrence of a physi-
cian, over the child's objections and without a court hearing); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (striking laws infring-
ing on parents' decisions regarding education). To be sure, the Supreme Court's decisions are
not always consistent and do not always place parental control above other social values. For an
especially perceptive discussion of these cases, see Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979
Sup. Cr. REV. 329; see also Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1983); Develop-'
ments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1313-15 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
41. See Developments, supra note 40, at 1323-26.
42. States can try to force parents to agree by requiring that disputing parents mediate. See,
e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1985).
43. Imagine a case in which the parents had agreed before separating that their four-year-old
child should be raised in the Greek Orthodox faith and had begun taking the child to religious
services shortly before their separation. Now, at divorce, both parents plan to move, one to an
urban center with a substantial Greek Orthodox community, the other to a small town with no
Greek Orthodox church within a hundred miles. I believe it would be appropriate for a court to
consider with favor the parent planning to move to the urban center because that parent would
carry forward the parents' previously shared view of what will be best for the child and for the
"family." The state has no appropriate view about religious training. The child might be per-
fectly happy not going to church or going to a church of another denomination. It is the parents'
own view here that would be given independent weight. Cf. T. v. H., 102 N.J. Super. 38, 40, 245
A.2d 221, 222 (Ch. Div. 1968), affd. per curiam on other grounds, 110 N.J. Super. 8, 264 A.2d
244 (App. Div. 1970).
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The second approach - through the child's stated view of her own
interests - relies upon the child as her own source of values for deci-
sion. It can be defended on several grounds as the appropriate basis
for resolving disputes over custody. First, it treats children more
nearly as full citizens entitled, like other citizens, to control the deci-
sions, or at least to influence the decisions, that affect their lives.
44
Second, to the extent we wish to keep the state out of the business of
defining the "good" family, it leaves the judgment in private hands. 45
Third, it recognizes that, in most cases, children are likely to do at
least as good a job as judges in divining their interests.46 For all these
reasons, a good case can be made for permitting an adolescent to re-
solve a custody dispute between her parents, except in unusual circum-
stances.47 A few states already have rules giving formal weight to the
older child's preference. 48 On the other hand, some children are too
young to be able to express a preference. Others who are able to ex-
press a view may lack the capacity to understand their own needs to
44. The Supreme Court itself has recognized a constitutional right of minors, or at least
"mature" minors, to make decisions on their own in some circumstances. See, e.g., Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (statute requiring a minor to seek parental consent before a judicial
authorization for an abortion could be granted held unconstitutional when the minor is "mature
and fully competent"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(public school regulation forbidding students to wear armbands protesting the Vietnam war un-
constitutional under the first amendment). Much has been written in the last two decades on the
extent to which children should be treated as autonomous individuals entitled to make decisions.
For a. particularly strident defense of the position that children should have essentially the same
rights as adults, including the right to choose where they live, see J. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM
CHILDHOOD (1974). For a contrasting view, see Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egali.
tarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youths to Their Rights, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV.
605, 651. For a fine analysis and synthesis, see F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF
ADOLESCENCE (1982).
45. See text at notes 49-52 infra.
46. See the discussion above in Section I of the difficulties for judges in learning enough
about a child's relationships and parents' capacities to make sensible choices. There is, on the
other hand, a growing literature on the capacity of children to make reasoned decisions for them-
selves. For a helpful review see Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings:
The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 309-20 (1983).
47. I have not tried to make that case in this Article. For the elements on which such a case
can be built on the basis of children's capacities to make decisions, see E. Greenberg, An Empiri-
cal Determination of the Competence of Children to Participate in Child Custody Decision-
Making (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana 1983); see also
note 46 supra. Adolescent children often control their placement after a court order has been
entered by simply moving to the home of the noncustodial parent and expressing a strong prefer-
ence to stay there.
48. See Moskowitz, Divorce-Custody Dispositions: The Child's Wishes in Perspective, 18
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 427, 431-34 (1978) (discussing laws in Georgia, Ohio, and Utah); Siegel
& Hurley, The Role of the Child's Preference in Custody Proceedings, 11 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1977).
Most other states permit or require the trial judge to consider the child's preference. See, e.g.,
UMDA, supra note 14, at § 402(2). In most such statutes, including the UMDA, it is unclear
whether the child's wish is to be accorded weight because of the child's interest in making her
own decision or merely because of the indirect evidence it provides of the child's interests as the
court determines them.
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such a degree that the state believes judges can make a wiser choice for
them. States may also prefer to have judges make the determination,
even in cases of more mature children, out of a humane desire to spare
them the pain of publicly rejecting one parent and the pain, in many
cases, of being subjected to unpleasant threats or cajolery by one or
both parents.
The third approach, through a state-prescribed view of children's
interests, has strong appeal, but fails for different reasons. Judges in
custody cases today may typically see themselves as giving voice to a
state view of what is "better" or "worse" for children. What they are
doing when giving expression to such a view is hard to say. Judges
often conclude that one setting is better for children than another
without explaining why. Some may see themselves as bluntly impos-
ing what they believe that a majority of people in the community
would say was better or worse for children, without forcing themselves
to inquire why a child is better or worse off with such a parent. If that
is all they are doing, we should find their conduct troubling in a nation
with an ostensible commitment to cultural and ethnic diversity and to
parental freedom to raise children in diverse ways. 49 Across a very
broad range, our nation has maintained a healthy agnosticism about
"good" childrearing and "good" outcomes of childhood. To be sure,
judges in custody cases are forced by circumstances to make choices,
but, unless no other approach to decisionmaking is possible, we ought
to ask of the state that it justify its choices between parents by more
than a simple reference to majority preferences.
50
Most judges probably believe that they are doing more. Yet is it
possible to develop a state-prescribed view of children's interests that
does not mindlessly refer to the majority's (or the judge's) preferences?
My own belief is that any attempt to do so will end up speaking either
in terms of placements that serve the state's own needs or interests
49. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (At issue was a
zoning ordinance that blocked certain forms of extended family arrangements. The Court said,
"the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its children - and its adults - by
forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (At issue was the authority of Oregon to compel all children to attend
public schools. The Court said, "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forc-
ing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.").
50. In one sense, I may be exaggerating the degree to which decisions by individual judges in
custody cases mark a significant state pronouncement on childrearing practices. After all, the
individual judges' opinions, which often contain only skimpy statements of their reasons for
reaching their results, are hardly major public pronouncements of state standards for childrear-
ing. Moreover, the judge is not imposing an absolute state standard, but is merely choosing
which of two parents the state prefers. The modestness of the state intrusion, however, does not
in any way alter the conceptual difficulty for the conscientious judge.
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(not the child's) or in terms of placements that the child herself will
find satisfying day by day or in the future.
Consider any quality of a parent or of a parent-child relationship
that might be at issue in a custody case - one parent's tenderness or
coldness or promiscuity or a child's particularly joyful or fearful rela-
tionship with one parent. Talk with someone about the reasons why
the state might prefer, for the child's sake, a placement that provides
the child access to or protection from such a quality. You might, for
example, believe that such a quality will have an effect on the child's
experience or character (either as an adult or child), such as making
the child feel secure or depressed, or helping the child to become self-
reliant or dependent. Whatever effect you foresee, ask yourself why
you consider the effect good or bad for the child. I think you will
discover that you talk either in terms of what that quality is likely to
mean to the child as the child experiences it in the short- or long-term
or in terms of how that quality may affect some asserted interest of the
state itself. You will not find another coherent way for the state to
talk about what is "good" for the child or what the child's "interests"
are. In our system, the state, unlike parents, cannot turn to religious
doctrine for guidance. If it turns to mental health professionals, it will
find that they, in turn, ultimately rely either on a view of society's
needs or, more likely, on their views of the child's expected exper-
iences as a child or as an adult.
There are thus these two approaches: the state can openly define
rules of custody to serve its own needs or it can turn to the child's
expected experience. Regarding its own interests, the state might, for
example, desire children who, as adults, will be self-sufficient, respect-
ful of authority, cooperative, dependable, patriotic, and resistant to ex-
tramarital sex and consequently prefer the parent who best promotes
those ends. I believe, however, that most Americans would be re-
pulsed by a statute that abandoned a concern for the child's interests
and baldly provided for the resolution of their custody in the manner
that served the "best interests of the state." And well they should.
Shaping children for the state's own ends is a common goal of collec-
tivist societies, but our society is much more ambivalent about such a
goal. With few exceptions, we are committed to leaving to parents the
task of choosing and shaping children's values and personal quali-
ties.51 In a custody dispute, when we can no longer turn to the par-
51. There can be little doubt that the state has an interest in preventing children from becom-
ing delinquents. As a practical matter, however, it is difficult to bring that interest to bear in
resolving custody disputes because of the impossibility of accurately forecasting delinquency as a
consequence of any particular placement. Whether or not the state has a legitimate interest in
creating "good citizens" through custody placements is more controversial. In this country, at-
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ents, most of us would still feel uncomfortable recruiting the child for
the goals of the state. Most of us would feel comfortable preferring
the parent who would help the child become self-reliant or cooperative
only to the extent that we can make a case for the value of those quali-
ties as they are experienced by the child herself.
We are left then, I believe, with defining children's interests
through the child's own expected experience. Under this approach, in
those cases in which the court cannot rely, or chooses not to rely, on
the child's stated preference, the question the court would ask is not
what the state has defined as "good" in the abstract. Rather, it would
ask one of two other questions. In the case of a child who has demon-
strated clear patterns of preferences and patterns of relationships with
her parents, the question for the judge is which placement will this
child experience most positively, both on a day-to-day basis while
growing up, and from the vantage of her own adulthood. Much of this
approach has been adopted in recent writing about paternalistic deci-
sions for adults who are, for example, in comas or severely mentally
ill, 52 and has sometimes been referred to by courts as a doctrine of
"substituted judgment. '53
tempts to instill patriotism or respect for authority would be seen by many as an illegitimate
attempt to sustain the current government in power or an inappropriate attempt to instill partic-
ular moral beliefs. See generally M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983) (examining
the legitimacy of government expression in a democracy); see also Justice Powell's opinion in
Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) ("[A]ffirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, reli-
gious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State not to attempt in a society constitution-
ally committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice.") (emphasis in original).
On the other hand, through public schools, the state inevitably seeks to instill values and
promote certain individual qualities, partially to serve its own ends. Most of us accept this attri-
bute of public education as an unavoidable by-product of a system that is valuable for the child's
own sake. Virtually no one, however, would argue that it would be appropriate for governments
to invoke child neglect statutes to rembve the children from intact families solely because the
parents were doing an inadequate job of instilling some value, such as cooperativeness or polite-
ness, that the state would promote through the public schools for its own ends. A custody dis-
pute in which one parent is seen as more likely than the other to instill such a quality in a child
falls somewhere in the middle. There is not the same degree of intrusion on family privacy and
autonomy because the parents have turned to the government for a resolution of the problem and
because the court will be placing the child with one of her parents. At the same time, the state
that asserts its own interests in a custody decision does so at the price of devaluing the needs of a
child at risk who deserves to have her concerns given high priority.
52. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 248-49 (1971); Dworkin, Paternalism in MORAL-
ITY AND THE LAW 107 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971); Dworkin, Paternalism: Some Second
Thoughts, in PATERNALISM 105 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983); Hodson, The Principles of Paternalism,
14 AM. PHIL. Q. 61, 65 (1977); see also Developments in the Law - Civil Commitment of the
Mentally 1l, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1220-22 (1974).
53. See, eg., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977) (applying substituted judgment doctrine to uphold lower court's decision not
to administer certain kinds of painful treatment that had serious side-effects to an aging, severely
retarded man dying of cancer). In its pure form, the notion of "substituted judgment" is in-
tended to protect the now-disabled person's right of self-determination - a coherent though
troublesome notion even when the now disabled person, before becoming disabled, had expressed
what he wanted done for him when he became disabled. In the Saikewicz case, in which the dying
December 1984]
Michigan Law Review
In most cases, however, the court will probably have insufficient
information to predict confidently the particular child's responses to
the possible alternative placements. In these cases, the question for
the judge is which placement would most children in comparable posi-
tions experience more positively, now and in hindsight. In such a case
the court would be applying a reasonable person - or "reasonable
child" - standard,54 drawing on as many characteristics of the partic-
ular child as it can. This approach recognizes that each child has a
unique set of preferences and possibilities that are not fully knowable,
but tries nonetheless to lure the judge into looking at the possible
placements through the eyes of a child. In many cases, judges will
have to ask both sorts of questions - confident about some aspects of
the particular child's responses, less confident about others.
This Article is not the place for a full elaboration and appraisal of
this "child's experience" perspective. For our purposes, a few points
need be made. First, there may be real differences in outcomes when
using this approach in place of one that relies on developing a state-
prescribed or majoritarian view of children's interests. This is true
even though, at first blush, this slightly odd point of view - through
the child's eyes, not out of the child's mouth - may appear to be
merely a tortured way of describing a state-declared view of what is
best for the child: we might presume that most children would want
for themselves what most adults would want for children, and it is
"most adults" who, through their representatives, would define a state
view. But there are some qualities that most adults might want in chil-
dren and believe were in children's best interests but that children
themselves, even from the hindsight of their own adulthood, might
believe less important or even irrelevant. Thus, most adults in this
country might say it is "good" for children to grow up very respectful
of adults or "bad" for children to grow up in a home with a parent
who cohabits outside of wedlock or "good" for children to grow up
man had an IQ of 10 and had never been rational, the best that the court could do was to try to
appraise the choices in terms of Saikewicz's apparent capacities, which seemed to be limited to
comprehending present pleasure and present pain. In cases like Saikewicz, the task of the court is
like the task described in the text for children about whose individual preferences and reactions
the court believes it knows too little to make predictions. For critical analyses of Saikewicz and
the difficulties of making these decisions, see Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decision-Making in
PATERNALISM 153 (R. Sartorius ed. 1983) and R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS 144-73
(1978). For the problems of applying this doctrine to young children facing decisions about
major medical procedures, see WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CON-
SENT (W. Gaylin & R. Macklin eds. 1982) (especially chapter 4 by A. Capron, chapter 6 by J.
Dworkin, and chapter 9 by R. Macklin).
54. Cf. Buchanan, supra note 53, at 157 (arguing that a reasonable person standard should be
used in determining whether to require continued medical treatment of a terminally ill person
when no information exists to show the patient's preference).
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free of sexist stereotypes, but most children, so long as they had the
benefit of other qualities such as love and physical security, might well
be indifferent to these qualities as a child and feel no worse off as an
adult for not having had them.55
The second point to be made is that there are positive, practical
virtues to this approach. It is not just the least objectionable among
several objectional possibilities. It places our focus squarely on the
expected subjective sense of well-being of the person who has to live
for the rest of her life with the choice the judge makes. It affirms that
we care about how this person feels both now and later. In addition, it
offers two advantages to judges. During custody hearings, it gives
judges an understandable, if difficult, question to pose to themselves as
they listen to the claims and accusations of the parties: not "is this
parental trait or conduct that I'm hearing about 'good' for the child or
'bad' for the child?" but "what is this trait or conduct likely to mean
to the child as she experiences it?" Similarly, at the end of the pro-
ceeding, it offers judges a reasonably coherent point of view that can
permit them, at least in theory, to make defensible choices between
parents even in those cases in which both parents would be considered
wholly "fit."
56
For all its advantages, however, this approach has many difficul-
ties. It is usually difficult, even in the case of a disabled adult, to an-
swer what a person would have wanted now or in hindsight if she had
been in a position to choose. This question is especially problematic in
the case of small children, who have little history of expressed or
demonstrated preferences and for whom any choice that is made now
will affect how they will look back on their childhood from the van-
tage of their adulthood.57
In fact, in the many custody cases in which judges have little infor-
55. Some qualities might also be viewed as positive by both "most adults" and "most chil-
dren," but not in the same way. In a case with an only child in which one parent planned
remarriage to a person with children, most adults might believe it would be good for the child to
have other siblings because it would keep her from becoming "too spoiled," whereas the child
might value the step-siblings for their companionship.
56. Mnookin seems to conclude that there are no principled bases under a best-interests stan-
dard for making decisions in custody disputes except in cases in which one parent would neglect
or abuse the child. See Mnookin, supra note 11, at 261-62. For the reasons stated in the text, I
disagree. In my view, even cases involving direct state intervention for neglect or abuse can be
better rationalized through the child's-experience point of view described here than through a
theory of a state view of minimally acceptable parenting that Mnookin contemplates. Or, put
another way, the state view of minimum parenting is best defined through a view of the "child's
expected experience" in living in an "abusive" situation; rules about state intervention would rest
on a balance of the child's interests so defined against other interests, such as parental autonomy.
57. WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT, supra note 53, is a
rare volume that addresses the question of paternalistic decisions made for children. In it, a
group of lawyers, physicians, and philosophers discuss the standards that parents and courts
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mation about a particular child's special characteristics, judges may
transform the elusive question about this child's likely reaction to the
different custodial settings into the easier question of which parent the
judge herself would prefer to live with. This transformation should
not be regarded with great concern as long as the judge is striving to
look at the world through a child's eyes, but the judge's vision can
easily become blurred by adult moral judgments about what is "good"
or "bad." This is admittedly a problem, but it nonetheless seems less
likely that judges will impose their own values (or their perceptions of
community values) under a standard that urges them to appraise the
proposed custodial settings through the perspective of the children's
subjective experience than under the typical statute today that gives
them no guidance about how to think about children's interests. More-
over, what my approach asks the judge to do is psychologically tena-
ble: it is possible to concentrate on understanding what it is likely to
mean to this child to live with a strict (or a lax) disciplinarian rather
than on asking what sort of disciplinarian do people believe it "best"
for a child to have.
There are other problems as well, 58 but two that need emphasis are
problems that apply almost equally to the other approaches. When-
ever courts or legislatures try to serve a child's interests through a
custody decision, they are almost inevitably concerned with the short-
and long-term consequences of the possible placements. The "child's
should apply in making decisions about risky medical procedures (such as transplanting an organ
from one sibling to another or permitting a child to be a subject of medical experimentation).
Little of the other writing that I can find by philosophers focuses on decisions made on behalf
of children. For example, a recent volume of essays entitled PATERNALISM (R. Sartorius ed.
1983) contains many general discussions of paternalism as well as whole chapters on the retarded
and on voluntary civil commitment of the mentally ill, but, except for references to the parent-
child relationship as metaphor in other discussions, the volume contains only a few scattered,
brief discussions of the special issues raised by decisions made on behalf of children.
58. Consider two. First, some would condemn approaching custody decisions through the
child's expected experience as hedonistic and amoral. The standard offers no conception of the
good other than that which children, while children or later, experience as positive in their own
terms. In one sense, this objection seems ill-considered. A court could find that a child exper-
iences positively the instilling of some reasonably coherent moral code, see generally E. MAC-
COBY, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL GROWTH AND THE PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIP 295-364 (1980) (tracing the development of a child's morality through the gen-
eral process of growing and through discipline and reward), and thus prefer a parent who would
provide moral guidance. The approach would limit severely the courts' freedom to prefer one
parent's code over the other's.
Second, if one is genuinely committed to asking what this child would prefer both today and
in hindsight, the approach may on occasion lead to results that many people, even people largely
sympathetic to the approach, would consider unjustifiable. Consider, for example, the case of two
parents, each reasonably strict in disciplining, but one of whom frequently gives the child expen-
sive gifts. Or consider the case of a particular disturbed child who seems to experience positively
a parental behavior such as severe beatings, that nearly everyone would say was not in her inter-
est. We can even imagine this particular child as an adult looking back on the parent's behavior
with masochistic pleasure and approval.
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eye view," like a state view of children's interests, leaves the court with
the same difficult task, discussed in the preceding section, of learning
enough about the child's current relationships with his parents and
about the parents' other qualities to make forecasts of the conse-
quences to the child of the alternative placements. Moreover, under
this approach as under a state view, there will be many cases in which,
having made rough forecasts, the judge will be unable to say that, from
the child's perspective, one future seems preferable to the other. They
will just seem different. There may in fact be even more such cases
under this approach than under approaches in which the state is
openly prescriptive about what is good for children; if so, this ap-
proach might be viewed as unhelpful by judges who are trying to reach
decisions, but may in the end serve the value of prodding states toward
other techniques (such as mediation) for resolving disputes without a
state-imposed outcome or toward new general rules (such as a pri-
mary-caretaker preference) that are believed likely to produce better
outcomes in most cases.
The second problem is that if one is trying, as I am, to devise new
general rules or preferences based on this "child's experience" view,
one must attempt in some systematic way to define some elemental
qualities of life or personal characteristics that most children would
want for themselves as they grow up and after they have grown. This
is an exceedingly difficult task, but I believe it is possible to identify a
few such qualities. In another context, John Rawls has attempted to
define the qualities that a hypothetical person who did not know what
place he would have in the world would wish from the state in which
he was going to live - certain "primary goods" that the person would
want whatever else he might want.
59
What a child would want from her parents is not the same as what
a citizen would want from her state, but a comparable notion of cer-
tain "primary goods" within a family may be possible to develop.
What, that is, are the essential qualities of a parent or a parent-child
relationship that are necessary in order for a child to feel a sense of
well-being during childhood and to become an adult with a sense of
well-being? The starting point is a stark biological fact. Children are
helpless at birth and cannot survive without the care of others. As
infants, they need both dependable care and, for a sense of well-being,
59. See Rawls, supra note 52, at 90-95. Rawls in fact argues that in making paternalistic
decisions on behalf of a child or other person whose preferences are unknown, we should be
guided by a theory of "primary goods," "act[ing] for him as we would act for ourselves from the
standpoint of the original position. We try to get for him the things he presumably wants
whatever else he wants." Id. at 249.
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a sense that they are loved, valued, and protected by those who take
care of themA0 As the child grows, the same qualities retain impor-
tance (though in differing degrees) and are joined by other qualities
also essential to a sense of well-being. Most globally, the need is for a
growing sense of competence - competence within the world around
the child, competence (in the child's own view) to relate successfully
to other people and competence (again, in the child's own view) to
function as a productive member of the society.61 Throughout the pe-
riod from infancy to adulthood, children's relationships with their par-
ents and parental traits and conduct need to be thought of not merely
as instruments for the child's future ("What will this help the child
become?"), but also as important contemporaneously ("Will this be
experienced positively at the time?"). And, although there may well
be tension between what a child will experience as positive at the mo-
ment and what the same child will look back upon positively later - a
tension between immediate gratification and growth - both perspec-
tives need to be kept in mind.
These qualities, which I would identify as important in a child's-
experience perspective, may sound suspiciously like qualities that a
majority of citizens would say were "good" for the child and that the
state would want a child to have to serve its own ends. I believe, how-
ever, that at this elemental level, though only at this elemental level,
the various perspectives on children's interests are likely to coincide.
Though the state might regard some other qualities as nearly as im-
portant for the child,62 it would probably include these qualities of
childhood and adulthood high on the list.
Thus, as we move on in this Article to appraise a preference in
60. Michael Wald has tried to identify such elemental qualities from the writings in child
psychology, child development, and child placement in divorce. The list includes the following:
the need to sustain a secure relationship with a parent figure, to feel valued by the parent figure,
to enjoy his childhood day by day, and to develop a range of capacities to function as an adult,
most particularly, to be able to love, to have a sense of self-worth, and to have a sense of control
over his life. The child of divorce who has known both parents will also want the opportunity for
regular contact with both parents in a conflict-free setting. The writers upon whom he draws are
not self-consciously building a theory of "primary goods," but the qualities listed are remarkably
consistent with the child's eye perspective argued for in this Article. (Conversations with Wald,
1984-85.).
61. See the writings of Erik Erikson, such as CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1950). See also
Freud's view of the mentally healthy person as someone who is able to love and to work. Others
have expanded Freud's notion of the capacity to love and to work into a notion of a capacity for
bath "work and enjoyment," with enjoyment including not only satisfying interaction with
others, but also pleasure in one's own achievements. See 0. FANISHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC
THEORY OF NEUROSIS 581 (1945).
62. Under a state-defined view of children's needs, some other qualities, such as the child's
adherence to some set of conventional moral norms, might be considered especially important,
but they are unlikely to be considered more important than these qualities that relate so centrally
to people's capacities to live day by day without debilitating anxiety or depression.
[Vol. 83:477
Custody Disputes in Divorce
custody disputes for placement with mothers, primary caretakers, and
the parent of the same sex as the child and for placement in joint cus-
tody, we will be asking whether these placements will advance one or
more of these identified qualities - of feeling loved, secure, and val-
ued; of developing the capacity to function productively as an adult;
and so forth - and leave to another day a fuller defense and elabora-
tion of the child's experience perspective.
B. The Case for Considering the Interests of Parents
The struggle in the preceding section to define a perspective
through which to view children's interests reflects the belief that chil-
dren's interests are of paramount importance in resolving issues of cus-
tody. As stated above, all states expect courts to make the children's
interests the sole focus of their attention. The parents' interests are to
be ignored. 63 Yet adult interests need not be ignored as a matter of
first principle and probably should not be as a matter of sensible policy
so long as they can be kept subordinate to the interests of children.
Today, states take into account the interests of parents in framing
standards for custody disputes in settings other than divorce. When,
for example, a biological parent contests custody with a third party
such as a grandparent or a foster parent, most states retain a presump-
tion in favor of the biological parent.64 Why they retain such a pre-
sumption is rarely made clear. Legislators may believe in a mysterious
bond between children and their biological parents that will serve the
child's interests. At bottom, however, the presumption probably rests
on an unexpressed but wholly defensible desire to protect the interests
of adult citizens in bearing and raising their own children.65 Even in
divorce cases, many states recognize the needs of the noncustodial par-
ent in fixing standards for visitation;66 and courts have similarly begun
63. Courts rarely have occasion to reject explicitly any concern about parents. But see, eg.,
In re Marriage of Tweeten, 172 Mont. 404,407, 563 P.2d 1141, 1143 (1977) ("[lIt is important to
remember the best interest of the parent, or detriment to the parent, is not the test."), overruled
by Markegard v. Markegard, 616 P.2d 323 (Mont. 1980) (overruled only insofar as Tweeten
supported the "tender years presumption").
64. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 17.5
(1968); Note, Psychological Parents vs. Biological Parents The Courts' Response to New Direc-
tions in Child Custody Dispute Resolutions, 17 J. FAM. L. 545 (1977).
65. See Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Per-
spective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 28 (1980) ("[P]arents also have rights of their own that, insofar as
they do not impinge on the rights of children, deserve recognition. Child-rearing is one of the
ways in which many people fulfill and express their deepest values about how life is to be lived.").
66. For example, § 407(a) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, adopted in nine states
as of 1984, frames the standard for visitation with a noncustodial parent not in terms of the
"child's best interests," but rather as something to which the noncustodial parent is "entitled,"
unless "visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional
health." UMDA, supra note 14, at § 407(a). For an argument that post-divorce visitation is the
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to consider the needs of custodial parents when reviewing a custodial
parent's request to move with the child to another state.67
In a custody proceeding during divorce, both parents face a loss of
daily contact with their child that may be equal as measured in hours.
Yet it does not follow that their interests are identical and cancel each
other out. As an initial matter, the interests of each parent might be
combined in support of rules favoring joint custody under certain cir-
cumstances.68 Moreover, even when single custody is at issue, the par-
ents' interests may be of differing strength.
Consider your own reaction to a reasonably common case. A fa-
ther who has been an involved but secondary caretaker plans to re-
marry immediately after the divorce becomes final. During a dispute
over custody, he argues that he can provide the child, now two years
old, with a two-parent home that includes a warm stepmother, who
will serve as a full-time caretaker. On the other hand, he continues,
the mother, who had been a full-time caretaker, has recently begun
working at a job that pays much less than his job and relies on a day-
care center to take care of their youngster. If we use the expected
experience of the child as the test of the child's best interests, the fa-
ther's arguments have considerable force: life might well be more
pleasurable for the child in the father's home. (According to one ob-
server, many judges accept such claims today in awarding custody to
fathers.69) Yet many of us, if in the role of judge, would be likely to be
affected by our sympathy for the devoted mother: We may believe
that it is not fair to penalize her for her disadvantaged economic posi-
tion70 and sense a special loss for her if denied the intimate daily inter-
action with her child.
Part of this Article argues that, if certain facts can be shown, a
noncustodial parent's constitutional right, see Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation: Untying the
Triangular Knot, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 121, 124-39.
67. See Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Relocation Controversies, 35 STAN. L. REV.
949 (1983) (reporting conflicting positions among courts but taking a strong stand for letting the
custodial parent decide when to move); see also D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200,
206, 365 A.2d 27, 30 (Ch. Div.) (considering, on deciding whether or not to allow a custodial
parent to move, "the prospective advantages of the move in terms of its likely capacity for im-
proving the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the child"), affd. mem., 144
N.J. Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976).
68. See Developments, supra note 40, at 1329 (arguing that a presumption for joint custody is
constitutionally required to protect the interests of each parent in continuing contact with the
child).
69. Polikof, Gender and Child-Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES,
POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 183, 190 (I. Diamond ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Polikoff,
Exploding the Myths]; Polikoff, supra note 10.
70. See text at notes 231-43 infra (discussing the relevance of men's more favorable economic
position in the labor force).
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preference for primary caretakers would be justified to meet the needs
of preschool children. 71 The converse argument made here is that a
preference for primary caretakers might also be wise for the sake of
the primary caretaker.72 Two different sorts of principled arguments
can be made for such a preference. The first is that primary caretakers
deserve custody as a form of compensation for their years of providing
care.73 It is an argument with strong initial appeal 74 - taking care of
children requires great effort, persistence, and the subordination of
personal needs - but it is, in the end, unpersuasive. As a broad moral
principle, we should be reluctant to use children as "rewards" under
any circumstances.
75
Furthermore, it is not at all clear, even in the context of a tradi-
tional marriage, that the primary caretaker should be considered to
have "earned" the child any more than the other parent. The other
parent, usually today the father, has typically supported the family by
working in the labor force. His earnings paid for the food the mother
cooked and the clothes she washed. If the primary caretaker "de-
serves" the child because of her contributions as childraiser, then the
other parent "deserves" to keep all stock and other assets held in his
name, because they were acquired from his labors.76 Neither is a result
71. See Section III infra.
72. So far as I can find, no state has adopted the position argued for here. There are a couple
of interesting, unusual appellate decisions in California that involved custody disputes in which
one of the parents was physically disabled and in which the court, in part because of state stat-
utes to protect the handicapped, openly took into account the handicapped parent's interest in
having an opportunity to raise a child. In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 740-41, 598
P.2d 36, 44-45, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391-92 (1979); In re Marriage of Levin, 102 Cal. App. 3d 981,
986-88, 162 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760-61 (1980).
73. See Polikoff, Exploding the Myths; supra note 69, at 196 (primary-caretaker mother de-
serves custody "because she has earned it by providing years of primary child care"); Uviller,
supra note 10, at 129-30 (a preference for primary caretakers to compensate for economic dis-
crimination). Uviller and Polikoff are concerned about judges who discriminate against mothers
by assigning what the authors regard as unfair weight to men's economic advantages. See Poli-
koff, Exploding the Myths, supra note 69, at 189-90; Uviller, supra note 10, at 122-23.
74. The law of contribution, for example, forms a significant part of the law of restitution.
See I G. PALMER, THE LAW op REST1TtrION § 1.5(d)(1978).
75. Very similar reasoning has been used by courts to justify granting custody to a parent as
a trophy for virtue when the other parent has committed a marital sin such as adultery. See, for
example, the British case of Re L., [1962] 3 All E.R. 1, 4 (C.A.), in which the mother had
committed adultery. Lord Denning awarded custody to the father, saying, "It is a matter of
simple justice between them that [the father] should have care and control. Whilst the welfare of
the children is the first and paramount consideration, the claims of justice cannot be
overlooked."
76. Of course, a primary-caretaking mother may not be in a position to bear more children,
while the secondary caretaker is often in a position to start over in developing assets. Despite
this, the secondary-caretaking father may still claim that his efforts as wage-earner directly bene-
fited the child and that he "deserves" the child as much as the mother.
There is a related claim that applies only to primary-caretaking mothers. It is that women
experience both public and private pressures, including pressures from their own husbands, to
devote much of their lives to the raising of children and that it is unfair to place them in this role,
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that should be found very satisfying as a way of thinking about the
breakup of the traditional "partnership" marriage.
77
A second argument for a preference for primary caretakers seems
more persuasive. It starts with the assumption that what each parent
has done is of equal "value" for the child and predicates a rule favor-
ing primary caretakers on the notion that primary caretakers, regard-
less of gender,78 will in general be substantially more distressed by the
loss of custody than will the other parent. Such a basis may seem
patronizing and soft-headed - we prefer primary caretakers not be-
cause they deserve more but because we do not want to hurt them -
but it is in fact more justifiable. A rule would rest not on a dubious
value judgment about contribution but rather on a desire to inflict the
least total emotional harm on all the members of a family, in a context
in which some emotional harm is inevitable under any resolution.
Before any special rule based on the needs of parents can be recom-
mended, however, two issues need to be faced. First, the factual prem-
ises supporting such a rule need to be tested: Will primary caretakers
in fact be more anguished by the loss of custody than secondary care-
takers? An attempt to answer this question is one of the aims of the
research review that follows.
The other issue is whether or not there are countervailing dangers
in adopting rules for custody that take into account the needs of par-
ents, even if a principled case can be made for doing so. There is a
danger that, once courts or legislatures are unleashed to consider adult
needs even secondarily, adult needs will eventually become primary.
The fear is not idle. Today, adult groups frequently invoke the needs
of children in behalf of new rules bearing on children, when the groups
are in fact largely motivated by their own interests. Consider, for ex-
ample, efforts by senior citizens' groups in support of laws that author-
ize courts to order grandparent visitation79 or efforts by some men's
groups in support of laws that authorize courts to impose joint cus-
curtailing other opportunities, and then to take the children away from them upon divorce. Men
can make a comparable argument about the pressures on them to be money makers.
77. The newly drafted Uniform Marital Property Act proposes that all states adopt laws very
close to community property laws, providing that all assets acquired during the marriage be
owned in equal shares by the parties. See UNU'. MARITAL PROPERTY AcT § 4 (draft 1983).
78. Polikoff and Uviller both have argued for a preference based on parents' interests. Uvil-
ler argues for a maternal preference and Polikoff argues for a primary-caretaker preference re-
gardless of gender. See notes 69, 73 supra.
79. After a flood of legislation in the 1960's and 1970's, at least 42 states now permit courts
to order grandparent visitation in certain circumstances. See Freed & Foster, Family Law in the
Fifty State" An Overview, 16 FAM. L.Q. 289, 353-54 (1983).
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tody.80 While legitimating rules for custody that openly take into ac-
count adult needs may have the valuable effect of creating more honest
and open legislative debate on the separate interests of adults and chil-
dren, it also runs the risk, in a world ruled by adults, that legislatures
will forget that children, not adults, are the most vulnerable partici-
pants in the divorce process. Once forgotten, the danger is the revival
of rules permitting courts to use custody orders to reward the public
virtue of one of the parents (such as one parent's marital fidelity).
81
There is also the danger that states will openly assert some of their
own crasser interests in the placement decision. It would, for example,
be unfortunate if the development of a presumption for primary care-
takers to benefit primary caretakers were seen as freeing the state to
develop a presumption against the placement of a child with a parent
already receiving or likely to receive public assistance simply to pro-
tect the interest of the state in saving money.
I regard these risks as serious. Adults cannot be trusted to keep
their own needs in check.82 We live in a particularly self-indulgent
era. At the same time, I continue to believe that, if primary caretakers
do in fact typically suffer more than secondary caretakers upon loss of
custody, their claims are compelling enough to justify the risks. We
must hope that legislators will decide that giving weight to the emo-
tional loss of primary caretakers is more important than giving weight
to the financial loss to the taxpayers that occasionally comes from a
decision placing children with a parent receiving welfare.
III. INFORMATION BEARING ON RULES FOR SOLE CUSTODY
A. What We Know About the Needs of Children
A predisposition toward placing children after divorce with their
mothers, with primary caretakers, or with the parent of the same sex
may be justified by a belief that children in such settings will receive
more nurturing, feel more loved or secure, or, in the long term, be
more competent and effective as adults. In this section, I appraise
whether or not existing research provides any substantial support for
such beliefs. I begin with research that directly studies children of
80. See Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation
and its Implication for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 538, 570-71 (1982).
81. See note 75 supra.
82. As Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have argued, "Adults have deeply ingrained irrational
reservations about the primacy of children's needs." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNrr,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 106 (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS]. I, like they, would accord children's needs the highest priority in deci-
sions about custody in divorce.
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divorce in various settings and move to the more indirect evidence
provided by research on the responsiveness of men and women in gen-
eral to children and on the relation of children to each parent in intact
families.
83
1. Research on the Children of Divorce
In 1969, Phoebe Ellsworth and Robert Levy, in the course of the
development of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, reviewed at
length the available research on divorced families and on children liv-
ing in other than two-parent settings to "determine what was empiri-
cally known about the effects of various custodial awards and
arrangements on the child's development."'8 4 They were disappointed.
They did not find studies comparing children in different custodial set-
tings after divorce. In fact, they could not find any studies of children
with fathers after divorce or any studies of children living after divorce
with mothers who had not been primary caretakers before divorce.
What they did find were studies of children who lived in institu-
tions or other settings without either parent and studies of children
living with primary-caretaker mothers with fathers absent. The stud-
ies of children raised in institutions reported deeply troubled children,
but such studies had only the most oblique relevance to questions of
divorce custody. The studies of children with their mothers alone
found these children also, on average, more troubled and more troub-
ling than children in two parent homes. Children, and especially boys,
raised alone with mothers were reported to be more likely than chil-
dren raised in two-parent families to have problems of cognitive devel-
opment, sex role identification, and delinquency.8 5 But, as Ellsworth
and Levy recognized, the question posed at divorce is not whether the
children would be better off in a two-parent home but rather which of
two single-parent homes would be better. Nothing in this early re-
83. Throughout this section, I am deeply indebted to Michael Lamb and Ross Thompson for
directing me to relevant research. The discussions among the three of us led Thompson to write
his own review of the same literature bearing on children's interests. It is more detailed in many
respects than the review here and should be read by anyone with a serious interest in the subject.
See Thompson, The Father's Case in Child Custody Disputes: The Contributions of Psychological
Research, in FATHERHOOD AND FAMILY POLICY 53 (M. Lamb & A. Sagi eds. 1983). 1 am also
indebted to Jeffrey Pickar, graduate student in the Department of Psychology, University of
Michigan, for his review of my references and for his many helpful comments on an earlier draft.
84. Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely
on Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies, 4 LAW & Socy. REv. 167, 169 (1969).
85. There are many reviews of the "father-absent" literature. Among the most recent is
Blechman, Are Children with One Parent at Psychological Risk? A Methodological Review, 44 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 179 (1982). Among the best regarded reviews are M. RUTTER, THE QUAL-
ITY OF MOTHERING: MATERNAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED (1974); Rutter, MaternalDepriva.
tion, 1972-1978: New Findings, New Concepts, New Approaches, 50 CHILD DEV. 283 (1979).
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search could answer whether these children living with their mothers
would have been any better off living with their fathers alone. More-
over, both before and after Ellsworth and Levy's review, researchers
have questioned the soundness of the conclusion that the problems of
children raised by one parent alone are attributable to the absence of
the other parent, pointing to many methodological failings in the re-
search.86 In the end, Ellsworth and Levy concluded that "social scien-
tists have not yet provided very much useful information even about
the central issue for most custody decisionmaking - how children are
likely to fare under alternative custodial arrangements. 87 At best,
the research suggested the questions to ask when research was later
conducted on children in other settings.
In the fifteen years since Ellsworth and Levy wrote, the quantity of
research on divorced families and children of divorce has multiplied
several-fold.88 Although we are still far from learning all that we need
to know, there is, today, a richer, more textured body of literature
addressing the experience of children of divorce living with their
mothers and a separate, far weaker but slowly growing body of re-
search addressing the experience of children living with their fathers.
The recent research moves us somewhat closer to answers to the ques-
tions posed in this Article, but also demonstrates again the need for
more research in the future and the need, for present recommenda-
tions regarding policies, to rely as much or more on indirect evidence
from research on children and their parents in intact families.
Of the recent research on children living after divorce with their
mothers, most continues to be based on observations, questionnaires,
or testing conducted at one point in time and most focuses on one or
only a few dimensions of the experience of the mother and children.
The tone of the research, however, has changed since the review by
Levy and Ellsworth fifteen years ago. As social attitudes toward di-
vorce have altered, researchers have concentrated less on searching for
86. For our purposes, two of the most important criticisms of this research are, first, that
much of it lumps together children of divorce both with children whose parents never lived
together and with children whose father died without looking for differences among them and,
second, that much of it fails to control for the separate effects of income and class. See reviews
by Blechman and Rutter, supra note 85.
87. Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 84, at 215.
88. For useful recent reviews and bibliographies, see Lamb, The Effects of Divorce on Chil-
dren's Personal Development, 1 J. DIVORCE 163 (1977); Hetherington, Divorce: A Child's Per-
spective, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 851 (1979); Levitin, Children of Divorce: An Introduction, J.
Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1979, at 1; Longfellow, Divorce in Context: Its Impact on Children, in DI-
VORCE AND SEPARATION: CONTEXT, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 287 (G. Levinger & 0.
Moles eds. 1979); Magrab, For the Sake of the Children: A Review of the Psychological Effects of
Divorce, 1 J. DIVORCE 233 (1978). The founding in 1977 of the Journal of Divorce, solely de-
voted to research on divorce, attests to the growth of scholarly interest in the subject.
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pathology. Some have even identified positive aspects of divorce for
children, such as an especially close relation with one parent and
closer relationships with siblings,8 9 and more ambiguous aspects, such
as "growing up a little faster." 90
Two recent studies have been particularly celebrated because the
authors followed families over a period of years and sought to develop
a comprehensive understanding of the lives of the children and the
parents. The first, by Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox, and Roger
Cox, followed seventy-two nursery-school-age children in forty-eight
families over a two-year period after divorce. 91 The second, by Judith
Wallerstein and Joan Kelly, followed 131 children of all ages from
sixty families over a five-year period after separation.92 (For simplic-
ity, I will refer to the studies as "Hetherington" or "Wallerstein.")
Each has done further follow-ups of the same families that await pub-
lication. For our purposes, these studies are in one sense simply a
more probing version of the old father-absence research, subject to the
same limitation of providing no direct information on the probable
consequences of placements with fathers or secondary caretakers.
Moreover, neither set of researchers drew on a random sample of di-
vorced families and the samples of both were of somewhat higher so-
cial status on average than the divorcing population in general.
Wallerstein's group almost certainly included a disproportionate
number of troubled families, because she obtained her sample by solic-
iting volunteers for short-term counseling.93
Nonetheless, because the two studies drew on extensive interviews
with all family members and because they offered a more detailed view
of the lives of divorcing families than had been previously available,
89. Schlesinger, Children's Viewpoints of Living in a One-Parent Family, 5 J. DIVORCE 1
(1982).
90. Weiss, Growing Up a Little Faster: The Experience of Growing Up in a Single-Parent
Household, J. Soc. ISSUES, Fall 1979, at 97.
91. The Hetherington, Cox, and Cox research has not yet appeared in book form. Parts have
appeared in many places. See, eg., Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Effects of Divorce on Parents and
Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233 (M.
Lamb ed. 1982); Hetherington, Cox & Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce, in MOTHER/CHILD, FA-
THER/CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 149 (J. Stevens & M. Mathews eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as The
Aftermath of Divorce]; Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Stress and Coping in Divorce: A Focus on
Women, in PSYCHOLOGY AND WOMEN: IN TRANSITION 95 (. Gullahorn ed. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Stress and Coping]; Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Play and Social Interaction in Children
Following Divorce, J. Soc. IssuES, Fall 1979, at 26; Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Divorced Fathers,
25 FAM. COORDINATOR 417 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Divorced Fathers].
92. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How CHILDREN AND PAR-
ENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980)
93. A discussion of the methodological problems in J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra
note 92, can be found in Bruch, Parenting at and After Divorce: A Search for New Models (Book
Review), 79 MICH. L. REV. 708 (1981).
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their findings have been widely discussed and their broad outlines
widely accepted.94 Part of their acceptance probably flows from the
fact that their findings are generally consistent with one another,
although Wallerstein's are somewhat bleaker than Hetherington's.
What the authors report is that for most children, custodial
mothers, and noncustodial fathers, the period immediately after sepa-
ration is a period of stress and anxiety. Each person is affected by the
absence of a person (or persons) who had been central to their lives.
Each person is forced to adjust to a substantially altered living situa-
tion at a time when each is least well-armed psychologically to cope
with it. Custodial mothers must cope with all the old tasks of child-
care while shaping a new role as the sole decisionmaker, disciplina-
rian, and principal or sole breadwinner. Children's basic physical
needs are met during this period, but nearly all children experience
severe emotional distress and grieve for the absent father, particularly
if he does not visit regularly. Many feel unhappy and disoriented for
long periods after the divorce for reasons that appear to relate to the
breakup of the family.95 According to Hetherington, young children
cry more, whine more, and throw more temper tantrums than children
in two-parent families. Wallerstein reports that children of all ages
have problems, although the reactions and problems vary depending
upon the age of the child at the time of the breakup.
96
During the year or so after separation, many mothers report the
temporary loss of traits they most prized as personal qualities in them-
selves, traits that many writers associate with primary-caretaking
mothers and that might incline us toward preferring placement with
them. Thus, mothers report feeling less able to reach out to their chil-
dren, less able to be sympathetic and compassionate or to control their
own tempers, and more likely to use negative sanctions.97 In a large
proportion of families, the worst point in mother-child relations is not
reached until a full year after divorce when mothers describe their re-
94. Many recent writers have placed heavy reliance on their research. See, eg., L. FRANCKE,
GROWING UP DIVORCED (1983); Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 25; Cochran & Vitz,
Child Protective Divorce Laws: A Response to the Effects of Parental Separation on Children, 17
FAM. L.Q. 327, 328-35, 338-43 (1983); Thompson, supra note 83; COMMrrEE ON THE FAMILY,
supra note 14.
95. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 13; see also Hetherington, supra note 88,
at 877-78 (reviewing the writings of others).
96. Wallerstein and Kelly found different patterns of reactions among children aged 3-5, 6-8,
9-12, and 13-18. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 55-95.
97. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 108-20; Stress and Coping, supra note
91; The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 91. The parents' difficulties during this period have an
important bearing on the capacity of courts to assess the quality of a child's relations to her
parents in the course of trying to make a decision about custody. See text at notes 20-24 supra.
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lationships with their children as "declared war," "the old Chinese
water torture," and "like being bitten to death by ducks."98 Mothers
report particular difficulties in their relationships with their sons, and
more sons than daughters seemed troubled. 99 Mothers also report less
satisfaction with their own performance of many of the day-to-day
household tasks. 100 They also report experiencing severe financial dis-
tress that exacerbated the other problems they faced. 101 According to
Wallerstein and Kelly, as long as three to five years after divorce, a
significant minority of the mothers still report major difficulties in
their relationships with their children that they and the authors attri-
bute at least in part to their divorce.,
0 2
During the early part of this period, the noncustodial fathers re-
port no greater satisfaction with their lives. Feeling rootless, they find
painful the visitation relationship and many, though by no means all,
find it difficult to maintain or build a satisfying relationship with their
children.'
0 3
Both studies report that within a few years after the divorce, most
families appear to have restabilized and the children's problematic be-
havior had subsided from its peak at approximately one year after the
divorce.'04 Nevertheless, both boys and girls are reported to be func-
tioning somewhat less well than their peers from intact homes and
boys continue to be comparatively more unhappy and pose more
problems of discipline. 0 5
98. See Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Divorced Fathers, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 417, 424-25
(1976) (comparing mothers and fathers); see also R. WEISS, MARITAL SEPARATION 176-80
(1975) (discussing the problems of the single-parent mother).
99. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 165-67.
100. Id. at 36.
101. Id. at 22-24, 150-51; cf. Wallerstein & Huntington, Bread and Roses: Nonfinancial Is-
sues Related to Fathers' Economic Support of Their Children Following Divorce, in THE PAREN-
TAL CHILD-SUPPORT OBLIGATION 135 (J. Cassetty ed. 1983) (examining the convergence of
economic and psychological factors in the financial support provided by the father).
102. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 225.
103. Id. at 121-31; see Wallerstein & Kelly, Effects of Divorce on the Visiting Father-Child
Relationship, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1534 (1980); see also Jacobs, Treatment of Divorcing Fa-
thers: Social and Psychotherapeutic Considerations, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1294 (1983). An-
other study has found that most children of divorce see their father at least once a month in the
first two years after their parents' separation but that by five years after separation, 64% have not
seen their father in over a year. See Furstenberg, Nord, Peterson & Zill, The Life Course of
Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 656, 665 (table
7) [hereinafter cited as Life Course].
104. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 161-78, 304-05.
105. Id. at 165-67. Elsewhere, Hetherington has suggested that the effects on girls may be as
substantial but merely delayed until adolescence. See Hetherington, Effects of Father Absence on
Personality Development in Adolescent Daughters, 7 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 313 (1972).
Cochran and Vitz, in a recent article, consider the findings of Wallerstein and Hetherington
sufficiently alarming that they recommend that states discourage divorce by requiring, for
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One limit of the Wallerstein and Hetherington works, even as stud-
ies of children in maternal custody, is that, though longitudinal and
thorough, they have not yet followed the children up to adulthood.
No study has done so. Oddly, it is also the case that there are few
retrospective studies of adults whose parents were divorced when they
were young to learn whether they report suffering or appear to suffer
more problems than persons whose parents remained married
throughout their childhood. One study, analyzing data from two
broad national surveys of the self-reported life satisfaction of Ameri-
cans, found very few differences between persons whose parents had
and had not divorced, and no differences in reported current life satis-
faction, but did find that more children of divorce looked back on
childhood as the least happy time of their lives.106 Although the study
did not analyze separately children raised by their fathers, the vast
majority of the respondents to the study whose parents had been di-
vorced had almost certainly lived with their mothers.107
Although this study, like those of Wallerstein and Hetherington,
has troubling findings, it cannot inform us directly about the expected
life experience of children raised by their fathers (or previous second-
ary caretakers). The research of Wallerstein and Hetherington is not,
however, without value for our purposes. It sets the stage well for rich
comparisons with the experience of children living in other settings, as
research on those other settings is conducted.
About a dozen smaller-scale studies reporting on families headed
by fathers have now in fact been published.10 8 Nearly all were written
couples with minor children, a one-year waiting period after separation before a divorce can
become final. See Cochran & Vitz, supra note 94, at 344-49.
106. Kulka & Weingarten, The Long-Term Effects of Parental Divorce in Childhood on Adult
Adjustment, J. Soc. IssuEs, Fall 1979, at 50.
107. Only about 10% of children living with a divorced parent live with their father. Glick,
Children of Divorced Parents in Demographic Perspective, J. Soc. ISSuES, Fall 1979, at 170, 177.
108. See D. LUEPNrrz, CHILD CUSTODY: A STUDY OF FAMILIES AFTER DIVORCE (1982);
Ambert, Differences in Children's Behaviors Toward Custodial Mothers and Custodial Fathers, J.
MARRIAGE & FAM., Feb. 1972, at 73; Bartz & Witcher, When Father Gets Custody, CHILDREN
TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 2; Chang & Deinard, Single-Father Caretaker Demographic Char-
acteristics and Adjustment Processes, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 236 (1982); Defrain &
Eirick, Coping as Divorced Single Parentr A Comparative Study of Fathers and Mothers, 30 FAM.
REL. 265 (1981); Fulton, Parental Reports of Children's Post-Divorce Adjustment, J. Soc. ISSUES,
Fall 1979, at 126; Gasser & Taylor, Role Adjustment of Single Parent Fathers with Dependent
Children, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 397 (1976); Hipgrave, Child Rearing by Lone Fathers, in
CHANGING PATTERNS OF CHILD BEARING AND CHILD REARING 149 (R. Cheaster, P. Diggony
& M. Sutherland eds. 1982); Keshet & Rosenthal, Single Parent Fathers: A New Study, CHIL-
DREN TODAY, May 1978, at 13; Mendes, Single Fatherhood, 21 Soc. WORK 308 (1976); Santrock
& Warshak, Father Custody and Social Development in Boys and Girls, J. Soc. ISSuES, Fall 1979,
at 112; Orthner, Brown & Ferguson, Single-Parent Fatherhood: An Emerging Family Life Style,
25 FAM. COORDINATOR 429 (1976); Smith & Smith, Childrearing and Single-Parent Fathers, 30
FAM. REL 411 (1981). The one study reporting unhappy fathers and children is Canadian.
Schlesinger & Todres, Motherless Families An Increasing Societal Pattern, CHILD WELFARE,
December 1984]
Michigan Law Review
within the last decade and in all the mothers of the children studied
had been the primary caretakers of the children before the father as-
sumed custody. These studies help us begin to understand both the
experiences of children raised by men and the experiences of children
whose care is taken over by secondary caretakers.
Sad to say, although they seem directly responsive to the questions
posed in this Article, the studies of children with fathers cannot pro-
vide the answers we need. One inherent limit is that because father-
custody is still relatively unusual in our society, even a study of a ran-
dom sample of fathers with custody today might tell us only a limited
amount about what children's experiences are likely to be if far more
fathers became custodians.10 9 In fact, the studies so far conducted are
not based on random samples. They nearly all rely on samples of vol-
unteers obtained through divorce support groups or advertisements.
Most mix children whose parents divorced with children whose
mothers have died. 110
In addition, few of the children were infants and none of the stud-
ies reports at any length on fathers caring for infants. Most involve
interviews conducted several years after the father had assumed cus-
tody and thus after the point at which Wallerstein and Hetherington
report children living with mothers suffering the greatest difficulties.
Most describe only how fathers viewed their own situations or at most
how the fathers believed their children were faring; only a few include
direct observations and interviews with the children comparable to
those conducted by Hetherington and by Wallerstein. 111 One would
be inclined not to report their findings at all except that they share a
remarkable surface similarity.
The surface similarity is the positive tone of their findings. They
report an expectable difficult time of transition: like mothers, fathers
with custody report loneliness, frustration, and a sense of inade-
Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 533. Though bleak in tone, the experience of these Canadian fathers seemed
nonetheless closely comparable to those reported for single-parent mothers in Wallerstein and
Kelly. Two British studies of fathers with custody of children mix children of divorce with other
children, V. GEORGE & P. WILDING, MOTHERLESS FAMILIES (1972); Ferri, Characteristics of
Motherless Families, 3 BRTrr. J. Soc. WORK 91 (1973); see also O'Brien, Lone Fathers: Transition
from Married to Separated State, J. COMp. FAM. STUD., Winter 1980, at 115.
109. Fathers who seek custody today stress that they viewed themselves as the better parent
than the mother and tend to have slightly higher levels of education and income than the average
noncustodial father. Chang & Deinard, supra note 108, at 238.
110. Even those with samples limited to divorced families do not separately identify children
who are in the custody of fathers after a custody dispute with the mother. For our purposes at
least, it would be valuable to know whether or not the experiences of such children are different
from those of children who were placed in the custody of their father without dispute.
111. The most notable exception is Santrock & Warshak, supra note 108.
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quacy. 112 They faced the difficult task of mastering new skills of
caregiving while trying to handle their former jobs. Because the new
tasks the father was fumbling to learn involved more intimate contact
with the children than the new tasks of the mother and because the
children were facing adjustment to a new primary caretaker, one
might expect the immediate post-separation period to be even more
stressful than that depicted for mothers by Hetherington or Waller-
stein. Unfortunately, with two exceptions, 113 none of the studies com-
pared the situations of custodial fathers and mothers, and few report
at all on the period of adjustment as experienced by the child.
In any event, all the studies report that fathers appear to attain
rapidly the housetending and childtending skills they previously
lacked. More basically, not one of the studies reports father-headed
families in chronic disarray, with fathers unable to cope and children
either physically or emotionally neglected. Interviewers found the
men knowledgeable about their children and highly motivated to meet
their needs. They report that the fathers believed that their children
were generally in good emotional condition, though some fathers wor-
ried that they lacked a "mother's touch." 114
The few studies in which the researchers directly observed the chil-
dren report complementary findings regarding the children's condi-
tions. A study of thirty-three preschool children being raised by
fathers, which the author himself treats as merely "exploratory,"
found no abnormal behavioral problems and reports that the children
were generally well-adjusted and capable of a high degree of indepen-
dent functioning for their age.1 15 Another small study of boys aged
nine to fourteen, some raised by fathers, some by mothers, found no
significant differences between the groups.116 One very recent study
does report that children of divorcing parents seem to be better off
with the parent of the same sex, but found no evidence whatever of
overall inadequacies of custodial fathers who had previously been sec-
112. See, ag., Chang & Deinard, supra note 108, at 239-40; Hipgrave, supra note 108, at 155-
61; Schlesinger & Todres, supra note 108, at 356-57.
113. See D. LUEPNrz, supra note 108, at 99-110 (an interview study reporting few differ-
ences; mothers too had to learn new domestic skills such as appliance repair and minor plumb-
ing); Santrock & Warshak, studies listed in note 117 infra (studies focus on the link between
gender of parent and gender of child, not on the differing experiences of mothers and fathers per
se).
114. See, eg., Hipgrave, supra note 108, at 159 (noting that single fathers particularly fear
that they are depriving their children emotionally because they cannot supply "motherly love").
115. T. Hipgrave, When the Mother is Gone: Proffle Studies of Sixteen Lone Fathers with
Pre-School Children (1978) (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Child Development Research Unit, Not-
tingham University), cited in Hipgrave, supra note 108, at 149, 165.
116. Lowenstein & Koopman, A Comparison of the Self-Esteem Between Boys Living with
Single-Parent Mothers and Single-Parent Fathers, 2 J. DiVORCE 195 (1978).
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ondary caretakers in comparison with custodial mothers who had been
primary caretakers all along.1 17
That study, the results of which are still being analyzed, merits
discussion at somewhat greater length because it is nearly unique in
including samples of father-headed, mother-headed, and two-parent
families and because its findings bear so directly on the questions
posed in this Article. The authors, John Santrock and Richard War-
shak of the University of Texas at Dallas, located samples of roughly
twenty children each in father custody, mother custody, and intact
two-parent custody and relied' upon psychological tests, laboratory ob-
servations of the custodial parent with their children, and structured
interviews with the children. At the time of the study, all the children
were between six and eleven, and the parents in the divorced families
had been separated an average of slightly over three years. The au-
thors' principal purpose was to test whether or not the gender of the
parent with whom a child lived seemed to make a difference in the
child's condition or development after divorce. The authors' early
findings are expressed in forceful terms: they found that, in general,
the children within their sample who lived with parents of the same
sex were less anxious, less demanding, and less angry; were warmer
and more honest; and displayed higher levels of maturity, self-esteem,
and social conformity than the children living with parents of the op-
posite sex. Although some of their measures may not be relevant for
our purposes,118 the sum of their findings suggests that, within their
sample, children with the same-sex parent felt on the whole happier
and more secure, a relevant consideration in deciding custody under
almost any test.
The Santrock and Warshak findings are provocative, especially be-
cause they suggest an easily applied rule of decision for judges, at least
in cases in which the children involved are in the range of ages that the
authors studied and all the children in the family are of the same sex.
As the authors acknowledge in part, however, there are many reasons
117. See Santrock & Warshak, supra note 108; Santrock, Warshak & Elliott, Social Develop-
ment and Parent-Child Interaction in Father Custody and Stepmother Families, in NONTRADI-
TIONAL FAMILIES PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 289 (M. Lamb ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Social Development and Parent-Child Interaction]; Warshak & Santrock,
Children of Divorce" Impact of Custody Disposition on Social Development, in LIFE-SPAN DEVEL-
OPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: NONNORMATIVE LIFE EVENTS 241 (E. Callahan & K. McCluskey
eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Children of Divorce].
118. The fact that a child is "demanding" or displays less "social conformity" would not
necessarily be negative qualities as experienced by the child. Thus here is one of the few places
within this Article that a factor might have different weight under different views of the "best-
interests" test. See the discussion of defining children's "best interests" at notes 34-62 supra and
accompanying text.
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to be cautious about their findings, cautious to the point of waiting for
further research before using them in making recommendations for
rules of custody.
Santrock and Warshak's use of matched samples and a diverse
range of tests and observations are exemplary and their findings were
"robust" in the sense that they were consistent across many different
sorts of observations. Unfo rtunately, however, their samples were
very small - only about ten each of mother-custody sons, mother-
custody daughters, father-custody sons, and father-custody daugh-
ters. 119 They are also nonrandom. Because of the rarity of father-
custody families in their area, the authors, much like others who have
studied custodial fathers, located their sample of father-custody fami-
lies through suggestions from their students, public agencies, and a
support group for single parents called Parents Without .Partners,1 20 a
form of sampling likely to produce a disproportionate number of fami-
lies in which the fathers who volunteered to cooperate believed their
children were faring reasonably well. Moreover, in few of these fa-
ther-custody cases had there been a fight over custody. It is thus pos-
sible that the comparative difficulties for many girls living with their
fathers, for all of whom their mothers had been the primary caretaker
before separation, derived not so much from their situation after di-
vorce as it did from some aspect of the mother-daughter relationship
before separation1 21 It hardly follows, and the authors do not claim,
that these particular girls would have been happier or more secure if
placed in the custody of their mothers. It is also possible that the
parents themselves were in some way affected in their voluntary deci-
sions about placement by the gender of the children and that whatever
factors guided their decision continued to affect the children's
experiences.
These criticisms do not prove that Santrock and Warshak's con-
clusions are wrong. They simply suggest that their proposition,
though tantalizing, and though consistent with some evidence from
studies of intact families reviewed below, remains unproven one way
or the other. 12
2
119. Social Development and Parent-Child Interaction, supra note 117, at 294.
120. Id. at 291.
121. Perhaps in some cases the daugher had lived until the parents' separation with a same-
sex primary caretaker who was more ambivalent than usual about devoting her life to children.
122. The one other study I can find that specifically compares boys in mother-custody with
boys in father-custody found no significant differences in terms of boys' self-esteem. See Lowen-
stein & Koopman, supra note 116. Santrock and Warshak themselves recommend against the
adoption of any rule that establishes placement by sex-matching, preferring individualized deci-
sions that take into account other factors such as the parents' childrearing methods. See Social
Development and Parent-Child Interaction, supra note 117, at 302-03.
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We have now reviewed the research on children in various settings
after divorce that has been conducted in the fifteen years since Ells-
worth and Levy's review of the literature. They found the writing
largely barren of reliable guidance for legislatures in framing rules for
custody disputes between parents. In the years since, the ideal study
of custody arrangements still has not been done, but it cannot be done:
to their credit, Americans would never tolerate randomly assigning
children at divorce to fathers, mothers, secondary caretakers, or joint
custody, simply for the sake of advancing knowledge. On the other
hand, it would be feasible (though very expensive) to follow a very
large random sample of families from the point of the parents filing for
divorce in the expectation that such a sample would produce a large
enough number of father-custody and joint-custody families to com-
pare over a long period of time with mother-custody families. This
study too still waits to be done. 123
As we have seen, however, the past fifteen years have not been
wholly unproductive. Researchers have increased our knowledge of
children in the custody of mothers and offered the first view of chil-
dren in the custody of fathers. For our purposes, however, the recent
research provides little more basis for rules than did the research avail-
able to Ellsworth and Levy. There is even a danger that the recent
research could deceive us into inappropriate conclusions. The mea-
sured, sober tones of Hetherington and of Wallerstein in their studies
of children with mothers, when compared with the generally optimis-
tic tone of the studies of children placed with fathers might lead one to
believe that children, and especially boys, are in general likely to be at
least as well off with their secondary-caretaking fathers. This, of
course, would be a wholly unjustified conclusion.
We have pointed out many of the shortcomings of the research on
children with fathers, including the nearly complete absence of infor-
mation about fathers with infants, the group for whom there might be
the greatest concern and about whom there is some evidence that men
are less likely to be responsive than women. Even as to older children,
we must remember that some of the studies of fathers with custody
were conducted by persons who seemed predisposed toward fathers,
123. Two studies are in progress that will meet part of this need. One is being conducted by
Eleanor Maccoby, Robert Mnookin, and Charlene Depner at Stanford University and will follow
children in such settings for two years, interviewing the parents and children, but not employing
psychological testing devises. The other, on a smaller scale, by Pat Walsh and Neil Kalter at the
University of Michigan, will interview children in such settings on only one occasion but will use
a var'iety of psychological testing measures. A primary virtue of both studies is their attempt to
rely on random samples drawn from court records.
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and all of the studies may have stressed the most positive findings be-
cause surprising findings arouse the most interest.
Moreover, even if the father-custody studies could have deter-
mined that the children studied were happier and more secure than
Wallerstein's or Hetherington's children with their mothers, there
would be many possible explanations for the differences other than
that father custody is beneficial. The studies reported in this section
all suffer sampling problems, but they are problems of differing sorts.
Wallerstein, because her sample came from volunteers for counselling,
seems highly likely to have studied a disproportionate number of fami-
lies in which the custodial mothers felt their children were troubled
while the father-custody studies were likely to have included a dispro-
portionate number of cases in which the fathers who volunteered to
participate did so because they thought they were doing well and
could foresee that they were going to be compared to custodial
mothers.
In the end, the only safe conclusion to be drawn from the current
research on children living with fathers who had been secondary care-
takers is that substantial numbers of individual children are reported
to be faring well on a day-to-day basis. 124 That isn't much. The limits
on our knowledge make clear why as much or more reliance needs to
be placed on the growing body of research about men and women in
general in relation to children and about mothers and fathers in rela-
tion to their children in intact families.
2. The Indirect Evidence from Intact Families and Other Sources
a. The relevance of gender. (1) Evidence favoring mothers be-
cause they are women. Are women substantially more likely than men
to possess traits such as patience or warmth or attentiveness to chil-
dren's physical or emotional needs? Under any definition of children's
best interests, such traits would probably be considered important to
children's, especially young children's, well-being.
125
Until the recent past, most states applied formal statutory or judi-
cially created evidentiary presumptions in favor of mothers in custody
disputes involving young children, children of "tender years.
1 26
124. Tony Hipgrave, a professor of social work, after reviewing most of the above research,
found "very little evidence that lone fathers are not perfectly capable of raising well-adjusted
children." Hipgrave, supra note 108, at 149.
125. See Section II A supra.
126. See, eg., Klaff, supra note 6, at 337-42; Roth, supra note 6, at 432-38. Before the mid-
nineteenth century, however, many courts, including British courts, applied an almost ir-
rebutable presumption for the father based on formalistic notions of the husband as head of the
family. Klaff, supra note 2, at 337; Roth, supra note 6, at 425-28.
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Most states have now eliminated any formal preference, 127 but even
within the last decade, some state supreme courts have defended the
continued use of the presumption. 128  Even without statutory or ap-
pellate-court authorization, many trial judges believe that young chil-
dren generally belong with mothers and tend to place children with
them, 129 though the judges' bias has almost certainly displayed itself
primarily in the context of cases in which the mother has also been the
primary caretaker, a separable factor the significance of which I con-
sider in a later section.130
In America today, many people would be as hostile to suggestions
that women are especially suited to raise children as they would be to
suggestions that men are especially suited to run nations. And yet,
although I will ultimately conclude that no preference based on gender
is justifiable, the evidence bearing on such a preference is somewhat
more equivocal than might be guessed.
It is not judges alone who believe that women have special gifts as
caretakers of children. The sociologist Alice Rossi has, for example,
argued that women have a predisposition toward childcare that is, at
least in part, genetically transmitted.1 31 Erik Erikson also claimed that
women have a "biological, psychological, and ethical commitment to
take care of human infancy."1 32 Freud had similar beliefs.133 Con-
versely, speaking of men, Bruno Bettelheim once argued that "[Miale
physiology and that part of his psychology based on it are not geared
127. Freed & Foster, supra note 63, at 351 (table VIIIE).
128. See Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271, 1276-77 (Okla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 863
(1978); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994, 996 (Utah 1975) (upholding a preference for mothers despite a
state equal rights amendment on the ground that the law need not "blindly ignore obvious and
essential biological differences"); see also Grubbs v. Grubbs, 5 Kan. App. 2d 694, 623 P.2d 546
(1981) (upholding maternal presumption despite the repeal of a sex-based preference by the
legislature).
129. See Johnson, Divorce, Alimony, Support and Custody: A Survey of Judges' Attitudes in
One State 3 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 4001 (Nov. 9, 1976) (Illinois); Pearson & Ring, Judicial
Decison-Making in Contest Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 716 (1983) (reporting on Denver,
Colo.); Weitzman & Dixon, supra'note 29, at 506 (California).
130. See notes 183-230 infra and accompanying text.
131. See Rossi, Gender and Parenthood, 49 Am. Soc. REV. 1 (1984); Rossi, A Biosocial Per-
spective on Parenting, 106 DAEDALUS 1 (1977); cf. N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING (1978) (finding a biological explanation unnecessary but developing a thesis that
tendencies toward nurturing capacities have deep and strong social origins not easily altered); D.
DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN
MALAISE (1976) (concluding that biology explains only a small part of gender roles and that
changes are possible and, indeed, necessary).
132. See Erikson, Inner and Outer Space Reflections on Womanhood, 93 DAEDALUS 582,
586 (1964); see also Tucker, John Bowlby on Latchkey Kids, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, issue 11,
1976, at 41 (quoting Bowlby as saying "mothers are specially prepared biologically; if mothers
don't look after babies, then babies are not going to prosper.").
133. See, eg., S. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS Disco-rTrrs 73 (1930).
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to infant care .... [T]he relationship between father and child never
was and cannot now be built principally around child-caring experi-
ences. It is built around a man's function in society: moral, economic,
political."
134
Rossi, Erikson, Freud, and Bettelheim have some obvious evidence
that can be adduced in their support. Only women can bear children
and only women can nurse. Over the whole history of humankind,
childrearing has been a central role for women, a secondary role for
men. 135 In America today,136 as in all other countries of the world, 137
it is women who perform most of the holding, feeding, and consoling
of young children.
Women are also widely perceived as possessing particular charac-
ter and behavioral traits that especially suit them for the care of young
children. One common characterization is that women are "expres-
sive," while men are "instrumental."1 3 Women are thought to be
more open in displaying affection; to have a greater capacity for gen-
tleness, empathy, and compassion; and to possess a greater solicitous-
ness for the needs of others.139 These qualities when lavished on a
young child may convert mere impersonal task-performing into true
"nurturing." Men, by contrast, are perceived as finding satisfaction in
activities that garner power or prestige rather than from activities that
provide private satisfactions. 40 They are viewed as more likely to be
competitive, self-reliant, and aggressive and more concerned about the
family's relationship to the outside world. These qualities, though
probably important over time in the child's development, may be
thought less central to a young child's well-being than those associated
134. Bettelheim, Fathers Shouldn't Try to Be Mothers, 31 PARENTS' MAGAZINE & FAM.
HOME GUIDE 125-26, quoted in J. LEVINE, WHO WILL RAISE THE CHILDREN?: NEW OPTIONS
FOR FATHERS (AND MOTHERS) 22 (1976).
135. See Maccoby, Woman's Sociobiological Heritage: Destiny or Free Choice?, in PSYCHOL-
OGY AND WOMEN: IN TRANSITION 147, 155 (J. Gullahorn ed. 1979).
136. See, eg., K. WALKER & M. WOODS, TIME USE: A MEASURE OF HOUSEHOLD PRO-
DUCTION OF FAMILY GOODS AND SERVICES (1976); Pleck, The Work-Family Role Systems, 24
Soc. PROBS. 417, 419-20 (1977).
137. E. MACCOBY, supra note 58, at 217.
138. Talcot Parsons was among the first to so describe men and women. See Parsons, Family
Structure and the Socialization of the Child, in FAMILY, SOCIALIZATIONS AND INTERACTION
PROCESS 151 (T. Parsons & R. Bales eds. 1955).
139. See Nash & Feldman, Sex Role and Sex-Related Attributions: Constancy and Change
Across the Family Life Cycle, in 1 ADVANCES IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (M. Lamb &
A. Brown eds. 1981); Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson & Rosenkrantz, Sex Role Stereo-
types" A Current Appraisal, J. Soc. IsSUES, Spring 1972, at 59; Herman, Women, Divorce and
Suicide, I J. DIVORCE 107, 110-11 (1977). For a summary of research on children displaying
these characteristics in play with others of their own age, see E. MACCOBY, supra note 58, at 216-
17.
140. See note 139 supra; see also FAsTEAu, THE MALE MACHINE (1974).
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with the mothers. Whatever role biology plays in shaping these general
characteristics, it is plainly the case that from early childhood on,
most boys and girls in the United States are taught that certain traits
are desirable for boys and different traits, including nurturing traits,
are desirable for girls.
141
For our purposes, however, the issue is not quite so global as
whether, in general, women are better suited to be childtenders than
men. Custody disputes arise between two people who are each the
parent of the child at issue and who have each indicated a willingness
to be the child's caretaker. A review of the available research suggests,
although less clearly than those who claim that there are no differ-
ences between the sexes might wish, that gender alone provides little
useful information for making decisions between contending parents.
A review also helps separate those issues that distinctly relate to the
parents' gender from those that relate to a parent's status as primary
caretaker, a difficult task in a world in which the overwhelming major-
ity of primary caretakers are women.
The broad generalizations about the personalities and behavioral
traits of men and women hold up rather poorly when individual adults
are studied.142 While researchers do report some persistent, sex-linked
differences in the psychological responses of men and women in gen-
eral,143 they also find that large numbers of individual men display
traits stereotypically associated with women. The more specific re-
search examining males and females in their interest in children, atten-
tiveness to them, and capacity to understand and respond to their
needs - what might be collectively termed their "responsiveness" to
children - is especially inconclusive.
Phyllis Berman recently published a helpful review of nearly sixty
studies conducted within the last twenty years that have sought to
measure differences in males' and females' responsiveness to young
141. From an early age, most boys learn that playing dolls or playing house is frowned upon.
By five or six, most boys have quite rigid notions of what is acceptable behavior for boys and
girls. They will ridicule another boy who engages in what they consider to be "girl's" play. See
E. MAccoBy, supra note 58, at 234-38; see also Barry, Bacon & Child, A Cross-CulturalSurvey of
Some Sex Differences in Socialization, 55 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 327, 328-29 (1957)
(Using ethonographic reports, the authors found that in over four-fifths of societies studied, girls
received more training than boys in the care of younger siblings and other dependent persons.).
142. See J. NICHOLSON, MEN AND WOMEN: How DIFFERENT ARE THEY? 17 (1984)
("There is far more variety of behaviour amongst babies of the same sex than there is between a
'typical' boy and a 'typical' girl - an observation which applies to virtually every sex 'difference'
between adult men and women."); see also E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SEX DIFTERENCES 247 (1974) (One example: "[Ifln almost every group that has been observed
there are several women who are fully as aggressive as the men.").
143. E. MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, supra note 142. (Most of the book is devoted to a review
of research exploring differences, in general, between men and women along various dimensions.)
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children. 144 The findings of the studies Berman reviewed are not
wholly consistent, but it is possible to discern some broad patterns.
Few studies found men more responsive to children than women re-
gardless of the measure used. A great many found women in general
more responsive than men and many others reported no differences.
The studies that most consistently found women more responsive were
those that involved self-reported responses to photographs and draw-
ings. These studies seem to provide the least reliable measures of how
people would respond to real children, in part because respondents are
likely to slant their answers toward those they believe will be socially
acceptable. On the other hand, the tests that relied on physiological
responses - for example, on changes in pulse rates - and are less
susceptible to respondent manipulation, were least likely to report dif-
ferences between men and women.
Similarly, of twenty-seven studies drawing on observations of ac-
tual interactions of males and females with children, most found no
differences and only three found persistent differences between men
and women in several age groups. In large part, differences when
found were greatest at ages when women are expected in our society to
be especially responsive to children or men are expected to be espe-
cially concerned with other roles.
In the context of custody disputes, the issue of special nurturing
traits associated with one sex is posed most purely in cases involving
newborns when neither parent has become the primary caretaker for
the child and in cases involving preschool children when parents have
shared in roughly equal measure the caregiving responsibilities.
Hence, the most relevant studies to us among those Berman reviewed
are those seeking to compare the responsiveness of mothers and fa-
thers of young children. Here the findings are complex and somewhat
mixed. Some studies have reported that women already serving as the
primary caretaker of a young child are more responsive than their hus-
bands to the young children of others, for example, when observed in a
waiting room. 145 On the other hand, when fathers and mothers are
144. Berman, Are Women More Responsive Than Men to the Young? A Review of Develop-
mental and Situational Variables, 88 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 668 (1980). As she reports, the
research on men and women in relation to children has assumed many forms. Some researchers
try to measure pulse rate and other physiological responses of males and females to pictures or
audiotapes of infants, some ask respondents to state preferences between pictures of adults and
children or to rate varying pictures on degree of attractiveness, and others, fortunately the largest
in number, have observed males and females actually interacting with infants and young children
and looked for signs of interest, attentiveness, or capacity to respond to the child's apparent
needs. The male and female subjects of the studies have varied widely as well - boys and girls,
single men and women, married but childless men and women, parents observed with children
other than their own, and parents observed with their own newborns..
145. Feldman & Nash, Interest in Babies During Young Adulthood, 49 CHILD DEV. 617
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observed with their own newborns before either has assumed differing
caretaking roles, fathers are in general as likely to hold them closely,
rock them, talk to them, and look directly at them. 146 New fathers
seem as skilled and gentle as mothers with their own children. Observ-
ers in the home at later stages, even after differing roles have been
assumed, have found that although fathers interact with young chil-
dren differently than mothers do, with more physical and less pat-
terned, rhythmic play, 147 there still seem to be few differences in the
degree of parents' interests in their children or in their capacities to
respond to their infant's signals.
148
Not reviewed by Berman are a few puzzling studies of men and
women actually performing the primary-caretaking role for an infant
within a two-parent family. Two studies have been conducted in the
United States, 149 one in Sweden.1 50 The findings of the three studies
differ somewhat, although all three found a pattern of males engaging
in proportionately more physical interaction and less cuddling. In the
Swedish study, the researchers found that after a period of at least a
month as primary caretaker, the seventeen fathers as a group still in-
teracted with their children far more like secondary-caretaking fathers
than like primary-caretaking mothers. In comparison to the mothers,
both sorts of fathers much less frequently displayed affection; smiled
at, held, or spoke to their children; or initiated caretaking actions.
The authors of the Swedish study read their results as suggesting that
Swedish men's and women's styles of interacting with young children
are either biological in origin or instilled in early social learning.
In mild contrast, in the first American study, 151 primary-caretak-
ing fathers seemed on many, but not all, measures to behave more like
(1978). This study leaves uncertain whether the differences between men and women, if real,
were related to gender, primary-caretaker status, or both.
146. See Parke & Sawin, The Father's Role in Infancy: A Re-evaluation, 25 FAM. COORDI-
NATOR 365 (1976). This article is not cited in Berman. It is a synthesis and reappraisal of
several earlier articles, by Parke and others, to which Berman refers.
147. See, eg., Lamb, Interactions Between Eight-Month-Old Children and Their Fathers and
Mothers, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 307 (M. Lamb ed. 1976);
Yogman, Development of the Father-Infant Relationship, in 1 THEORY AND RESEARCH IN BE-
HAVIORAL PEDIATRICS (H. Fitzgerald, B. Lester & M. Yogman eds. 1982).
148. See E. MACCOBY, supra note 58, at 220.
149. Field, Interaction Behaviors of Primary Versus Secondary Caretaker Fathers, 14 DEV.
PSYCHOLOGY 183 (1978); Pruett, Infants of Primary Nurturing Fathers, in 38 PSYCHOANALYTIC
STUDY OF THE CHILD 257 (1983).
150. Lamb, Frodi, Hwang & Frodi, Varying Degrees of Paternal Involvement in Infant Care:
Attitudinal and Behavioral Correlates, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 117 (M. Lamb ed. 1982); Lamb, Frodi, Hwang & Frodi, Effects of Paternal
Involvement on Infant Preferences for Mothers and Fathers, 54 CHILD DEV. 450 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Infant Preferences].
151. Field, supra note 149.
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primary-caretaking mothers than like secondary-caretaking fathers.
For example, primary-caretaking mothers and fathers both imitated
sounds of their infants in a responsive, interactive way to a substan-
tially greater extent than secondary-caretaking fathers. The author of
the first American study believed that primary caretakers of both sexes
learn how responsive infants are to such imitative cooing. The other
American study, of seventeen infants with fathers serving as primary
caretakers for extended periods, was conducted by a psychiatrist and
did not draw comparisons with a sample of primary-caretaking
mothers. It found, at two different examinations, that the infants were
"vigorous, competent and thriving" and that their fathers had been
fully capable of forming the "intense reciprocal nurturing attach-
ments" so critical in early life. 152 The Swedish and American studies
are intriguing, but all involved small samples and, for differing meth-
odological reasons, are difficult to generalize to the issues posed in cus-
tody disputes.
153
The mixed evidence of the Swedish and American studies needs to
be seen against the background of more general evidence about the
adaptability of human beings of both sexes to new roles, including
childtending roles. Although men and women are commonly assigned
different tasks in our society, they have capabilities many other ani-
mals lack to adapt fairly swiftly to new ones. 154 Unflattering to either
sex is the evidence that Western European women of the middle and
upper classes for several centuries before the nineteenth century typi-
cally displayed few nurturing qualities toward their children; parents
farmed infants out to wet-nurses for several of their early years.155 On
the other hand, in some agricultural societies, in which both men and
women participate in food production, both are reported to display
nurturing qualities, and men typically perform a more active role in
152. Pruett, supra note 149.
153. The Swedish men studied may not have been eager to play the caretaker role, but rather
were pressured into it by economic circumstances. Whether or not this would be a common
context for father-custody in divorce is hard to surmise. Moreover, the study suggests that there
may be important cultural differences between Swedish and American men and differences in
their interaction with children; American fathers often engage in more active play with their
children than their wives do, whereas Swedish men apparently do not. See Infant Preferences,
supra note 150, at 455-57. Field's study involved one brief, filmed observation. Pruett's involved
observations of the parent and child on more than one occasion and is impressively rich in its
observations, but, as with the others, his sample is small and nonrandom.
154. See Abrahams, Feldman & Nash, Sex Role Self-Concept and Sex Role Attitudes: En-
during Personality Characteristics or Adaptations to Changing Life Situations?, 14 DEVELOPMEN-
TAL PSYCHOLOGY 393 (1978); Kurdek & Siesky, Sex Role Self-Concepts of Single Divorced
Parents and Their Children, 3 J. DIVORCE 249, 257 (1980); see also Berman, supra note 144, at
682, 684, 685.
155. P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 374-75
(1962); E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 175-90 (1977).
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childtending than they do in societies in which men work outside the
home. 156
What then is the lesson, for our purposes, of the research on gen-
der-related traits? The perplexing question is not whether men are
able to perform various childrearing tasks. No one has doubted their
physical ability to do so. The issues are whether or not fathers (1) are
as capable as mothers of reading their children's signals regarding var-
ious needs, (2) have the patience and dedication to apply themselves to
responding to those needs over time and, (3) have the capacity and
motivation to accompany the provision of care with whatever emo-
tional qualities are needed by a child to feel loved, respected, and se-
cure. The studies reviewed by Berman leave some doubt about
whether or not, in general, men are as capable of reading children's
signals as women, though the concern about men's capacities in this
respect probably does not extend to children after they become old
enough to verbalize most of their needs. Few studies shed much light
on the second question of whether or not men are as likely as women
to apply themselves adequately over time to the provision of care to
young children. The impressionistic studies of children in father-cus-
tody reviewed earlier and the few American and Swedish studies of
primary-caretaker fathers in intact families indicate that some fathers
are doing so, but these fathers may not be representative of fathers in
general or even of the sorts of fathers who will volunteer for cus-
tody.157 Furthermore, if men receive little reinforcement from em-
ployers and peers for serving in a caretaking role, it will be harder for
them than for women to sustain their efforts, even if they begin with
equal motivation to succeed.
The third question, whether or not fathers in general can infuse
caregiving with the appropriate emotional qualities, is especially diffi-
cult to answer. We have seen that men, even men who are primary
caretakers of children, may typically behave toward children some-
what differently than women do. From this alone, of course, it does
not follow that women's behavior better serves children's needs. For
our purposes, the issue is not whether "father's touch" is identical to
"mother's touch" but whether "father's touch," whatever it is like, is
likely to lead to a less desirable quality of life or less desirable outcome
156. West & Konner, The Role of the Father: An Anthropological Perspective, in THE ROLE
OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 185, 202-05 (M. Lamb ed. 1976).
157. See, eg., Mendes, supra note 108, at 309 (fathers interviewed in one study who sought
custody had strongly positive sentiments toward parenting); see also K. Gersick, supra note 17,
at 157-64 (finding that one distinguishing characteristic of those who did seek custody of their
children after divorce was a resentment of the small role their own fathers had played in their
caretaking).
[Vol. 83:477
Custody Disputes in Divorce
for the child in either the short or long term. In this regard, the Swed-
ish study and American studies of primary-caretaking fathers provide
no clear answers and some mixed signals.
15 8
The conclusions to be drawn on the basis of all that is now known
about the differences between men and women are not obvious. It is
not possible to say that there are no sex-linked differences between
men and women that bear on childtending. In fact, while no evidence
points toward a conclusion that men are more responsive to children
than women, some evidence points in the opposite direction. Given
the roles that men and women have performed over millenia and the
ambiguous messages from the research on sex differences, a risk-averse
legislator or judge might be inclined to retain or revive old preferences
for women based simply on their gender. 159 They might be especially
inclined to do so, if they believe that judges in any given dispute will
have grave difficulties determining the responsiveness and attentive-
ness of the men and women before them to their children.
Despite judges' compelling need for guidance, however, the incli-
nation toward a maternal preference should probably be resisted for at
least two reasons. The first is political. We live in an era in which
there are grave suspicions of generalizations based on sex, particularly
generalizations hardened into legal rules. A loose preference for wo-
men, regardless of the actual role they have played in a child's up-
bringing, flies in the face of efforts to equalize opportunities and
responsibilities for men as childraisers. Even if a preference for wo-
men would produce slightly better dispositions for children across the
generality of cases today and even if it turned out that some parenting
propensities were genetically transmitted and hence unalterable, gen-
der-based rules might transmit a harmful message to both men and
women about appropriate spheres of responsibility. The harm from
such a message might well be thought to outweigh the value to chil-
dren to be obtained from a general rule.
The second reason for resisting a general rule is that it is probably
158. The lower level of interaction between the primary-caretaking fathers and their children
could indicate less warmth and less stimulation for the child in the custody of her father. The
authors of the Swedish study, see note 150 supra, made no judgments about the children's emo-
tional development nor even any statements about whether or not the children seemed less happy
or secure, but their evidence is at least disturbing. The American studies of primary-caretaking
fathers, particularly the one by Pruett, see note 149 supra, found children to be "thriving" but
noted that the fine condition of the children might be due in part to the fact that their mothers,
though secondary caretakers, were more actively involved in their care than most secondary-
caretaking fathers.
159. See Campbell, On the Conflicts Between Biological and Social Evolution and Between
Psychology and Moral Tradition, 30 AM. PSYCHOLOIsT 1103 (1975) (warning against lightly
throwing over what Campbell regards as the ancient lessons of biology).
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unnecessary or factually inappropriate in the cases that will actually
come before courts, even acknowledging the difficulty courts have in
making case-by-case'appraisals. Consider the patterns of cases that ac-
tually arise. In cases involving young children, for whom the genera-
lized characteristics associated with women are thought most
important, there is usually one parent who has been the primary care-
taker. If it is the father who has performed that role, that is itself likely
to suggest that he has a high commitment to childcare and may sug-
gest personal characteristics far from the stereotype. 16° If it is the
mother who is the primary caretaker, the bond she has formed with
the child as primary caretaker is probably a better, even if weak, basis
for a preference than her gender alone. 161 If neither parent has been
the primary caretaker because they have shared childcare equally, that
again suggests a father who is likely to possess the desired nurturing
traits. If the child is older, the nurturing characteristics peculiarly as-
sociated with women become less pressing among the values that one
would want to serve through a custody decision. In the end it is only
as to the newborn for whom neither parent has yet become a primary
caretaker that a preference based on women's gender alone seems con-
ceivably justified, and even here the evidence is unclear. 162
(2) Evidence favoring matching children with the parent of the
same sex. In the section describing current research on children of
divorce in various settings, I described a recent study by Santrock and
Warshak that concluded that, by several different measures, children
aged six to eleven placed after divorce with a parent of the same sex
seemed "better adjusted" than children of the same age in the custody
of a parent of the opposite sex.163 I also reported, however, that for
many reasons, Santrock and Warshak's research should be regarded as
exploratory. 164 There is nonetheless psychological theory and some
research to support a view that children have a special affinity for the
parent of the same sex and special difficulties in their relations with the
parent of the opposite sex.
Freudian psychological theory has long suggested an especially
160. See the study by Pruett, supra note 149.
161. See the discussion of the relevance of primary-caretaker status, text at notes 183-230
infra.
162. See Parke & Sawin, supra note 146. Parke and Sawin observed parents on a single
occasion and found no differences between mothers and fathers. Their findings about the father's
responsiveness on that occasion can tell us nothing about whether or not the fathers would show
the necessary perseverance over time. Alice Rossi believes that women may have a biologically
based predisposition toward long-term nurturing of newborns and infants that men lack. Rossi,
Gender and Parenthood, supra note 131, at 5-9.
163. See note 117 supra (articles by Santrock & Warshak).
164. See text following note 119 supra.
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strong identification by children with the parent of the same sex. 165
Social learning theory suggests much the same conclusion, focusing on
the way children learn by observing and interacting with the parent of
the same sex. 166 Moreover, in a society in which men and women still
are encouraged toward different activities on the basis of their sex, a
child is simply more likely to enjoy participating in (and receive peer
approbation for participating in) the activities of the same-sex parent.
As a guide through the perils of growing up, a same-sex parent is
likely to be more able to remember comparable moments in his or her
own childhood and thus understand better the problems that the child
encounters.
Studies of intact families provide some support for these hypothe-
ses. In the next section I will discuss the strong bonds that seem to
develop between children and both of their parents, but, as recently
reviewed by Ross Thompson, 167 some evidence points to especially
strong relationships by sex, especially between boys and fathers. From
infancy on, as Thompson summarizes, fathers in general take more
interest in their sons than daughters. In observation-based studies,
they typically touch and talk more to their infant sons, a pattern that
continues through infancy. 168 A comparable but milder preference
has been found of mothers for daughters.1 69 In turn, children seem to
respond preferentially to the parent of the same sex. At least after the
first year, researchers find that young children, especially boys, seek
out more contact with the parent of the same sex than the parent of
the opposite sex. 17
0
The studies of children of divorce to which I have already alluded
also suggest some special problems for children, or at least for boys,
separated from parents of the-same sex. Studies of boys raised by sin-
gle mothers have suggested that such boys more frequently experi-
enced problems of sex-role identification and self-control than did the
boys in two-parent families.171 Hetherington, Cox, and Cox found
that mothers, in general, reported more difficulties in handling their
165. See summary in Santrock & Warshak, supra note 108, at 115.
166. Id
167. See Thompson, supra note 83, at 72-73 (1983).
168. Id. at 72.
169. Id. at 73.
170. Id.
171. See note 85 supra; see also M. LAMB, THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOP-
MENT 27 (1981) (lists of studies); Children of Divorce, supra note 117, at 246 (brief review of
research). The studies of fatherless boys have been criticized for failing to control for the effects




sons than in handling their daughters. 172 They relate a pattern, partic-
ularly common with boys, of mothers caught in a vicious cycle with a
problem child in which the relationship steadily worsened and the
mother felt more and more powerless, angry, and depressed.
173
Similarly, Wallerstein and Kelly found that some mothers were es-
pecially harsh on their sons after separation, in part because the boys
reminded them of their ex-husbands. 174 At eighteen months after the
divorce, more boys than girls longed for their fathers, more boys than
girls were depressed, and only half as many boys had improved in
their overall adjustment since separation.1 75 It is possible, however,
that whatever problems boys face (or pose to their mothers) in
mother-custody homes would be nearly as likely to arise in father-
custody homes and are traceable either to problems the boys faced
before divorce or to special problems for boys of living in any single-
parent situation. 176 Furthermore, the Wallerstein study was of fami-
lies in which the custodial mother believed she needed help, 177 and it
may be that the problems of boys in mother-custody simply display
themselves earlier than the problems of girls. Hetherington in an ear-
lier writing suggested that the problems for girls in homes without
their fathers are most likely to show up in adolescence in the form of
greater difficulties in relating to boys.178
In sum, the current body of research provides strong hints that
many children will be happier when placed with the same-sex parent.
Andrew Watson, for example, has recommended that girls be placed
with their mothers.179 To my reading, more research is needed before
recommending any sort of preference based on shared gender.
172. See THE AFrERMATH OF DIVORCE, supra note 91, at 162-73.
173. Id. at 169-70.
174. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 108-13.
175. Id. at 165-68, 170-72.
176. For example, in comparison to girls, boys cause more disciplinary problems and are less
responsive to parental efforts at correction in two parent-homes. See E. MACCOBY, supra note
58, at 221-23. On the other hand, at least one study conducted in the early 1960's reported a
lower incidence of delinquency among boys raised by fathers than among boys raised by mothers.
Gregory, Anterospective Data Following Childhood Loss of a Parent, I: Delinquency and High-
School Dropout, 13 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 99 (1965).
177. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 21, at 7-8. One additional puzzling aspect of
Wallerstein's research is that women conducted all the interviews of children. If boys had more
difficulties than girls relating to female interviewers, it could have affected the interviewers'
findings.
178. See Hetherington, supra note 105, at 313, 324 (girls of divorced parents likely to be
unusually apprehensive in relations with boys); see also Jacobson & Ryder, Parental Loss and
Some Characteristics of the Early Marriage Relationship, 39 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 779
(1969).
179. Watson, Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRA-
CUsE L. REV. 55, 82 (1969).
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Although there is an abundance of research on boys in mother-headed
homes, there is very little research, apart from the work of Santrock
and Warshak, comparing boys in father-headed families with boys in
mother-headed families or discussing girls in single,-par ent homes
headed by fathers. Even in Santrock and Warshak's study, the young-
est of the boys and girls studied were at least six years old at the time
they were observed. 180 None of the other impressionistic studies de-
scribed earlier of families headed by single-parent fathers181 has re-
ported substantial differences between the experiences or adjustments
of girls and boys, neither remarking on boys looking especially well or
girls looking comparatively poorly, although, with perhaps one excep-
tion,182 none of these studies appear to have looked for such
differences.
b. The relevance of primary-caretaker status. Women have no
attributes that so especially suit them for childrearing that they merit a
preference in custody disputes simply because of their gender. 183 On
the other hand, men and women involved in custody disputes during
divorce do not simply possess parenting or nurturing qualities in the
abstract. They have each had a relationship with the particular child
over whom they are fighting. One of them, more commonly the wo-
man, has typically spent far more time giving care to the child than
the other parent. When there is such a person within the family, I
will call him or her the "primary caretaker."'
184
Three arguments can be advanced for preferring placement with
parents who have been the primary caretaker: they know more about
the particular child; they have demonstrated a dedication to meeting
the child's needs; and they have built an emotional bond with the child
that may be more important-for the child to sustain on a daily basis
than whatever bond the child has with the other parent. Of the three
arguments, the last is the one most commonly advanced in favor of the
primary caretaker. I will focus principally on this claim of the impor-
180. See Santrok & Warshak, supra note 108, at 116.
181. See note 108 supra.
182. D. LUEPNrrz, supra note 108, at 11, describes Santrock and Warshak's research and
thus seems to have been alerted to sex-linked differences. She did not report such differences in
the body of her report. A few of the other father-custody studies cited at note 108 supra do relate
anecdotes of particular problems fathers had with daughters (for example, feeling awkward in
taking the daughter to buy clothes), but greater systematic difficulties are not discussed.
183. See notes 125-62 supra and accompanying text.
184. The term "primary caretaker" is not a precise term of art. For our purposes, we should
be seeking to define the term functionally: to identify whether or not evidence suggests that a
parent who performs many more of certain tasks with a child or has many more of certain sorts
of contacts with the child can be predicted to serve the child's needs better. Unfortunately, we
will find that such precision eludes us.
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tance of sustaining a special emotional bond between the child and the
primary caretaker. The other two arguments will be taken up along
the way.18
5
Unlike the arguments in the preceding section, the arguments for
the primary caretaker can be framed without reference to the gender
of the parent for whom they are being advanced. On the other hand, it
is extremely difficult to discuss the arguments in any detail without
alluding to gender, for, with a few exceptions, all the writing about
children and their primary caretakers has relied on observations of
children being raised by primary caretakers who were women. In-
deed, much of this writing uses the terms "mother" and "primary
caretaker" interchangeably.1 86 In the section that follows, the term
"primary caretaker" will be used without reference to gender in dis-
cussions of theory or general propositions but the term "primary-care-
taking mothers" will be used in discussions of specific research based
on observations of mothers.
Here then is an attempt to state the strongest case that can be
made for placing children with primary caretakers. Remember as you
read that this is the partisan's brief for primary over secondary care-
takers. After the case is set forth, the several ways in which it is not
fully persuasive will be examined.
One of the central tenets of modem psychoanalytic and social
learning theory is that the intimate interaction of a caretaker with an
infant produces a bond between them, generally referred to as an "at-
tachment." 18 7 Young children can, and typically do, form attach-
ments to more than one adult, including secondary-caretaking
fathers,188 but the tie between a child and a primary-caretaking
mother is generally depicted as stronger and more salient to the child
than the tie with the father. "[M]ost theorists," says psychologist
Michael Lamb, "whatever their orientation, have assumed that the
185. However, for discussions of secondary-caretaking fathers who quickly learn to meet
their children's needs, see the earlier discussion of research on children in the custody of fathers,
text at notes 108-16 supra.
186. An example obvious from its title is S. FRAIBERG, EVERY CHILD'S BIRTHRIGHT: IN
DEFENSE OF MOTHERING (1977). The book is not a defense of caretaking by women but a
defense of caretaking by primary caretakers, urging caution in placing children in day care and
foster care. Bowlby also uses the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT
(2d ed. 1982).
187. See, ag., J. BOWLBY, supra note 186; E. MACCOBY, supra note 58; see also M. RUTrER,
supra note 85; Ainsworth, The Development of Infant-Mother Attachment, in 3 REViEw OF
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 1 (B. Caldwell & H. Ricciuti eds. 1973). "Attachment" is a
technical term in the field of child development. We will use it broadly, as most writers about
child development seem to use it, to mean any "relatively enduring emotional tie [by one person]
to a specific other person." E. MACCOBY, supra note 58, at 53 (emphasis omitted).
188. See text at notes 211-21 infra.
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mother-infant relationship is unique and vastly more important than
any contemporaneous, or indeed any subsequent, relationships." 189
In the early months of a child's life, a primary-caretaker mother
typically touches, caresses, and holds her child many times every day
and feeds her several times a day. Within a few months, the child can
typically identify her, has positive feelings toward her, and can tell her
apart from others. By some point between around six months and a
year, the child begins to display what is commonly called "attachment
behavior": seeking to be near her, becoming distressed on separation
from her, showing pleasure or relief on reunion with her, and orienting
herself to her even when not in physical contact (listening for her
voice, checking to make certain that she is not too far away).
190
Before becoming fully verbal, children and their primary caretak-
ers develop elaborate and personal rituals of communication that ap-
ply to feeding, diaper-changing, responses to small injuries, and most
of a child's other repeated events. Through these rituals, a high level of
communication takes place in a "language" that no one else knows
fully how to "speak."' 91 The mother assumes a place in her infant's
psyche that others cannot replace by performing the same services.
Many writers about child development believe that the importance
to the child of the psychological bond that develops between the child
and primary caretaker in this early period stretches well beyond what
might be inferred from these visible small events and interactions.
They consider attachment to a primary caretaker the essential corner-
stone for a child's healthy emotional development. At the earliest
stage, it is critical to the child's learning to place trust in others and to
have confidence in her own capacities.192 Later, it plays a central role
in the child's capacity to establish emotional bonds with other per-
sons. 193 The sense of trust in others and in self that the attachment
189. Lamb, The Role of the Father: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 2 (M. Lamb ed. 1976) (citation omitted). Lamb refers to several prominent
theorists including Freud, Bowlby, Kohlberg, Maccoby, Parsons, and Sears.
190. See E. MACCOBY, supra note 58, at 46-54, 61; Rutter, supra note 85, at 285.
191. See E. MACCOBY, supra note 58, at 66-67, 76.
192. See, eg., E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SocIETY 248-49 (2d ed. 1963).
193. As Freud put it, "the mother-infant relationship is unique, without parallel, established
unalterably as the prototype of all later love relations." S. FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOA-
NALYSIS 45 (1948), quoted in M. Lamb, The Father's Role in the Infant's Social World, in
MOTHER/CHILD, FATHER/CHILD RELATIONSHIPS 87, 88 (J. Stevens & M. Mathews eds. 1978);
see also S. FRAIBERG, supra note 186, at 4, 32. Marshall Klaus and John Kennell have stated the
claim more broadly and, if possible, even more stridently:
This original mother-infant bond is the wellspring for all the infant's subsequent attach-
ments and is the formative relationship in the course of which the child develops a sense of
himself. Throughout his lifetime the strength and character of this attachment will influ-
ence the quality of all future bonds to other individuals.
M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING 1-2 (1976).
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provides may also affect the child's development of intellectual and
social skills. 194 The growing child passes through many developmen-
tal stages, each requiring her to acquire critical skills and capacities.
At one stage, a child needs to learn how to interact successfully with
other children, at another to begin to master the skills (reading, hunt-
ing, weaving, or whatever) needed to become a productive member of
the larger society. The original bond of the child with the primary
caretaker is believed to have an important continuing effect on the
child's ability to pass through each stage with success. 195
What harms are likely to befall a child who is separated from her
primary caretaker at divorce and placed with the other parent?1 96 The
greatest concern is likely to be expressed for preschool children. Un-
fortunately, as related in the preceding section, there are only a few
studies of children of any age placed with secondary caretakers after
divorce and none focusing on preschool children placed with secon-
dary caretakers. The research that has been conducted on children
separated from their parents that provides analogies to the divorce set-
ting is primarily of two sorts. One is studies of children raised in or-
phanages or other institutions who never developed strong
attachments as infants to any consistent caretakers. Such children, by
the time they reach school age, often become withdrawn and restless
and suffer severe problems in relating to others, even when adopted by
loving parents in their late preschool years.197 The other relevant re-
search is on young children who have formed attachments but are sep-
arated from both parents for periods of a few days to a week. James
194. See Ashton, The Role of the Attachment Bond in Effective Parenting, in MOTHER/
CHILD, FATHER/CHILD RELATIONS, 31, 31-32 (J. Stevens & M. Mathews eds. 1978).
195. See, eg., BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTS, supra note 27, at 31-34.
196. In recent years, such questions about the consequences of disrupting children's relations
with primary caretakers have been posed with concern in many settings - not only in the con-
text of custody disputes after divorce, but also, for example, in the context of debates over public
policies regarding the removal of children from parents thought to be neglectful or abusive, see
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27
STAN. L. REv. 985 (1975); the placement of infants and toddlers in day-care programs, compare
S. FRAIBERG, supra note 186, at 78-84 (raising doubts about the wisdom of day care for young
children), with J. KAGAN, THE GROWTH OF THE CHILD: REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT 74-100 (reporting on a study of day care and defending well-designed infant day-care
programs); and even hospital practices that separate mothers from their newborns in the first
minutes after birth, compare M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 193, at 88-98 (strongly urging
policies to permit immediate mother-child contact), with Chess & Thommas, Infant Bonding:
Mystique and Reality, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 213, 216-19 (1982) (raising doubts about
Klaus & Kennell's research).
197. See review of recent literature in Rutter, supra note 85, at 287, 288-89. For research on
institutionalized children, see J. BOWLBY, SEPARATION: ANXIETY AND ANGER 215-20 (1973);
S. PROVENCE & R. LIPTON, INFANTS IN INSTITUTIONS (1962); Spitz, Hospitalism: An Inquiry
into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood, 1 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF
THE CHILD 53 (1945).
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and Joyce Robertson, for example, conducted a study and produced a
series of films of young children whose mothers were briefly hospital-
ized and who were taken care of by strangers. Within as short a time
as four days, the children suffered substantial distress and displayed
withdrawal, loss of appetite, prolonged crying, and difficulty in
sleeping.
19 8
On the basis of this evidence and the general theory of attachment,
both short- and long-term fears might be expressed for a child placed
with a secondary caretaker, at least so long as it is assumed that the
child's relationship to the secondary caretaker is not nearly as central
to her sense of well-being as her relationship to the primary caretaker
is. If placed with a secondary caretaker, the child might thus find the
period immediately following separation especially stressful. Her
needs will not be met in the way she has come to expect. Whether or
not objectively cared for as well as before, the young child, and per-
haps even the older child, is likely to feel anxious, sad, and less secure.
Over the months that follow, the child may fail to master, or even
regress in mastering, developmental tasks on which she is currently
working.
The expectable long-term consequences of separation from the pri-
mary caretaker are less certain. Bowlby, however, has expressed the
belief that the child who is separated from a primary caretaker early in
life is more likely than other children to develop into an adult less
capable than others of forming and maintaining emotional ties' 99 and
to be subject to sudden depressions and to periods of acute anxiety.2°°
Although psychologists might worry about children separated
from primary caretakers at all ages up to adolescence, the younger the
child at separation (except for those under a few months of age), the
greater the expected disruption of development. The strongest con-
cern would probably be for children separated from their caretaker
between the ages of five or six months and roughly three years. Dur-
ing these years many children show greater adverse reactions than at
any later point to even relatively brief separations from their care-
taker.201 At this early age, the child is incapable of understanding a
198. See Robertson & Robertson, Young Children in Brief Separation: A Fresh Look. 26
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 264 (1971).
199. See J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE, at 215-19 (2d ed. 1965) (in
these writings, Bowlby was not focusing on custody placement during divorce); cf BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS, supra note 27, at 32-33 (1973) (regarding consequences of separating children
from "psychological parents," but considering both parents as likely "psychological parents").
200. See J. BOWLBY, supra note 197, at 4-5.
201. See Robertson & Robertson, supra note 198; see also Kagan, Emergent Themes in
Human Development, 64 AM. SCIENTIST 186 (1976).
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primary caretaker's extended absence. Thus, in the context of di-
vorce, even if the former primary caretaker visited frequently, the
child might experience each leave-taking as permanent and as a rejec-
tion. Theory also suggests that during these early years the child is
still building the strong ties to her caretaker from which healthy emo-
tional development grows and that the primary caretaker's displace-
ment will disrupt this process.
Some mental health professionals would extend the age of special
concern to as late an age as ten.20 2 Because there are few studies of
grade-school-age children moved from their primary caretakers, 20 3 the
fears about such a move are probably based on more general observa-
tions that psychosocial development can be affected by environmental
changes at any stage of childhood 2°4 and that the period from roughly
five or six to ten or eleven, usually called "latency," is an important
period of intellectual and social development for children.
20 5
These are the arguments for primary caretakers that derive from
attachment theory. Much about them is attractive. But the founda-
tions of the case for primary caretakers prove wobbly when subjected
to close scrutiny. A small part of the weakness is that the role of
attachment bonds in child development has probably been overstated
by Freud, Bowiby, and their other principal proponents.20 6 In their
zeal to make certain that the importance of attachment was recog-
202. This concern has been expressed through endorsements of a presumption for mothers in
custody disputes for children up to the age of ten. See, eg., Watson, supra note 179, at 82; cf
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (applying a new preference for primary caretak-
ers to children of "tender years," not defining the term but apparently including the children up
to adolescence); Leonard & Provence, The Development of Parent-Child Relationships and the
Psychological Parent, 53 CONN. B.J. 320 (1979) (custody should be given to the parent who had
the primary nurturing role; the younger the child, the more likely the mother played that role,
but individual examination is necessary).
203. Studies of children placed for adoption after reaching school age have been conducted
but have included few children who had been living with a parent or single foster family up to
that point. See, eg., B. TiZARD, ADOPTION: A SECOND CHANCE 151-79 (1977).
204. See, e.g., Rutter, supra note 85, at 291; see also EARLY EXPERIENCE: MYTH AND EVI-
DENCE (A. Clarke & A. Clarke eds. 1976) (claiming that stages beyond the early stages of devel-
opment are just as important as the early stages).
205. See EARLY EXPERIENCE: MYTH AND EVIDENCE, supra note 204, at 273-76; E. ERIK-
SON, supra note 192, at 258-61; cf White, Some General Outlines of the Matrix of Developmental
Changes Between Five and Seven Years, 26 BULL. ORTON SOCY. 99, 101, 109 (1979) (between the
ages of five and seven, children typically develop cognitive processes dominated by adult logic
rather than juvenile logic, but both forms of logic always exist to varying degrees throughout the
life of an individual).
206. For "revisionist" views of the centrality of the mother-infant attachment - not by any
means claiming it unimportant to the child, but raising doubts about its irreplaceability and its
dominance over other factors in the child's development - see Chess & Thomas, supra note 196;
Rutter, supra note 85. More broadly, researchers have repeatedly found it difficult, even impossi.
ble, to predict the long-term outcomes from events occuring in early life. See A. SKOLNICK, THE
INTIMATE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 378-79 (1973).
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nized, they ignored or undervalued the significance of other factors.20 7
Some recent research outside the context of divorce suggests that, even
when a child moves permanently from her parents to caretakers she
has not previously known at all, her long-term adjustment to separa-
tion "will be primarily determined by the quality of the relationship
with the new caretakers, not by the experience of separation" from the
previous attachment figure.
208
For our purposes, however, the weakest part of the case for pri-
mary caretakers is not that it exaggerates the importance of attach-
ment in general but that it exaggerates the importance of the bond to
the primary-caretaker parent in comparison to the bond with the other
parent. The claim for primary caretakers posits a minor position for
secondary-caretaking parents in the development of children, or put
more precisely, rests on observations of the mother-child relationship
that have not included comparisons with any of the child's other rela-
tionships.20 9 Very few of those conducting the research with mothers
have spent time observing the father-child relationship. They watched
the miraculous bond that develops between primary-caretaking
mothers and children and simply assumed that it was unique.210
Only within the last two decades has substantial research been con-
ducted on the ties that children develop to their fathers in two-parent
families.211 It indicates that although children have very different re-
207. See Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Toward Abuse and Neglect of Children: A Re-
view of Before the Best Interests of the Child (Book Review), 78 MICH. L. REV. 645 (1980).
208. E. MACCOBY, supra note 58, at 99. Yarrow, for example, found that children placed for
adoption after developing attachments to a foster mother showed considerable distress at the
time of being moved into the adoptive home, but eventually adjusted as well in their new homes
as children placed for adoption nearer to birth. See Yarrow & Goodwin, The Immediate Impact
of Separation: Reaction of Infants to a Change in Mother Figures and Yarrow, Goodwin,
Manheimer & Milowe, Infancy Experiences and Cognitive and Personality Development at Ten
Years, in THE COMPETENT INFANT: RESEARCH AND COMMENTARY 1032, 1274 (L. Stone, H.
Smith & L. Murphy eds. 1973).
209. For example, one recent defense of a preference in custody disputes for primary-care-
taker mothers traces the research on mothers and infants but overlooks the recent studies of the
relationships children develop with their fathers. See Klaff, supra note 6, at 343-48.
210. As one study reviewing the literature on children commented, "A visitor from Mars
might report that, as far as most psychologists on Earth are concerned, the only social object in
the infant's life is its mother." Lewis & Weinraub, The Father's Role in the Child's Social Net-
work, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 157 (M. Lamb ed. 1976).
211. One of the earliest studies of the father-infant relationship was H. SCHAFFER & P.
EMERSON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL ATTACHMENTS IN INFANCY (Monograph of the
Society for Research in Child Development, No. 29, 1964). See the especially helpful review of
more recent literature by Thompson, supra note 83, at 64-77 (1983); see also Lamb, supra note
189; Fein, Research on Fathering: Social Policy and an Emergent Perspective, 34 J. Soc. ISSuES,
Winter 1978, at 122, 129-30. The research has taken many forms. Much of the work on attach-
ment of fathers to infants and toddlers has been conducted using the "strange situation" proce-
dure in which observers watch the interaction of parent and child in the presence of a stranger
and upon reunion with the parent after being left alone with the stranger. For a recent descrip-
tion of the "strange situation" method and a general review of the literature, see Lamb, Thomp-
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lationships with their secondary-caretaker fathers than with their
mothers, they typically form strong attachments to both.
An initial, uniform finding from interviews with parents is that, in
general, fathers spend far less time with infants than mothers, even
when mothers work outside the home.212 A high proportion of fathers
report that they perform no regular caregiving functions at all.213
On the other hand, as early as eight months of age, and quite
clearly by a year and a half, children differentiate both between their
mothers and strangers and between their fathers and strangers, and
their behavior toward their fathers is much more like their behavior
toward their mothers than it is like their behavior toward strangers.214
Some studies have found that at about one year, children more com-
monly seek out their primary-caretaking mother in preference to fa-
thers for relief when tired or anxious and both parents are present.215
But, at about the same age, when both are present, children more com-
monly turn to the father for social interaction.21 6 Forced to choose,
many people would believe that the primary caretaker's relief-giving
capacity is more important; yet, there is very little evidence to suggest
that when only a secondary-caretaking parent is available, that parent
is not fully adequate to provide the needed reassurance. 217
The central message of this research is that by the time most chil-
dren are toddlers, they have formed substantial emotional bonds with
both parents. As children grow, primary-caretaking mothers continue
son, Gardner & Charnow, supra note 26. Other research on fathers' ties to their children has
involved interviewing or other forms of observation in laboratories or home settings. See Radin
& Russell, Increased Father Participation and Child Development Outcomes, in FATHERHOOD
AND FAMILY POLICY 191, 192-93 (M. Lamb & A. Sagi eds. 1983) (describing research ap-
proaches).
212. See the review of studies in Thompson, supra note 83, at 64-65. One study found that
fathers spent an average of only 15 to 20 minutes each day with infants. See Ban & Lewis,
Mothers and Fathers, Girls and Boys: Attachment Behavior in the One-Year Old, 20 MERRILL
PALMER Q. 195 (1974).
213. Kotelchuck, The Infant's Relationship to the Father Experimental Evidence, in THE
ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 329, 338 (M. Lamb ed. 1976) (reporting on a
1972 study by Kotelchuck, which found that in a middle-class Boston sample only 25% of fa-
thers had "any regular daily caretaking responsibilities").
214. See Lamb, supra note 147, at 307-10 (describing study he conducted and reporting the
research of others). Children typically engage in substantial amounts of attachment behavior
and "affiliative behavior" such as smiling and laughing with both parents. See Thompson, supra
note 83, at 67-72, for a thorough review of the "strange situation" literature as it bears on the
father-infant relationship.
215. See, eg., Cohen & Campos, Father, Mother and Stranger as Elicitors of Attachment
Behaviors in Infancy, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 146 (1974).
216. See Thompson, supra note 83, at 69.
217. I infer this from children's responses to fathers during "strange situation" experiments.
See Thompson, supra note 83, at 67-72. Secondary-caretaking fathers, at least when observed in
laboratory conditions, also seem as competent as primary-caretaking mothers in responding to
their own newborns and infants. See Thompson, supra note 83, at 66-67.
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to devote more time than fathers to childcare, but fewer of the tasks
require intimate physical interaction with the child. The amount of
time that parents actually spend in social interaction with their chil-
dren typically draws closer.213 During these years, secondary-caretak-
ing fathers generally perform other important functions for children
that seem to affect positively the strength of children's emotional ties
to them. They help to establish and enforce rules of conduct; they
provide models of appropriate behavior and express expectations for
the children's conduct; they concern themselves with the child's physi-
cal safety; and they engage in various sorts of reciprocal behaviors
such as "buddy" or "flirt."
219
To be sure, many of the functions the father performs are mediated
by the role of the mother: what the child derives from the father is
affected in part by the child's relationship with her mother and by the
child's perception of each parent's relationship to the other.22 0 None-
theless, whatever the mediating forces, fathers in the two-parent fam-
ily typically hold a central position in children's daily lives and in their
sense of well-being. As Ross Thompson has said in summarizing the
literature:
[Bloth fathers and mothers are significant figures in the infant's world
from a very early age. . . .[I]t is apparent that infants develop emotion-
ally salient attachment relationships with each parent by the end of the
first year. . . There is every reason to assume that the psychological
salience of each parent persists as the child grows older.
2 21
As Thompson and others recognize, however, the research with
young children and each of their parents must be used with care. The
attachment behavior observed by researchers toward secondary care-
takers is not the same as the attachment itself. The frequency of any
behavior, however suggestive, may not mirror the strength of the psy-
chological bond of the child to either parent.222 It does not follow
218. See Pleck, Men's Family Work- Three Perspectives and Some New Data, 28 FAM. COOR-
DINATOR 481 (1979). Even for young children, the amount of time mothers actually interact
with their infants (as opposed to being present in the room or home with them) is less than most
people assume. See, eg., K. CLARKE-STEWART, INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MOTHERS AND
THEIR YOUNG CHILDREN: CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSEQUENcES 32-33 (Monographs of the
Society for Research in Child Development, Vol. 38, Nos. 6-7, 1973).
219. Radin & Russell, supra note 211, at 193-99 (1983).
220. See Clarke-Stewart, And Daddy Makes Three: The Father's Impact on Mother and
Young Child, 49 CHILD DEV. 466 (1978) (discussing the effects of each parent on the other's
relation with the child). Some of the functions secondary-caretaking parents perform, such as
their role as participants in play, may be especially tied to their not having primary-caretaking
responsibilities.
221. See Thompson, supra note 83, at 90 (emphasis in original).
222. Under laboratory circumstances, for example, two-year-old children have been found to
engage in attachment behavior toward a babysitter they have known only a few hours when a
total stranger is introduced. Feldman & Ingham, Attachment Behavior: A Validation Study in
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from the studies done, even if the researcher's observations are wholly
accurate, that a child will suffer no more from long-term separation
from a primary caretaker than from the same separation from a
secondary caretaker.
223
The ultimate point to be drawn from this brief review of the re-
search is not that primary caretakers and other parents stand in pre-
cisely the same place in children's minds. Rather it is that the
differences in the degree of significance of children's ties to their par-
ents seem to be less than had been believed. In particular, there are,
for our purposes, two complementary implications of the research,
each supported by and supporting other information now available
about divorced families with children. The first is that even though
the primary-caretaking mother is typically associated in the child's
mind with caregiving functions that we may believe are especially cen-
tral to a child's well-being, it nonetheless may be the case that the
trauma for children of losing daily contact with the primary caretaker
will typically be no more severe or only marginally more severe than
the trauma when they lose daily contact with the other parent.224 The
studies of the close ties children typically develop with their fathers in
ongoing families make more plausible the suggestions of Wallerstein
and others that some children in the custody of their mothers who
seem to have good relationships with their mothers have low self-es-
teem and high levels of depression due in significant part to the de-
creased contact with their father.
225
The second implication is the converse: that there is less reason
than in the past to fear that a secondary-caretaking father, if given
custody, will meet his child's basic needs for continuity of attachment
and nurturing less satisfactorily than primary-caretaking mothers. I
described in an earlier section the many recent impressionistic studies
Two Age Groups, 46 CHILD DEV. 319 (1975). This research does not prove, of course, that the
babysitter was as important a figure as the mother in the two-year-old's life.
223. While the research suggests that secondary-caretaking fathers serve many of the same
functions for children in terms of their senses of security and well-being, it also leaves open the
possibility that they they do not serve them to the same degree. Moreover, the same research
suggests that fathers and primary-caretaking mothers serve somewhat different functions, func-
tions that may or may not be of equal significance to the child.
224. Wallerstein and Kelly reported the grieving of children for their absent fathers and their
sadness when he fails to visit (although it is impossible to determine how much of their grieving
is for their broken family). J. WALLERSTEiN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 132-46.
225. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 170-72 (18 months after separa-
tion), 217-20 (five years after separation); Stress & Coping, supra note 91; Hess & Camara, Post-
Divorce Family Relationships as Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce for Children, J.
Soc. IssUEs, Fall 1979, at 79. But cf., Nelson, Moderators of Women's and Children's Adjust-
ment Following Parental Divorce, 4 J. DIVORCE 71 (1981) (mother's post-divorce relationship to
her former spouse important to her own healthy adjustment, but pattern of visitation with child
not reported by mothers as significant factor in child's adjustment).
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of fathers with custody after divorce, virtually all of which report that
children in such settings are doing reasonably well.2 26 Because of their
methodological shortcomings, these studies do not, standing alone,
justify a conclusion that most children living with their fathers are
doing as well as the nonrandom samples of children who have been
studied, or even that the long-term outcomes for the very children ob-
served would be as favorable as short-term appearances indicate.
Taken together, however, with the recent studies of fathers' place in
children's lives in two-parent families, the optimistic conclusions of
the authors of the father-custody studies seem at least more plausible:
when fathers assume custody, they may well typically begin with
much more of a foundation than has been previously believed.22 7
Despite these encouraging suggestions from the research on father-
child relationships, fears about the effects of secondary-caretaker cus-
tody may nonetheless persist for the youngest children, those up to
four or five years of age. To be sure, there is little basis for such a fear
in any of the studies actually observing mothers and fathers with their
young children. On the other hand, these studies - typically brief
observations in laboratories - cannot in themselves disprove the theo-
ries of Bowlby, Freud, and others who posit a unique bond between
infants and primary-caretaking mothers that develops over the early
years. At most, they raise doubts. There is still no methodologically
rigorous research on children placed in the custody of secondary care-
takers at an early age. Thus, where one comes out in the end with
regard to custody decisions involving young children will depend in
large part not on empirical research but on the persuasiveness of the-
ory. I have shared earlier drafts of this Article with a substantial
number of persons with training in psychology or psychiatry.22 8
Nearly all acknowledge the absence of a firm empirical foundation for
the conclusion that preserving the bond of children to primary care-
takers is more critical than preserving the bond to secondary caretak-
ers and yet nearly all believe that there is something special in that
relationship worthy of weight in making decisions about placement.2 29
As to the next older group of children, those between roughly five
226. See notes 108-17 supra and accompanying text.
227. At a minimum, the research on children and fathers makes clear that nothing useful can
be inferred about father-child relationships from the research on children in institutions or chil-
dren adopted by strangers.
228. Some of them are listed in the acknowledgements in the opening footnote. Another of
those who had a similar reaction to an earlier draft was Eleanor Maccoby, Department of Psy-
chology, Stanford University.
229. In conversations, I am never fully certain whether the psychologists are reflecting an
unspoken, and perhaps unconscious, concern for the primary caretaker as well. See Section II,
supra, and Section III B, infra.
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and ten, theorists might still express some concerns, but their claims
about the dangers that might accrue to children placed with a second-
ary caretaker whom they know well are almost certain to be more
muted. Moreover, neither the research on single-parent fathers or sin-
gle-parent mothers nor the research on single-parent families justifies a
belief that secondary-caretaking parents who volunteer to care for
children in this age group will perform less well because of their earlier
secondary status.
In the end, developmental theory supports some sort of weight in
the decisional process for primary caretakers of very young children.
It also provides guidance toward a functional definition of "primary
caretaker." It suggests that what is important is not simply tasks per-
formedfor the child but interactions with the child - direct contact in
feeding, bathing, talking, snuggling, and so forth.230 If one parent per-
forms many more of those interactions than the other parent, that par-
ent should probably be considered the primary caretaker, even if he or
she works part or full time outside the home and someone else pro-
vides the caregiving during work time. On the other hand, as the dif-
ferences between the parents' roles decrease and the difference in time
spent by them in these sorts of interactions becomes more nearly
equal, theory and available evidence suggest little basis for drawing
fine lines.
(c) A counterweight: the higher earnings of men and the relevance
of resources in general. The preceding section argues that there may
be certain advantages for a young child in placing her with the pri-
mary caretaker. In building this claim, however, I have overlooked a
counterbalancing systematic advantage that secondary caretakers, par-
ticularly male secondary caretakers, are likely to offer the child: a
higher income and greater resources. A large income disparity typi-
230. In Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981), the West Virginia Supreme
Court endorsed a primary-caretaker preference, defining primary caretaker as follows:
In establishing which. . . parent is the primary caretaker, the trial court shall determine
which parent has taken primary responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of the follow-
ing caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing,
grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, in-
cluding nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers
after school, i.e. transporting to friends' houses . . . (6) arranging alternative care i.e.
babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle
of the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners
and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and (10) teaching ele-
mentary skills, i.e. reading, writing, and arithmetic.
Under the approach to defining "primary caretaker" that I would recommend, most, but not all,
of the "duties of a parent" that the Garska court includes would be relevant. Tasks such as
numbers (1) and (3) on the Garska list, the preparing and planning of meals or the purchasing,
cleaning, and care of clothes, would not be of direct relevance unless they included close interac-
tion with the child; on the other hand, a factor not included in the Garska list, the actual feeding
of a small child, might be highly relevant under my definition.
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cally exists between divorcing parents. For example, within a sample
of over four hundred divorcing families with minor children that I
studied in Michigan, one parent earned at least fifty percent more than
the other parent in over ninety percent of cases; in at least four out of
five cases in which there was such a disparity, it was the father who
had the higher income.231 And while child-support payments can be
used to offset this disparity in part, a large income difference is likely
to persist in a high proportion of cases.
232
If, in general, secondary caretakers have substantially higher re-
sources, are there advantages to children from access to such resources
that neutralize the advantages of placing children with primary care-
takers? Similarly, should the systematic higher earnings of men be
considered as yet another reason for rejecting the arguments consid-
ered earlier for preferring women as caretakers for very young
children?
At the extreme, of course, a child with no economic resources
lacks the most basic necessities: food, clothing, and shelter. The risk
of such privation, however, is rarely at issue in a custody dispute. In
most cases, the child's most basic needs can be met in either setting.
The disparity in income is, nonetheless, likely to make important dif-
ferences in the quality of life available to the child in the two settings.
Studies have shown that in successive income groups of the general
population from low to high, the proportion of people who report
themselves to be happy rises steadily.233 For the divorcing family, ac-
cess to resources can determine whether or not the custodial parent
can afford to remain in the home the couple lived in during the mar-
riage and, as it does for all Americans, it can mean access to opportu-
nity for the child - to a more expensive education, summer camp, or
music lessons. 234 Moreover, even when most basic needs can be met, a
231. The study was conducted in Genesee County, Michigan in the 1970's, using a random
sample of about 400 divorced couples with minor children. Other findings from the study are
reported in D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT
(1979).
232. Id. at 37-68.
233. See Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evi-
dence, in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 89, 99-103 (P. David & M.
Reder eds. 1974); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR THE
EIGHTIES, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN LIFE: THE QUALITY OF
AMERICAN LIFE IN THE EIGHTIES 17 (1980). As many have pointed out, having sufficient re-
sources within a culture is probably a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for a
sense of well-being. See A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE & W. RODGERS, THE QUALITY OF AMER-
ICAN LIFE: PERCEPTIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND SATISFACTIONS 380-84 (1976).
234. In fact, it is a belief that money makes a difference in children's well-being that explains,




parent accustomed to living at a higher standard is likely to worry a
great deal about money, 235 which in turn may produce stress for the
child.2 3
6
At least in the abstract, it would thus appear wholly defensible for
courts to give weight in custody decisions to the comparative financial
positions of the parties. Some custody laws explicitly require consider-
ing the parents' resources,2 37 and some courts are reported to do so
routinely under a best-interests standard.2 38 Similarly, legislatures
might take these financial considerations into account in deciding
whether or not to adopt an otherwise defensible preference for primary
caretakers.
The problem with giving substantial weight to resources or income
potential is that, in this country today, the effect of doing so is to dis-
advantage mothers in two ways that many people would consider un-
fair.239 First, women in general earn much less than men in general. 240
This disparity in income is widely perceived to be the result of system-
atic discrimination against women in the labor market. Second, even
in families in which the particular parent, usually a woman, could
have earned as much as her spouse, a parent who has, with her
spouse's concurrence, stayed at home or worked less than full time
because of children is at a disadvantage as to resources for reasons that
we should applaud, not count against her. For these reasons, it might
well be argued that because of the effect it has on mothers, courts
should ignore systematic income differences in forming rules.
If such an argument is to be accepted, the first ground of system-
atic discrimination against women is more compelling to me than the
second. If there were no gender discrimination in wages, and the only
disparity in earnings came from the fact that one parent had partici-
pated less in the labor market in order to care for her children, it
would not be bothersome that parents who assume differing roles in
235. See A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE & W. RODGERS, supra note 233, at 398, 420.
236. Cf Wallerstein & Huntington, supra note 101, at 150-52 (good psychological adjust-
ment of children significantly associated with adequate, stable child support, but poor psycholog-
ical adjustment unrelated to issues of child support).
237. For example, Michigan's child custody act lists among factors for a court to consider in
determining a child's best interests "the capacity. . . of competing parties involved to provide
the child with food, clothing, medical care. . . and other material needs." MICH. COMp. LAWS
M.C.L.A. § 722.23(3)(c) (1979).
238. See Polikoff, Exploding the Myths, supra note 69, at 190.
239. See Id.; Uviller, supra note 10.
240. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
table 774, at 469 (1984). As of 1981, among year-round, full-time workers, women's median
earnings were $12,457, men's were $20,692. In addition, more women than men work part time
and earn even less than full-time working women. This disparity in income appears to apply to
divorced men and women with children. See D. CHAMBERS, supra note 231, at 53.
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childcare should find their differing roles during marriage permitted
them at separation to offer differing advantages to the child.241 On the
other hand, the fact of gender discrimination in wages is genuinely
troubling. It is not merely that women face a disadvantage for a rea-
son outside their control (most qualities taken into account in custody
matters are in some sense outside the individual's control) but rather
that a male-dominated economic system has imposed this economic
subjugation and now stands ready to take further advantage of it.
Expressly to offset this economic discrimination, some writers have
proposed the return to a strong maternal preference that can be over-
come only by a showing of unfitness.242 A milder approach would be
to ignore systematic economic differences between men and women in
considering a maternal or primary-caretaker preference, and to direct
courts in individual cases to consider financial resources of the parties
only if one parent is unlikely to be able to meet the child's most basic
needs. Of the two approaches, I prefer the latter, even though I am
uneasy about any special rule regarding resources. The source of my
discomfort is that both ways of compensating for economic discrimi-
nation necessarily involve baldly placing some adult interest (here, the
interest of women in equal treatment) ahead of the interests of the
particular child involved in a custody dispute. Contrary to my stated
goal in the section on the interests of the parent,2 43 an adult interest
would be treated not as a secondary value to take into account only
when the child's needs do not point to a placement with one parent
over the other, but a primary interest being taken into account despite
a potential cost to the child.
B. What We Know About the Needs of the Parents.
In Part II above, I argued that judges and legislators would be
acting sensibly if, in framing rules for resolving custody disputes, they
accorded some weight to the interests of parents, so long as they con-
tinued to give primary weight to the interests of children.244 I sug-
gested in particular that a rule creating a rebuttable presumption for
primary caretakers might justifiably rest in part on a finding, if one
could be made, that primary caretakers typically suffered emotionally
much more than secondary caretakers on the loss of the custody of
241. To be sure, women are socialized to remain in the home with children or to subordinate
their careers to the careers of men, but men also are socialized not to remain at home and not to
center their lives around children.
242. See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 10.
243. See text at notes 33, 63 supra.
244. See notes 63-70 supra and accompanying text.
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their children.245 In this section I ask whether such a finding can in
fact be made.
Unfortunately, just as there are no longitudinal studies comparing
children in the custody of mothers (or primary caretakers) with chil-
dren in the custody of fathers (or secondary caretakers), so there are
no longitudinal studies comparing the experience of primary caretak-
ers who are denied custody of children with that of secondary caretak-
ers in the same position. Indeed, there appear to be only two published
studies, of any kind, reporting on parents who had once been primary
caretakers but later lived apart from their children. One is an explora-
tory, impressionistic study based on interviews with a small group of
divorced, noncustodial mothers.246 The author describes many of the
women she interviewed as feeling depressed, unworthy, unloved, and
no longer in control of their world, but she was not in a position to
compare these women's reactions with those of former secondary care-
takers living apart from their children. The other study, very different
in its scope, included a large sample of divorced parents, of whom
around twenty-five were mothers living apart from their children. The
study provides indirect support for a conclusion that primary caretak-
ers have more at stake than secondary caretakers in continued contact
with their child because the mothers living apart from their children
were substantially more likely to maintain regular visitation with their
children than were fathers living apart from their children.
247
Despite the paucity of direct observations and comparisons, the
hypothesis that primary caretakers generally will be more seriously
affected emotionally by the loss of custody than secondary caretakers
has substantial plausibility. Whenever one parent receives sole cus-
tody of a child, the other parent is necessarily shifted into being just a
"visitor." The shift is likely to mark a much more dramatic change in
the lives of most primary caretakers than it will for most secondary
245. An alternative hypothesis would be that even if primary caretakers without custody of
their children are no more despondent than are secondary caretakers without custody of their
children, it is possible nonetheless that having custody of their children will make primary care-
takers substantially happier than having custody will make secondary caretakers.
246. See Fischer & Cardea, Mother Child Relationships of Mothers Living Apart From Their
Children, 5 ALTERNATIVE LIFE YLE S 42 (1982) (sample of 17 mothers, at least a few of whom
had joint custodial arrangements in which children spent at least half their time with their fa-
thers). There also have been a few journalistic pieces. See, e.g., Doudna, The Weekend Mother,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 72.
247. See Life Course, supra note 103, at 663 (In a sample of noncustodial mothers and fa-
thers, 69% of the mothers, but only 33% of the fathers, had visited with their minor children at
least once a month during the preceding year; in fact, 52% of the fathers, but only 14% of the
mothers, had not seen their child in over a year. The sample included 336 fathers, but only 25
mothers.); see also Santrock, Warshak & Elliott, Social Development and Parent-Child Interac-
tion, supra note 117, at 294 (reporting similar finding in their study).
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caretakers. For primary caretakers, shifting to "visitor" status almost
certainly leads to a substantial reduction in time spent with the
child.248 While it is true that the primary caretaker who loses custody
is freed from the petty drudgery of washing school clothes and pack-
ing lunches, for many caretakers the predictable rhythm of these very
tasks had given structure to their lives. They are likely to. experience
the sudden freedom as a loss.
In addition, primary caretakers, whether female or male, may well
be more dependent than secondary caretakers on the emotional sup-
port and stimulation they receive from the small interactions with the
child, especially the young child - the cuddling, the seemingly aim-
less chatter, and so forth.249 Moreover, those primary caretakers, es-
pecially those who have been full-time homemakers, often have no
identity other than their identity as spouse and parent to fall back
upon. Divorced and without their children, they have nothing to
make them feel valued.250 Most secondary caretakers, at least most
secondary-caretaking men, have a second identity through their job.
However much the parenting role has meant to them and however
much they complain about their work, it seens likely that when they
lose custody, they are less frequently left without any activity from
which they derive a sense of worth and a sense of place.
251
For all these reasons, one might suppose that, in general, primary
caretakers, and especially those primary caretakers not employed
outside the home, suffer emotionally more than secondary caretakers
when deprived of the opportunity to live with their children.25 2
248. I have already alluded to the substantially greater number of hours that full-time pri-
mary caretakers typically spend with their children, especially when the children are young. See
note 184 supra and accompanying text.-
249. See Benedek, Parenthood as a Developmental Phase7 A Contribution to the Libido The-
ory, 7 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC A. 389 (1959) (referring to the intense "symbiotic" relation of
mother and child during the period when child is nursing); Thompson, Normal Child Develop-
ment, in SOCIAL WORK WITH ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN: A MANUAL OF INTER-
DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE 219 (K. Faller ed. 1981) (primary-caretaking mother relives her own
childhood experience through her child and the years of intense interaction with the child are
critical to her sense of well-being and contribute to her own emotional growth); Pruett, supra
note 149, at 273 (reporting primary-caretaking fathers who developed an especially intense rela-
tionship with infants).
250. Cf. R. WEISS, supra note 98, at 172 (reporting that mothers with custody of their chil-
dren after divorce report that their children's need for them is critical to their sense of being a
valuable person).
251. For a discussion of the central place of work to most working peoples' sense of self-
worth, see WORK IN AMERICA: REPORT OF A SPECIAL TASK FORCE TO THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE 3-10 (1973).
252. Any attempt at assessing the probable differences between primary and secondary care-
takers also needs to take into account an additional factor that probably affects the emotional
responses of most primary-caretaking women, but not those of primary-caretaking men. In this
country today, divorced women living apart from their children, particularly young children, are
likely to be perceived by others as deserters or as unfit. They face a stigma not experienced by
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Luepnitz, in her interview study of parents after divorce, quoted one
mother who, though speaking only about her own children and former
husband, summarized well the case for primary caretakers: "He is an
excellent parent, but they are the most important thing in my life, and
I would not have survived without them. They would have been
happy either way, but I wouldn't have pulled through if I had lost
them." 2
53
Unfortunately, the dearth of direct research on primary caretakers
who have lost custody of children makes it impossible to prove or dis-
prove any hypothesis about their suffering, even in the purest case of
the full-time caretaker of the preschool child. Even less can be said
about the probable emotional suffering of the primary caretaker who
has been working full time for some period before the separation, 254
or the parent who served as full-time primary caretaker when the child
was very young but whose child is now an adolescent.
255
A few suggestions about the probable harms to primary caretakers
can be obtained from research in related areas, but this research can
serve at most to refine hypotheses, not to prove or disprove them.
Two sorts of analogous research are available. The first has examined
adults' emotional responses to other life changes and stresses that
might be comparable to loss of custody. The second is the research on
the lives of primary-caretaking mothers with custody and the lives of
secondary-caretaking fathers without custody, which may provide
clues about what one might find if the situations were reversed.
With regard to other life stresses, research has repeatedly revealed
divorced men in general. Cf. Fischer, Mothers Living Apart from their Children, 32 FAM. REL.
351 (1983) (Faculty members and graduate students in West Texas were asked to appraise ten
"lifestyles" in terms of being common or uncommon, socially approved or disapproved. The
position of the noncustodial father was seen as common and approved; the position of noncus-
todial mother was seen as uncommon and disapproved. Only persons in homosexual cohabita-
tion were seen as more disapproved than the woman who lived apart from her children.).
For our purposes, it is probably wise to try to separate out and disregard any additional
emotional suffering caused by this stigma, because, if this were considered in the shaping of rules,
states would simply be reinforcing old notions of proper responsibilities based on sex alone that
they may no longer wish to endorse.
253. D. LUEPNrrz, supra note 108, at 23-24.
254. As of 1981, over half ofAmerican mothers with children three to five years old were in
the labor force. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL Aa-
sTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83, at 142 (table 223) (103d ed. 1982). While it seems
plausible that a job outside the home would give the primary caretaker a source of satisfaction
and role to fall back upon, it is nonetheless equally plausible that, if the primary caretaker still
has an intense attachment to his or her children, the loss of custody will deprive other life activi-
ties of their satisfaction. At least one study has suggested that employed mothers are far more
likely to receive satisfaction from parenting than from their jobs. Hoffman, Social Change and its
Effects on Parents and Children: Limitations to Knowledge, in WOMEN: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE 313, 319 (P. Berman & E. Ramey eds. 1982).
255. Cf note 264 infra (literature on the empty nest).
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that sudden, major changes of all sorts in people's lives trigger both
emotional and physical problems.256 The more profound the change,
the greater the likely reaction. Death of a spouse is the life event most
likely to be followed by illness.2 57 Following it in frequency of health
crises are marital separation and divorce,2 58 each of which is more
closely comparable to the death of a spouse in the way it is experi-
enced than has usually been recognized.25 9 Some research also sug-
gests that the effects of sudden changes are additive: if several occur
simultaneously the risks of illness or emotional problems increase cor-
respondingly. 26 Separation and divorce often produce multiple
changes - not just the ending of a relationship but also movement to
another home or town, changes in employment and income, and
changes in daily living schedule, each an independently stressful oc-
currence.261 Loss of custody has not been studied in this context, but
the research on these other events suggests that if loss of custody
marks a more momentous further life change for primary caretakers
than for secondary caretakers, then the emotional and health costs for
the primary caretaker are likely to be greater.
One might hope to learn something about the comparative effects
of loss of custody on primary and secondary caretakers from research
on a few other life events that seem especially analogous to loss of
custody. A small amount of research does exist, for example, on par-
ents' reactions to the death of a child,262 to the placement of a child in
foster care or in an institution,263 and to a child's growing up and
256. See, eg., M. RILEY, M. JOHNSON & A. FONER, AGING AND SOCIETY 184 (1972) (per-
sons compelled to retire unhappy with their loss of a work role).
257. Holmes & Rahe, The Social Readjustment Rating Scale, 11 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RE-
SEARCH 213 (1967). Some recent research suggests that divorce is even more likely to lead to
physical and mental health problems than death of the spouse. See Divorce's Stress Exacts Long-
Term Health Toll, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1983, at Cl, col. 1; see also Rahe, Meyer, Smith, Kjaer
& Holmes, Social Stress and Illness Onset, 8 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 35 (1964).
258. See note 257 supra.
259. R. WEISS, supra note 98, at 43-46. Weiss believes that most married people, even those
experiencing enormous tensions in the marriage, become intensely attached to their spouses and
pass through something very similar to mourning upon separation.
260. See, eg., Hebert, Life Changes and Seriousness of Illness in Female College Students, 43
PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 1297, 1298 (1978) (finding a significant relationship "between the number
of life changes and the seriousness of illness"). But see Rabkin & Struening, Life Events, Stress,
and Illness, 194 SCIENCE 1013, 1015 (1976) ("only cursory attention" has been devoted to "the
size and practical significance of the correlation between number and nature of life events and
subsequent illness episodes").
261. Changes in financial state, change to a different line of work, change of living condi-
tions, revisions of personal habit, and changes of residence are all on the list of stressful events
that, at least when coupled with other events, are frequently followed by illness. Holmes & Rahe,
supra note 257, at 216.
262. See summary in J. BOWLBY, Loss: SADNESS AND DEPRESSION 179 (1980).
263. See S. JENKINS & E. NORMAN, FILIAL DEPRIVATION AND FOSTER CARE 107, 225
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leaving home.264 Unfortunately, such research is inconclusive for our
purposes, because almost none of it compares the reactions of primary
and secondary caretakers.
Inconclusive also, unfortunately but inevitably, is the indirect evi-
dence that can be adduced from the existing research on intact and
divorced families. In stating at the beginning of this section the hy-
pothesis that primary caretakers are likely to suffer more, I have al-
ready alluded to the principal supportive evidence: the substantially
(1972) (mothers and fathers report similiar sad feelings on day of placement); Mandelbaum,
Parent-Child Separation: Its Significance to Parents, 7 Soc. WORK, Oct. 1962, at 26 (parents of
children entering residential treatment report feeling loneliness and inadequacy; no reported dif-
ferences between mothers and fathers); Smith, Ricketts & Smith, The Recommendation for Child
Placement by a Psychiatric Clinic, 32 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 42 (1962) (parents report in-
tense feelings of loneliness, emptiness, and guilt; no reported differences between mother and
father).
264. There is somewhat more writing about parents' reactions to the child who leaves home
on reaching adulthood. It has been long assumed that mothers reacted more severely than fa-
thers to the suddenly "empty nest." See Harkins, Effects of the Empty Nest Transition on Self-
Report of Psychological and Physical Well-Being, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 549 (1978) (referring
to both popular and clinical literature and pointing out recent full-page advertisements in medi-
cal journals recommending antidepressant medications for women to combat the empty-nest
"syndrome").
Nearly all recent research concludes, however, that most women who have been primary
caretakers either experience almost no sadness or, at most, a quickly passing period of sadness as
their children leave. See, eg., L. RUBIN, WOMEN OF A CERTAIN AGE 13-40 (1979) (interviews
with 160 women aged 35-54, reporting periods of sadness but overall happiness and relief);
Glenn, Psychological Well-Being in the Post-Parental Stage: Some Evidence from National
Surveys, 37 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 105 (1975) (middle-aged women with children who have left
home report somewhat greater happiness than middle-aged women with children still at home);
Harkins, supra (study of 318 women with children recently graduating from high school or about
to do so, children in varying stages of transition; found "empty nest" effects slight and quickly
passing; transition produced positive effect on psychological well-being); Lewis, Freneau & Rob-
erts, Fathers and the Postparental Transition, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 514 (1979) (interviews
with 118 fathers; 22% reported sadness at last child leaving home). But see Bart, Depression in
Middle-Aged Women, in WOMEN IN SEXIST SOCIETY 99 (V. Gorneck & B. Moran eds. 1971)
(depression in a sample of hospitalized women seemed to be related in part to empty nest and
related loss of sense of performing important role); Birnbaum, Life Patterns and Self.Esteem in
Gifted Family-Oriented and Career-Committed Women, in WOMEN AND ACHIEVEMENT 396 (M.
Mednick, S. Tangri & L. Hoffman eds. 1975). Few studies have compared mothers' responses
with fathers' responses, and those that have do not report significant differences in self-reported
reactions. See L. Saunders, Husband-Wife Consensus in Their Perceptions of Life Satisfaction in
the Postparental Years (Aug. 1975) (unpublished paper presented at the meeting of the National
Council on Family Relations), cited in Lewis, Freneau & Roberts, supra, at 519. That primary-
caretaking mothers do not seem to suffer especially severely, in absolute or comparative terms, as
their children grow up and leave home might suggest that there would also be little suffering
when custody of a younger child is placed in the other parent. Yet several reasons exist why a
primary-caretaking mother who did not suffer when her teenager moved away might have suf-
fered greatly if she had lost custody of the same child when the child was much younger. One
reason is the greater intensity of the relationship with the child while the child is young. By the
time children reach 18 or 19, most mothers spend little time with them. A second difference is
that the act of the older child leaving home is often experienced as a moment of success, as the
capstone of successful parenting. By contrast, losing custody of a young child is unlikely to be
experienced by a primary-caretaker mother as a fulfilling event. The low degree of distress re-
ported by mothers whose teenagers leave home may, nonetheless, suggest that primary caretak-
ers of adolescents will feel less distress than primary caretakers of younger children on losing
custody disputes.
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greater time that the primary caretaker spends with the young child;
the special nature of the emotional bond the primary caretaker may
have with her child; the fewer sources of satisfaction other than
parenting available to most primary caretakers; and the way that pri-
mary-caretaking mothers before and after divorce speak of their chil-
dren as giving purpose to their lives. All of these suggest that the
primary caretakers will suffer greater emotional harm than secondary
caretakers from loss of custody.
Despite all this, other research on parents, separated and un-
separated, suggests indirectly that the experience of being separated
from their children may be nearly as traumatic for secondary caretak-
ers as for primary caretakers. We have already discussed the growing
evidence that children typically develop strong emotional ties to both
parents. 265 The reverse is also true: many secondary-caretaking fa-
thers, perhaps most, also appear to develop strong emotional ties to
their children. Some of the emotions that men feel toward their chil-
dren are based on a sense of role fulfillment that has little to do with
daily contact with the children. 266 What it means to most men to be a
parent may not be the same as what it means to most women. Yet, for
many men, the relationships they build with their children around
play and shared tasks are almost certainly central to their own emo-
tional well-being and sense of self-worth, even if they spend much less
time with their children than mothers.
267
The ways that secondary-caretaking fathers respond to the loss of
daily contact with their children is also revealing. A good deal of re-
search, much of it anecdotal and descriptive rather than statistical,
depicts the unhappy position of fathers living without their children in
the period after divorce. The portrait of the divorced male as a care-
free bachelor is greatly exaggerated. Divorced men, like divorced
women, report lower degrees of life satisfaction than men and women
who have never married, are currently married, or are widowed.
2 68
Like divorced mothers, most divorced fathers report feeling anxious,
depressed, angry, rejected, and incompetent during the first year or
265. See notes 211-21 supra and accompanying text.
266. See Fein, Men's Entrance to Parenthood, 25 FAM. COORDINATOR 341 (1976); Lewis,
Freneau & Roberts, supra note 264.
267. Both men and women report that parenthood and success at parenthood are important
to their life satisfaction. For men, jobs and marriage vie with parenthood as sources of satisfac-
tion. For women, parenthood appears somewhat more important than jobs and marriage. See
Douvan & Kulka, The American Family: A Twenty-Year View, in PSYCHOLOGY AND WOMEN:
IN TRANSITION 91-92 (J. Gullahorn ed. 1979).
268. See A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE & W. RODGERS, supra note 233, at 398; Douvan &
Kulka, supra note 267, at 88.
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two after separation. 269 They miss the sense of participating in a fam-
ily. They report lacking a sense of structure in their lives and feelings
of rootlessness.
270
Of course, on this evidence alone, it is impossible to determine how
much happier secondary-caretaker men would be if they had custody
of their children. What is missing from their lives is not merely their
children but their partner of many years and their status as head of an
ongoing family. Yet the altered relationship with their children may
well contribute significantly to many men's sense of unhappiness.
Their new status as visitors to their children might at first blush seem
little different from the relationship many of them had with their chil-
dren while the family was intact. For many divorced men, however,
the visiting proves too contrived, too formal, and too strained.271 It is
different from the play at home at the end of a day's work while the
family lived together.272
Moreover, even if more primary-caretaking mothers suffer more
upon loss of custody than secondary caretakers do, the period of suf-
fering may typically be of limited duration. Most human beings are
resilient. The experience of a woman without her children is likely to
be mixed rather than wholly bleak. During marriage, children are both
a burden and a pleasure for the full-time caretaker. 273  The same is
true after divorce for women with custody.274 Without her children,
the divorced primary caretaker loses an activity that has given struc-
ture to her life but is suddenly freed of obligations that can interfere
with her efforts to establish a career, meet new people, and establish
new sexual relationships.275 It is possible, though hardly certain, that
269. See Divorced Fathers, supra note 91, at 426-27.
270. See The Aftermath of Divorce, supra note 91, at 158.
271. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 92, at 123-26.
272. The alarming finding of one researcher shows that roughly half of the children living
with their mothers after divorce have not seen their fathers in over a year. See Life Course, supra
note 103, at 663. While the finding suggests that most men care little about contact with their
children, a closer look at the research, which also reports that visiting is much more common in
the period immediately after separation and declines over time, leaves open the possibility that,
for many men, it is largely the visiting relationship (which might be much the same for a former
primary caretaker) and not a weakness in the preexisting relationship that leads to the infre-
quency of contact. On the other hand, the same study also found that noncustodial mothers
visited their children more frequently than noncustodial fathers. See note 247 supra.
273. One should hardly need a footnote for this point, but research reveals much ambiva-
lence among full-time caretakers about their lives. See, eg., J. BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF
MARRIAGE (2d ed. 1982); G. GURIN, J. VEROFF & S. FELD, AMERICANS VIEW THEIR MENTAL
HEALTH 129 (1960) (women more likely than men to cite negative aspects of parenthood); Nye,
Adjustment to Children, in THE EMPLOYED MOTHER IN AMERICA 356 (F. Nye ed. 1963) (In a
study of over 2,000 working and nonworking mothers, 40% of homemakers and 28% of mothers
employed outside the home agreed "children made them nervous.").
274. See text at notes 94-101 supra; see also Stress and Copin& supra note 91, at 111-25.
275. Cf. Bloom, Asher & White, Marital Disruption as a Stressor: A Review and Analysis, 85
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the experience for most primary caretakers without custody of their
children is little different from the experience of most secondary-care-
taking men today - a year or two of loneliness, depression, and con-
fusion, followed by a new and reasonably satisfying equilibrium.
It is also possible that those secondary-caretaking men who want
custody of their children typically have more of an emotional stake in
their relationship with their children than other secondary caretakers.
For such secondary caretakers, even if they have full-time jobs outside
the home from which they have derived satisfaction, the loss of their
children may cast h pall over all other aspects of their lives, including
their work, and leave them as bereft of a sense of identity and worth as
the loss of the children would to the primary-caretaking parent with-
out any outside employment.
On all the current evidence, it is thus plausible to hypothesize a
trauma of comparable magnitude for both primary and secondary
caretaker deprived of the custody of children. On the other hand, it is
equally plausible, perhaps more plausible, to hypothesize that the
trauma for the primary caretaker is typically substantially worse and
of longer duration, especially for the primary caretaker who has young
children and is not employed outside the home. We simply do not
have enough evidence to reach a firm conclusion either way. My own
hunch is that, in general, primary caretakers suffer more and for a
longer period, but it is only a hunch.
IV. INFORMATION BEARING ON RULES FOR JOINT PHYSICAL
CUSTODY
When divorcing parents agree to cooperate in making important
decisions about the child - decisions, for example, about major medi-
cal procedures or place of school attendance - they are agreeing to
what is commonly called "joint legal custody." When parents go fur-
ther and agree that the child will maintain a residence with each of
them, they are agreeing to "joint physical custody." It is with joint
physical custody that I am concerned in this Article.2 76 Joint physical
custody takes many forms: most commonly the child spends half of
PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 867, 875-76 (1978) (reviews research suggesting that women without depen-
dent children adjust more quickly after divorce than women with children; the women without
children in these studies were not women who lost custody of their children, but were rather
childless or mothers of grown children).
276. Joint physical custody is far less common than joint legal custody. See, eg., W. Phear,
J. Beck, B. Hauser, S. Clark & R. Whitney, An Empirical Study of Custody Agreements Joint
versus Sole Legal Custody, II J. oF L. & PSYCHIATRY 419, 425 (1983) [hereinafter cited as EM-
PIRICAL STUDY] (reporting a study of court records in Massachusetts' most populous county,
finding joint-legal-custody arrangements in 22% of cases, but joint physical custody in only 2%
of cases); Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 29, at 489, 491 (reporting that, in 1972, only 2.2% of
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each week or alternate weeks with each parent, but sometimes the
child changes homes each month or even every six months. Some-
times the amount of time spent in the two homes is far from equal.
277
In fact, the major difference between joint physical custody and single-
custody arrangements with provision for substantial visitation is a
phrase in the divorce decree and a state of mind about where "home"
is - a state of mind that seems to be meaningful to both adults and
children.
Two principal questions need to be answered concerning joint
physical custody. The first is whether or not childrens' (or adults')
interests will be served when parents voluntarily enter into such ar-
rangements. (The answer to this question might guide courts and leg-
islatures in determining whether or not to encourage such voluntary
arrangements either directly or through fostering procedures, such as
mediation, that seem likely to lead to negotiated agreements for joint
custody.)278 The second question is whether and under what circum-
stances the children's and adult's interests can be served when joint
custody is imposed over the objections of either or both parents.
Many states now expressly empower their courts to impose such
arrangements. 279
A. What We Know About the Needs of Children
Much of the research already reviewed in this Article provides a
basis for hope that joint physical custody can serve the interests of
children better than sole custody, at least when it is voluntarily en-
tered into between the parents. We have seen that infants living with
two parents typically form strong attachments to both and that both
parents typically play important roles in their children's development.
We have also seen that when parents divorce, children grieve for the
absent parent and often find the visiting relationship unsatisfactory. 280
all divorces in San Francisco ended in an award of joint physical custody (0.8% in Los Angeles),
while 16.3% ended in an award of joint legal custody (2.9% in Los Angeles)).
It is not fully clear to me why so many parents with physical custody of a child are agreeing,
apparently without major concessions from the other parent, to share legal custody of the child.
Joint legal custody gives the noncustodial parent an effective veto over important decisions bear-
ing on the child that the custodial parent alone is forced to live with. It is possible that custodial
parents foresee, perhaps correctly, that noncustodial parents with joint legal custody will comply
more readily with child-support obligations or maintain more regular visitation with the child.
277. The line between joint physical custody and a single-custody arrangement with gener-
ous visitation cannot be drawn by reference solely to the amount of time spent in the two homes:
some children in single custody spend more time "visiting" with the noncustodial parent than
some other children in joint custody spend "living" with one of their parents.
278. See Pearson & Ring, supra note 129.
279. See Scott & Derdyn, supra note 3, at 471-74.
280. See notes 95, 211-21 supra and accompanying text.
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Joint custody may thus have appeal because it promotes a continuing
intimate relationship with both parents. The few studies of sole-cus-
tody fathers who had previously been secondary caretakers also sug-
gest that fathers who volunteer for full-time custody are able to attend
to the children's physical needs.281 They should be no less able to do
so on a part-time basis.
On the other hand, some aspects of the same research point in the
opposite direction. The fact that children are likely to fare reasonably
well with either parent when there is visitation does not necessarily
lead to a conclusion that the same children would fare as well living
alternately with both parents. While the hope may be that joint cus-
tody will foster strong attachment bonds with both parents, the risk is
that joint custody will undermine the child's sense of a secure tie to
either parent. This fear seems most justified for the infant, who might
experience each move from one parent's home to the other as an aban-
donment by the parent she is leaving. Even the older child may suffer
from a more subtle anxiety about his security and his obligations of
loyalty.2
82
Caution in endorsing joint custody seems justified. Throughout
human history, families in many societies have been nomads, but in
few have the children alone been the travellers moving between sets of
principal caretakers and in even fewer, if any, have children moved
between caretakers who were apart because they had proven unable to
live together. Because of this anomalous quality of joint-custody ar-
rangements, research appraising the effects of such arrangements on
children should be held to particularly rigorous standards. Unfortu-
nately the available research fails to meet such standards. As with
children in the custody of fathers, there are no published studies that
have followed children in joint custody over time beginning at the
point of separation or divorce.2 83 Nor are there any studies of adults
who spent their childhood in joint custody.
What does exist, again similar to the studies of father custody, are
six studies, most of them impressionistic, of families in ongoing joint-
custody arrangements.284 All six suffer from familiar problems. All
281. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
282. It seems largely on the basis of these sorts of fears that Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit,
without drawing on any research about joint custody, reject the idea of imposed joint custody
and appear to have doubts about the wisdom of voluntary joint custody as well. See BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 82, at 37-39, 119-20.
283. One promising study is in progress that intends to follow representative samples of chil-
dren in joint legal and joint physical custody (as well as in sole maternal and sole paternal cus-
tody). It is being conducted by Eleanor Maccoby, Robert Mnookin, and Charlene Depner at
Stanford University.
284. The most thorough study by far is Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint
December 1984]
Michigan Law Review
drew small, nonrandom samples: the largest in which both parents
and children were interviewed was twenty-four families; some had
fewer than a dozen families.285 Only one included a matching sample
of children in sole custody. 28 6 Families were selected by means likely
to bias the study sample toward contented families.287 Most included
interviews with the parents only, and only one drew on more than one
set of interviews. 28 In nearly all, the interviews were conducted long
after the arrangement had been established, providing few contempo-
raneous views of difficulties in a period of transition. And, of course,
all were unavoidably limited to studying the sorts of joint-custody ar-
rangements that currently exist. They were thus nearly all voluntary
arrangements between parents willing to try something out of the ordi-
nary; they involved couples more likely than the average divorcing
Custody Arrangement, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Experience
of Children]; S. Steinman, The Parental Experience of Joint Custody: A Report of a Study
(1982) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as Parental Experience]. Some of her findings
are recounted in a recent law review article. See Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What
We Have Yet to Learn, and the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 739
(1983).
The others are D. LUEPNrrz, supra note 108 (18 parents with joint custody compared with 16
single-custody mothers and 16 single-custody fathers); Abrons, The Coparental Divorce: Prelimi-
nary Research Findings and Policy Implications, in JOINT CUSTODY: A HANDBOOK FOR
JUDGES, LAWYERS AND COUNSELORS, Cl (Assn. of Family Conciliation Courts 1979) (41 par-
ents with joint custody, unidentifiable proportion with joint legal custody only); Arbarbanel,
Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce A Study of Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOpSY-
CHIATRY 320 (1979) (only four families); Greif, Fathers, Children and Joint Custody, 49 AM. J.
ORTHOpSYCHIATRY 311 (1979) (interviews with 40 divorced fathers, fewer than eight with joint-
custody arrangements); cf. Keshet & Rosenthal, Fathering After Marital Separation, 23 Soc.
WORK 11 (1978) (study of 128 divorced men with children age seven or younger - although
none of the men had sole custody, 10 who were interviewed at greater length took care of their
children two or more days each week).
In addition there are several books that include anecdotal information about joint custody or
more informal interviews, most of it strongly positive. See, e.g., M. GALPER, CO-PARENTING:
SHARING YOUR CHILD EQUALLY (1978); M. MORGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, JOINT CUSTODY:
AN ALTERNATIVE FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES (1981); M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE Dispos-
ABLE PARENT (1978); C. WARE, SHARING PARENTING AFTER DIVORCE: AN ENLIGHTENED
CUSTODY GUIDE FOR MOTHERS, FATHERS, AND KIDS (1982).
Two studies of court records that include no interviews with parents or children also exist.
One sought simply to learn whether or not parents in joint custody returned to court after di-
vorce as frequently as parents in single custody, viewing returns to court as a sign of stress. See
Ilfield, Ilfield & Alexander, Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of Relitiga-
tion, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62 (1983). The authors found that joint-custody parents returned
only half as frequently. Unfortunately, the study mixes parents with joint legal custody with
parents with joint physical custody, and thus its utility for our purposes is greatly reduced. In
the other study, the children in joint custody were overwhelmingly in joint legal custody, not
joint physical custody. See EMPIRICAL STUDY, supra note 276, at 425. Unlike Ilfield, the Phear
Study found that parents with joint legal custody returned to court as frequently as parents with
sole custody. Id. at 432.
285. Eg., the studies of Arbarbanel and Greif.
286. Luepnitz, supra note 284.
287. Families were found not through random sampling of court records but through other
means, such as newspaper advertisements.
288. Experience of Children, supra note 284.
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couple to have only one child, and the one child was typically at least
of nursery-school age when the arrangement was entered. Sadly, for
our purposes, the available research provides almost no insights into
families with joint custody imposed by a court, few glimpses of very
young children, and few glimpses of families whose joint-custody ar-
rangements have broken down in the first few years.
Despite these defects, there is a uniformity among the findings of
these studies that makes them at least worth reporting, just as the fa-
ther-custody studies seem worth reporting. For even the studies con-
ducted by persons who do not seem biased in favor of joint custody are
reporting that, at least in the short run, children in voluntary joint
custody seem to be faring about as well as - and in some ways, proba-
bly better than - children in sole custody.
Of the six studies, the most thorough and balanced is that of Susan
Steinman, who has been following twenty-four joint-custody families
in California.289 In most respects it agrees with the finding of the
other, more impressionistic, studies. She conducted two interviews
each with the parents and children and then reinterviewed the families
a year to eighteen months later. At the time of the first interview, the
families had already shared their arrangements for two to nine years.
Although Steinman's sample suffers from the same problem of non-
randomness of most other studies of families after divorce (her sample
came from personal referrals and newspaper advertisements), she
nonetheless provides valuable insights into the lives of a group of fami-
lies who have been choosing joint physical custodial arrangements and
sticking with them over an extended period.
Steinman found that the children she studied were attached to and
strongly loyal to both their parents. She also found that the parents
shared a strong ideological commitment to joint custody and were re-
spectful of each other as parents and tolerant of their differences in
childrearing practices, even though they typically did not get along
well with each other as individuals. The children knew well and had
generally adjusted comfortably to the differences between their par-
ents. Steinman found none of the sort of grieving for an absent parent
that Wallerstein and Kelly found in their study of children in the cus-
tody of their mothers.
290
289. See Experience of Children, supra note 284; Parental Experience, supra note 284. At the
time of her first interviews in 1978, the combined incomes of the parents averaged about $16,000.
The 32 children in the 24 families ranged in age from 4 to 15 years. Three-quarters of her
children either split their weeks or alternated weeks between the parents. See Experience of
Children, supra note 284, at 403, 406-08.




On the other hand, the families were not without problems. Nearly
all the children appreciated their access to both parents and the sense
that both parents loved and wanted them, but many criticized the in-
convenience of going back and forth. Some seemed also to feel a need
to be "hyper-loyal" to both parents, to make certain that they treated
them with absolute equality. In her conclusions on the basis of the first
sets of interviews, she found that about one-third of the children suf-
fered some unhappinesss and confusion and "felt overburdened by the
demands and requirements of maintaining a strong presence in two
homes. '291 She concluded tentatively that the critical factors in the
success of joint custody were the parents' shared commitment to make
the arrangement work and their day-to-day behavior.292
When Steinman reinterviewed the same families later,293 she
found, to her surprise, that although the joint arrangements had all
been in place for at least two years at the time of the first interview, by
the second interview a year to eighteen months later, a third of the
families had made major changes in their custodial arrangements.294
The most frequent reason was a change in one of the parents' living
situations - most commonly, remarriage or a move to a new city or
both. Steinman does not report on whether or not children in families
in which there had been a move or remarriage seemed adversely af-
fected by the change; and, of course, she could not have determined,
even if she had tried, whether any harms to the child that had oc-
curred were greater than those that would have occurred if one of the
parents had obtained sole custody at the point of the original
separation.
Steinman's belief that some children in joint custody will suffer
problems that are created or exacerbated by the joint custodial ar-
rangements seems plausible. But we have already seen that children in
sole-custody settings with their mothers also display recurrent
problems that appear to relate to that form of custody.295 Wholly un-
determined yet is whether certain children are simply likely to suffer
more after divorce than other children regardless of the custodial ar-
291. Experience of Children, supra note 284, at 414.
292. See id.
293. See Parental Experience, supra note 284.
294. Compare a study of two-parent families in Australia in which parents shared caregiving,
but in which half the families had changed their arrangements when the author followed up two
years later. See Russell, Shared-Caregiving Families: An Australian Study, in NONTRADITIONAL
FAMILIES: PARENTING AND CHILDREARING 139 (M. Lamb ed. 1983).
295. Eg., mourning for the loss of one parent, disciplinary difficulties that may relate to not
having two adults to back each other up, financial problems that cast a pall over much of their
lives. See notes 92-105 supra and accompanying text.
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rangement, with the suffering simply manifesting itself in different
ways depending on the custodial arrangement, or whether certain chil-
dren, because of their family situation or personal characteristics, will
encounter fewer problems in one form of custody than another.296
In a thorough review of the research bearing on joint custody,
Clingempeel and Reppucci, 297 writing shortly before Steinman, found
the information on children actually in joint custody so thin that they
relied largely on the sorts of indirect evidence from research on ongo-
ing families that I used earlier to discuss fathers and primary caretak-
ers. Clingempeel and Reppucci identified a wide range of factors
including the remarriage of the parents, that they thought were likely
to affect the success of joint custodial arrangements, none of which
had been adequately studied.
298
For our purposes, there are two extremely serious gaps in the re-
search on joint custody. The first is the absence of studies of children
who have lived in joint custodial arrangements that have been termi-
nated. Steinman's research suggests that the incidence of voluntary
termination may be very high. The other gap, perhaps even more seri-
ous for those trying to frame recommendations for public policy, is the
absence of studies of children in joint-custody arrangements that have
been imposed by courts over the objections of one or both parents (or
arrangements "voluntarily" entered into under pressure by a parent
who wanted sole custody but feared that a court would award custody
to the other parent or impose joint custody).
299
296. Steinman believed that for the one-third of her subject children who seemed troubled,
the joint "arrangement did not help them and may have added to their burden." See Experience
of Children, supra note 284, at 414. Such a conclusion seems impossible to sustain in light of the
sparse data directly comparing children in single and joint custody - as unsustainable as the
conclusion that the other two-thirds of children were helped by the joint arrangement. See
Kelly, Further Observations on Joint Custody, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 762, 763-64 (1983) (pointing
out that roughly one-third of the children in her study (with Wallerstein) of children with
mothers were poorly adjusted at the five-year follow-up and that "either form of custody may
create or consolidate adjustment problems"). Moreover, even if the same child is likely to en-
counter different problems in the two settings, the question remains whether or not the problems
in one are likely to be as severe as the problems in the other.
297. Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 25.
298. They grouped the factors into three sets. The first, centering around the divorced family
itself, included the quality of the preexisting dyad relationships (mother-child, father-child,
mother-father), the mechanics of the joint-custody plan, the similarity or dissimilarities of the
two home environments, the characteristics of the child (age, temperament), and the social-
demographic characteristics of the family. Id. at 105-16. The second, centering around the fam-
ily's social system, included jobs, schools, and informal social networks. Id. at 117-18. The
third, which they call the "family life cycle," focuses on the recoupling or remarrying of the two
parents. Id. at 118-23. Clingempeel and Reppucci were especially concerned about the potential
impact on children in joint custody of the remarriages of their parents. Steinman's later reported
finding of the frequent voluntary termination of joint-custody arrangements after remarriages
suggests the need for pursuing this factor.
299. Of course, it is not surprising that there are no studies, because until recently courts
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There is good reason to fear for the experience of children in such
compelled or pressured arrangements. Voluntary joint custody seems
to work most satisfactorily to the parents and child when the parents
are tolerant and resilient and when the children are not allowed to
play one parent off against the other.3°° The satisfying psychological-
parent relationship maintained by the child with each parent appar-
ently experienced by many children today in voluntary joint-custody
relationships is likely to be much less commonly experienced by chil-
dren in court-compelled arrangements if the parents are hostile to each
other and the court and try to undercut the child's relationship with
the other parent. Research in other contexts suggests, not surpris-
ingly, that stress can impair the apparent security of the attachment
between a child and his parents even in a family with both parents
living together.301 Furthermore, a principal difficulty in some volun-
tary joint-custody arrangements observed by Steinman - that even
when parents cooperate, some children are anxious about treating
each parent absolutely equally - seems likely to be even more fre-
quently a problem in imposed joint-custody arrangements.
We must nonetheless be cautious in making apocalyptic predic-
tions for imposed joint custody. Although published accounts of ar-
rangements imposed by courts or entered into under pressure are not
at all encouraging, 30 2 we must remember the alternatives. In single-
custody arrangements, visitation will almost invariably be imposed,
and visitation arrangements can lead to two different sets of problems
for children, each potentially as upsetting to them as rancorous joint
rarely imposed joint custody. Two studies are being conducted now that include (or will include)
families with imposed arrangements. One, by Steinman, draws on a sample referred to a clinic
and is nearing completion. See S. Steinman, A Summary of Joint Custody Research: Some
Preliminary Impressions from the Joint Custody Project (March 1984) (memorandum describing
project prepared for a conference sponsored by the Women's Legal Defense Fund, Racine, Wis-
consin). The other project, just getting started, is that of Robert Mnookin, Eleanor Maccoby, and
Charlene Depner at Stanford University.
300. See Joint Custody, supra note 284, at 745-49; Experience of Children, supra note 284; see
also Benedek & Benedek, Joint Custody: Solution or Illusion?, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1540,
1543 (1979).
301. See Lamb, Thompson, Gardner, Charnov & Estes, supra note 26, at 12-14.
302. In a very preliminary report of her newest study Steinman, supra note 299, reports on
10 families whose joint physical custodial arrangement had been imposed by the court or recom-
mended by a court mediator prior to referral to her project for counselling and who were unable
to work out their problems through her project. In all, the parents had been following a joint
custodial plan but were unable to cooperate. Ten of the 15 children in these families were show-
ing "major signs of emotional and behavioral problems," and the parents were unable to decide
jointly, in most cases, how to help the child with these problems. Because the study is based on
samples of families referred for counselling, there is no way of knowing how representative the
families are among families with imposed joint custody. See also D. LEUPNITZ, supra note 108,
at 49-51 (describing one case in which joint custody had been imposed by a court; the parents
fought constantly and the children, who were 11 and 12, showed "clear maladjustment" and yet
both children said they preferred joint custody to either possible single-custody arrangement).
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custody. The first is that the parents often fight over the weekly de-
tails of visitation in much the same way that they might fight over the
weekly arrangements of joint custody, so that the experience for the
child would be closely similar in joint or sole custody. The other is
that the incidence of visitation between the noncustodial parent and
the child declines over time or even ceases; for the child, a rocky life in
joint custody might be preferable to a lonely life in sole custody.
B. What We Know About the Needs of Parents
Will the total satisfaction for both parents in a joint-physical-cus-
tody arrangement commonly be greater than the total satisfaction of
the two parents in either single-custody arrangement? 303
As before, this question looks very different depending on whether
the context is a voluntary or imposed arrangement. Looked at solely
from the point of view of the parents' own satisfaction, it is plain that
many adults are finding voluntary joint-custody arrangements satisfy-
ing.30 4 For the parent who would otherwise have had sole custody,
joint custody permits time off for other activities and a sharing of the
responsibilities for the child. Few parents with joint arrangements re-
port that they have a less satisfying relationship with their child than
they believe they would have had with single custody, though some do
report that they regret missing out on events that occur at the other
home.305
For the parent who would otherwise have had a visiting relation-
ship, usually the father, the commonly reported benefits are even more
substantial when compared to what the situation would have been in a
visitor relationship. 30 6 Indeed, many fathers report closer relation-
ships with their children than they had as secondary caretakers before
separation. To be sure, both parents report some difficulties and dis-
advantages: the logistics of joint custody can be annoying and the
costs of maintaining full residences for the child in two homes can be
303. For earlier discussions of why the interests of parents can be relevant to the framing of
rules, see notes 63-82 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the question posed in the text is
unanswerable given the difficulties of defining and measuring satisfaction in this context.
304. With the two noted exceptions, see note 302 supra, all of the studies listed in note 284
supra included interviews with parents in voluntary joint-custody arrangements.
305. See Parental Experience, supra note 284; see also Joint Custody, supra note 284, at 743-
44 (describing the advantages and disadvantages for the parents).
306. We have already discussed the large number of fathers who experience a deep sense of
loss when separated from their children by a traditional custodial arrangement and find the visit-
ing relationship unsatisfying. They no longer feel part of a "family." Joint custody permits each




burdensome.30 7 But for large numbers of couples who have actually
tried joint custody, the advantages seem substantial. That many
choose to stick with the agreements for several years is some evidence
that it works for them.
The problem with relying on all this enthusiasm reported in studies
is again that none of the available research reports on voluntary joint
custodial arrangements that have ended because of the dissatisfaction
of the child or one or both parents. We do not have information on
the proportion of voluntary arrangements that survive over time, let
alone on what distinguishes those that survive from those that do not.
We also do not know whether parents who terminate voluntary ar-
rangements feel that their relationship with the child has been dam-
aged and that the relationship would have been better if sole custody
had been adopted from the outset.
Even if we assume that joint custody is likely to receive reasonably
high marks from parents who embark on it voluntarily, it does not
follow that parents will give even passing marks to joint custody im-
posed by a court. It seems likely that such coerced relationships will
typically prove unsatisfying to all parties, even the parent who re-
quested it. Joint custody offers even more opportunities than single
custody for an angry parent to make life difficult for the other parent
and for a parent who cannot accept the idea of the divorce to try
fumblingly to get back together with a former spouse who is wholly
uninterested in reconciling. Imposed joint custody might create a high
level of tension between the parents, which might harm the relation-
ship between one or both parents and the child. These discouraging
guesses about compelled joint custody are plausible, but it is unfortu-
nately the case that there are no available studies on the consequences
of imposed joint custody for either parents or children.
V. NEW SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
CUSTODY DISPUTES
A. Rules for Sole Custody
The goal of the review of research was to determine whether an
empirical foundation could be constructed for new rules of decision in
custody disputes. Because of the difficulties posed for courts under the
open best-interests standard used in most states today, my hope was to
307. Some women's groups, once supporters ofjoint custody, now oppose it, in part on these
financial grounds and in part on the related ground of men's use of joint custodial arrangements
to secure a reduction in the amount of child support that would otherwise be ordered. See Schul-
man, Who is Looking After the Children?, 5 FAM. ADVOCATE, Fall 1982, at 31, 36.
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find some factor readily identifiable in all or most cases that could offer
a solid basis for an evidentiary preference - a rule that the parent
with that quality (or that relationship to the child) would receive cus-
tody unless the other parent demonstrated by evidence of some pre-
scribed weight that the child's interests would be better, served by a
different placement. In order to merit recommendation, however, any
such rule of decision ought to meet a fairly exacting -standard. To be
acceptable, it ought to help courts or parents reach, in the majority of
cases, better results than are reached under the current case-by-case
approach or results that are as often as good with fewer harmful trans-
actional costs (such as protracted litigation or embittered litigants). A
rule produces "better results" if it increases the probability that chil-
dren will be placed with the parent who better serves their interests, in
whatever manner the state defines children's interests. In the alterna-
tive, under the analysis of this Article, a rule also produces "better
results" if it creates at least as high a probability of a placement that
serves the child's interests coupled with a greater probability that
placement will be with the parent more likely to suffer emotionally
from separation from the child.
Because we do not, perhaps cannot, know how good the results are
that are reached in contested cases under the current case-by-case sys-
tem, it is in one sense impossible to know if some new preference
would lead to better results. On the other hand, because of the many
ways in which court determinations under the current rules are likely
to be unreliable, 30 8 if there is a sound basis for believing that any gen-
eral rule will produce better outcomes than random assignment, such
a rule has a plausible foundation.
Having completed the review, I now believe that no new or revived
presumptions based on gender or primary-caretaker status can meet
this standard on the basis of the existing empirical studies standing
alone. There is simply not enough hard evidence that children in gen-
eral are better off with women, primary caretakers, or the parent of the
same sex than with the opposite parent. However, the state of evi-
dence with regard to the three factors is not identical, and one of them,
primary-caretaker status, may still warrant some sort of preference,
when developmental theory and the practical values that a preference
can serve are taken into account.
With regard to gender, my review has revealed that there is some
evidence that men in general respond to children differently than
women in general. On the other hand, there is no basis for concluding
308. See notes 9-29 supra and accompanying text.
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that women are substantially more likely than men to possess traits
better suiting them for childcare, just because they are women, at least
when the man and woman are parents of the child at issue and both
have expressed a desire to care for the child.
30 9
With regard to placing children with the parent of the same gen-
der, psychological theory does suggest that children are likely to feel a
special affinity with the parent of the same sex and one of the few
studies ever conducted that sought to compare children in the custody
of mothers with children in the custody of fathers, found that those
with the same-sex parent were more secure, happier, and had higher
self-esteem than those with the parent of the opposite sex.310 On the
other hand, none of the other studies of children of divorce has re-
ported comparable findings, and the study that did reach these conclu-
sions used a small, nonrandom sample and can at most be regarded as
exploratory and suggestive. Based on current knowledge, the most
that a judge would be justified in doing is to look for an already ex-
isting bond between parent and child that appears to be related to their
shared gender.
With regard to primary caretakers, the evidence is of a different
order. As we have seen, there are few studies of children of divorce
that include children in the custody of parents who were primary care-
takers before separation together with children in the custody of par-
ents who were not primary caretakers and no studies that conclude
that children seem better off with the parent who had been the pri-
mary caretaker. And while there is an enormous body of research
documenting the strong bond that develops between infants and pri-
mary-caretaking mothers, there is now a growing body of research
that suggests that most children form a comparable, though probably
not identical, bond with their secondary-caretaking fathers. On the
basis of the current empirical research alone, there is thus no solid
foundation for concluding that children, even young children, will be
typically better off if placed with their primary caretaker.311 That is a
surprising conclusion, but it is important to note that it is as much a
conclusion about the rudimentary state of research on children of di-
vorce as it is a conclusion about the actual quality of parent-child rela-
309. See notes 157-62 supra and accompanying text.
310. See the discussion of the research by Santrock and Warshak, text at note 117 supra.
311. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, in their celebrated book BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 82, have frequently been misread as suggesting that children can
have only one adult to whom they will be strongly attached. That is not in fact the position they
espouse. They believe a child typically forms a bond to both parents and would, for example, in
divorce custody disputes create no presumption for the parent who has been the primary care-
taker. See id. at 100 (Provisions for a Child Placement Statute, para. 30.3).
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tionships. It is equally correct to state that on the basis of current
research, there is no solid foundation for concluding that children, and
particularly young children, will not be better off if placed with the
primary caretaker.
What policy recommendations one makes about primary caretak-
ers may thus depend on what rule it is most reasonable to adopt in the
absence of firm evidence either way. This Article has taken the posi-
tion that the current open standard for resolving custody should not
be altered to give weight to any particular factor unless evidence af-
firmatively suggests that giving such weight will produce better results
in the generality of cases. In the absence of such evidence, we should
simply call, as scholars often do, for more and better research. Yet a
softer form of empirical data - developmental theory resting on non-
systematic clinical observation - may still suggest the wisdom of a
preference for placing young children (those between roughly six
months and five years) with their primary caretaker.
Although there are no studies focusing on such young children in
the custody of parents who had previously been secondary caretakers,
there is a large and widely accepted body of writing by developmental
psychologists that concludes that there is typically a special attach-
ment between a young child and a primary caretaker and that foresees
subtle but significant harms from its breach. Research on the ties of
children to secondary caretakers makes clear that such ties are typi-
cally stronger than once believed but leaves open the significant possi-
bility that preserving the intimate interaction of the child with the
primary caretaker is of greater importance to the child. In this con-
text, in the absense of harder evidence to the contrary, it makes sense
to listen to theory.
By much the same token, though there are again no studies mea-
suring and comparing the emotional suffering of parents who are de-
nied custody, my earlier review suggests the probability that primary
caretakers will suffer more emotionally than secondary caretakers
when shifted into a mere visitor's role. Standing alone, the evidence
about the probable harm to primary caretakers is insufficient to justify
a preference for them, but the plausibility of such harm and the ab-
sence of research suggesting the contrary, provides some reinforce-
ment for legislatures to create an express preference for primary
caretakers that is based primarily on the expected benefits to children
and secondarily on the expected benefits to primary caretakers.
What form should such a preference take? Under existing legisla-
tion, judges would be wise to adopt as a starting point for their think-
ing about children's "best interests" the premise that children five or
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under should in general remain with their primary caretaker.312 Leg-
islatures, drawing on both child's and adult's interests, should create a
more formal preference for primary caretakers. They should define
the primary caretaker as the parent, if there is one, who has performed
a substantial majority of the caregiving tasks for the child that involve
intimate interaction with the child.313 They could then endow the
preference with any of at least three degrees of strength. The strongest
rule would mirror the strongest form of the old maternal presumption:
the primary caretaker of a young child receives custody unless demon-
strated to be "unfit. ' 314 Slightly less strong would be a rule that the
primary caretaker receives custody, unless the other parent demon-
strates by "clear and convincing evidence" that he or she is the more
appropriate custodial parent. Least strong would be a rule that the
primary caretaker receives custody, unless the other parent can show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is the more suitable
placement.
The two stronger versions of the rule would probably discourage
litigation by giving a clear signal to the parents about the probable
outcome of going to court, but both may seem unacceptable on the
ground that the empirical evidence supporting a primary-caretaker
preference is simply too thin to justify tilting the decision so heavily
toward primary caretakers. The evidence is indeed weak, but the de-
gree of strength appropriately attached to a preference turns on more
than just the evidence in its support. Once there is some basis for it,
the strength of the preference appropriately turns in substantial part
on the degree to which tribunals are capable of assessing the evidence
in individual cases and reaching sensible decisions. I would reject the
"unfit" parent form of the preference not because it is too strong but
because it invites focusing on the wrong question - the moral and
other qualities of one parent - and not on the parent-child relation-
ship however difficult that relationship is to assess. 315 On the other
312. A recent article points out that many state appellate courts are now using the term
"primary caretaker" and giving weight to that parent in their decisions. See Atkinson, Criteria
for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 16-19 (1984).
313. See note 230 supra and accompanying text.
314. This is the standard that the Supreme Court of West Virginia has adopted in announc-
ing a preference for "primary caretakers." See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
315. The Supreme Court of West Virginia did define the term "unfit" in a way that appears
to reflect concern with the parent's ability to provide the child with emotional support, nourish-
ing food, and clean surroundings. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 n.9 (W. Va. 1981). On
the other hand, the notion of unfitness focused too frequently on the moral quality of the parent's
conduct. Even in Garska, the "unfitness" test excludes any inquiry into the other parent's rela-
tionship with the child so long as the primary caretaker is not "unfit." I believe that there are
cases in which a primary caretaker would meet the Supreme Court's definition of fitness but the
secondary caretaker should not be excluded from consideration.
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hand, I believe that either of the other two standards - the "clear-
and-convincing evidence" test or the "preponderance" test - would
be wholly justifiable.
The "preponderance" test would be more consistent with the mod-
est empirical support for a preference, but it has a great disadvantage.
Although it in theory ought to reduce the incidence of litigation by
letting one side know it is less likely to win, there is some empirical
evidence that in this weak form it is unlikely to have such a deterrent
effect. 316 For this reason, I would recommend to legislatures that they
adopt the "clear-and-convincing evidence" test.
To be sure, under either the "preponderance" test or the "clear-
and-convincing evidence" test, the judge in cases that actually go to
trial would still be burdened with making elusive measurements of
current parent-child relationships and parenting capabilities in deter-
mining whether or not the secondary caretaker has met his or her bur-
den of proof. Nonetheless, even if framed in the weakest form and
clearly if framed in terms of "clear and convincing evidence," a new
presumption, simply by placing the burden of proof on one party,
should nonetheless resolve a large portion of disputes. Whoever bears
the burden of proof will be denied custody in those cases, probably
substantial in number, in which the judge concludes at the end of all
the evidence that she has no strong basis for believing that the children
will do better in one setting than the other. It is these cases, if the
factual generalization underlying the presumption is sound, that
should be resolved more wisely on average with the presumption than
without.
There is another sense in which such a presumption may produce
"better" results. If it is in fact the case that primary caretakers typi-
cally have more at stake than secondary caretakers in the relationships
with their children, then primary caretakers, because they care more,
are likely to be willing to make more concessions regarding property
and financial matters in order to be certain of obtaining custody of
their children. 317 If we believe that the child (unlike a boat or cottage)
is not an item that a parent ought to have to make financial conces-
sions to receive, if indeed we want to protect the financial security of
the child if the child ends up in the custody of the parent who wanted
316. Consider Weitzman and Dixon's surprising finding that the incidence of custody litiga-
tion did not rise in California after its legislature shifted from a weak maternal presumption to a
wholly neutral best-interests test. See Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 29, at 485-92.
317. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950, 977-78 (1979). The West Virginia Supreme Court in Garska was especially
concerned about the sorts of concessions a primary caretaker might make to receive custody.
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360, 362 (W. Va. 1981).
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her more, then creating a preference for primary caretakers may re-
duce at least slightly the use by secondary caretakers of the threat of a
custody fight for tactical advantage.
The presumption argued for in this section applies only to disputes
involving children up to about five years of age. What should courts
do in cases of children above that age - or in the cases of families
with children both over and under five? Our review found no empiri-
cal basis and a much flimsier theoretical basis for a statutory prefer-
ence applying to such older children based on serving the interests of
the child. States might conclude that there were values to children,
especially young children, in not being separated from siblings, and
expand the preference for placing young children with their primary
caretakers to include cases of older children who have young sib-
lings. 318 For cases in which all the children are roughly between six
and twelve, I have no suggestions for a new rule. Courts may simply
have to make do with the unweighted "best-interests" test in its cur-
rent form.319 For the oldest children, children twelve or so who have
reached adolescence, states might adopt a rule permitting the children
to choose for themselves.320 Whatever the age of the child, the evi-
dence regarding attachment of children to both parents and of both
parents to their children suggests the wisdom of continuing rules that
create a strong presumption that noncustodial parents will be permit-
318. I can find no studies of "split custody" - families with more than one child in which at
least one child was placed with each parent. Many judges, at least, believe that there is value in
keeping siblings together. See Lowery, Child Custody Decisions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey
of Judges, 12 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 492, 494 (1981).
319. For this group, the open best-interests test is, of course, not much less difficult to apply
than it is for the younger group. If courts start approaching the question of children's best
interests through the expected experience for the particular child, then the older the child the
more the court should be able to learn about what makes the child feel happy or secure. See
notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
Some would recommend the extension beyond age five of a primary-caretaker presumption as
desirable for the interests of the child. See note 202 supra. To my reading, however, both theory
and available evidence provide little persuasive support. Some might also extend beyond age five
a preference for primary caretakers based on the interests of primary caretakers, but again my
own review finds the evidence for comparatively greater emotional harm to primary caretakers
denied custody too thin by itself to serve as the basis for a preference for children of any age. See
text at notes 244-75 supra. The most that could be said for extending a weak preference for
primary caretakers up to the age of 11 or 12 would be that no better case can be made for any
other presumption and that the benefits of creating some presumption (the benefits of reducing
litigation and increasing certainty) might well outweigh the harms that would arise from cases in
which a secondary caretaker who would better meet the child's needs either does not litigate or
improperly loses because of the presumption.
320. See text at note 47 supra. Research on the capacity of children to make various sorts of
decisions typicaly finds chronological age a poor predictor: many 10-year-olds make better deci-
sions than many 12-year-olds. See Greenberg, supra note 47, at 140-44. On the other hand,
there are values to both parents and children in clearly determinable general rules, and the only
early determinable factor correlating even mildly with decisionmaking maturity is age.
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ted substantial visitation with their children.3 21
B. Rules for Joint Custody
Within the last few years, over half the states have adopted legisla-
tion dealing in some way with joint-custody awards in divorce.3 22 The
new laws vary widely, but all were enacted in a context in which legis-
latures were trying to encourage or even compel the wider use of joint
legal and joint physical custody.
The evidence reviewed in this Article suggests that much of the
legislators' enthusiasm for joint physical custody is justified. In most
unseparated families, children form strong emotional ties to both par-
ents and both parents form ties to their children. Joint physical cus-
tody may thus help sustain the emotional ties that run both ways
better than single custody even with generous visitation. Consistent
with this hope, the few studies of families with voluntarily arranged
joint custody report generally high levels of satisfaction both of chil-
dren and of their parents.
This research, as reviewed earlier, has many methodological limits.
Its lessons, to the extent that any lessons can be drawn from it, are
clearer for voluntarily agreed joint physical custody than they are for
court-imposed arrangements. In voluntary arrangements worked out
by the parties, the satisfaction of many parents with joint-custody ar-
rangements is sufficiently widespread that courts should refrain from
setting aside parentally chosen joint custodial arrangements, just as
they nearly always acquiesce in single-custody arrangements to which
parents agree. In fact, legislatures should explicitly deprive courts of
the power to disallow joint custodial arrangements voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties. My recommendation for limiting court power in
this manner does not flow from a belief that parents who choose joint
custody will invariably be serving their children's needs, but rather
from a belief that courts are rarely in a better position to determine
that some other arrangement will be better for the child.3 23 It is only
321. See, eg., UMDA, supra note 14, at § 407(a).
322. See summary of legislation in Scott & Derdyn, supra note 3, at 456 n.5. Many legisla-
tures have adopted laws that make it difficult for judges to disapprove voluntary joint-custody
arrangements hammered out by the parties. Several legislatures have gone further by explicitly
authorizing courts to enter orders of joint custody over the objection of either or both parties. A
few have announced a state policy favoring joint custody that can be read as creating a formal
legislative presumption for joint custody even in cases in which one or both parents object. Id. at
457 n.9, 471 n.73. Under state statutes that do not impose a preference for joint custody, state
appellate units have often held that joint custody should rarely be imposed. See. e.g.. Braiman v.
Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019,407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978); In re Marriage of Pool, 118
Ill. App. 1035, 455 N.E.2d 887 (1983).
323. As a general matter of principle (grounded only in part in beliefs about courts* capaci-
ties), I believe that courts should stay out of decisions both parents make about their children
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as to infants still building attachment bonds with their parents that a
joint physical arrangement would appear to pose risks of a sufficient
degree that even cooperative parents should generally be discouraged,
though not forbidden, from entering into them.324
The lessons of current research on the wisdom of permitting courts
to impose joint physical custody are harder to draw. In one sense,
there are no lessons because no studies have yet been published of im-
posed joint-custody relationships. Yet even without research that
demonstrates how children fare under imposed joint custodial ar-
rangements, I would recommend to legislatures that they act to de-
prive courts of the power to impose joint custody over the objections
of one or both parents. Joint custody seems even more rife than single
custody with opportunities for tension and anxiety for the child and
for the parent on whom it is imposed, even conceding the difficulties of
forced visitation in single-custody arrangements. Moreover, although
there may be some cases where parents ordered to participate in a
joint-custody arrangement would cooperate to make it succeed, even
the best judges will have grave difficulty discerning which cases those
are: in court, the parent who does not want joint custody may try
nonetheless to appear reasonable in order to bolster his or her case for
sole custody; the parent who wishes joint custody may try to seem
more reasonable and cooperative than he or she would later be. In
this context, judges may be misled about the probabilities of success.
Worse, there is something insidiously attractive to judges about im-
posed joint custody. Because judges find custody disputes between
parents painful, imposed joint custody may be too tempting a solution
a way of avoiding the appearance of labelling either parent inade-
except when a strong probability of serious harm to the child can be shown (the sort of standard
we would set for intruding on a family on the grounds of abuse). In the context of joint custodial
arrangements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, the likelihood of such severe harms actually
accruing is sufficiently slender that I think it is sensible to cut off judicial inquiry altogether.
324. If legislatures wish to encourage voluntary joint-custody arrangements, the recommen-
dation in the preceding section that legislatures create a preference for primary caretakers in
disputes over sole custody might, if adopted, serve as a mild deterrent to voluntary joint-custody
agreements. It might do so, because primary caretakers who prefer single custody to joint cus-
tody would then know more clearly than they do today that they are likely to receive single
custody if they press for it and thus be somewhat less likely to agree to a request by the other
party for joint custody.
Whether or not such deterrence is unfortunate is uncertain. On the one hand, if one parent in
a couple prefers sole custody, that couple may not be as promising a candidate for a joint custo-
dial arrangement as the couple with both parents agreeing on joint custody as their first choice.
On the other hand, one of the reasons behind the suggestion of a preference for primary caretak-
ers is to recognize the primary caretaker's emotional stake in the child, and voluntary joint cus-
tody might fully preserve the primary caretaker's ties, while preserving much better than a
visiting arrangement the emotional ties of the secondary caretaker.
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quate - and judges will blind themselves to signs that the parents are
unlikely to cooperate.
A final reason for depriving courts of the power to impose joint
custody relates more to the negotiating process between the parties. A
parent who is not really interested in having joint custody may use the
threat of demanding it as a tool to induce the other parent to make
concessions on issues of property division and child support.
325 If
there were good reasons to believe that imposed joint custody would
work well for children, this impact on the negotiating process would
be worth the risk. Because there are not, the risk is worth avoiding.
326
Judges today, in states with legislation that appears to create an
affirmative legislative preference for joint custody, may feel themselves
without power to adopt a fiat rule of never imposing joint custody. If
they have doubts about imposed joint custody, they will sense an un-
comfortable tension, indeed an inconsistency, between the legislature's
expression of enthusiasm for joint custody and the legislature's more
overarching injunction to resolve each case to serve the best interests
of the child. For judges who believe that they must make case-by-case
decisions on requests for joint custody, I would suggest that they im-
pose joint custody only when they find that several conditions are met:
(1) the child in question is not three years of age or younger; (2) both
parents seem reasonably capable of meeting the child's needs for care
and guidance; (3) both parents wish to continue their active involve-
ment in raising the child; (4) the parents seem capable of making rea-
soned decisions together for the benefit of the child and seem
reasonably likely to be able to do so even under the coerced circum-
stances; (5) joint custody would not impose substantial economic
hardship on the parent who opposes it; and (6) joint custody would
probably disrupt the parent-child relationships less than other custo-
dial alternatives.327 I despair of the capacity of anyone, judge or any-
325. Compare the discussion above on the relationship between a preference for primary
caretakers and the tactics of negotiation. See note 318 supra and accompanying text. Some crit-
ics of joint custody have been particularly concerned about requests for joint custody to obtain
tactical advantage. See note 307 supra.
326. How, one might ask, can we ever learn whether imposed joint custody can work well for
children if legislatures accept the advice to deny courts the power to impose it? The answer is
simply that few states are likely to accept my advice, and researchers should be studying the
children living in court-imposed or court-pressured arrangements.
327. I have borrowed most of these criteria from a thoughtful article by Jay Folberg and
Marva Graham, who suggest that judges ought in fact to impose joint custody under the circum-
stances they prescribe. I agree with Folberg and Graham that if all their criteria can be met, the
prospects for success in a particular case would be high (almost by definition, given factor (6)).
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 523 (1979).
Folberg and Graham would have courts order joint custody if "'(1) both parents are fit; (2) both
parents wish to continue their active involvement in raising the child; (3) both parents are capa-
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one else, to make many of the findings in a reasonably accurate
manner. I would thus recommend these criteria only for judges who
believe they have no choice but to make case-by-case decisions, but I
still recommend, for the several reasons stated above, that legislatures
act to remove from judges the power to impose joint custody.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes you don't know whether to smile or to cry. The cur-
rent approach states use for resolving custody disputes in divorce - a
case-by-case inquiry into the best interests of the child - has many
flaws. One has been that neither legislatures nor custom has provided
judges with a coherent framework for thinking about what children's
interests are. A second, equally serious, has been the inability of
judges to make accurate determinations, under the circumstances pre-
vailing in the context of litigation, of the quality of most individual
children's relationships with their parents or of parents' skills at
childrearing.
This Article has undertaken to define the goals that states should
be seeking to serve when resolving custody disputes, arguing for view-
ing children's interests through the expected experience for the child
as the child herself will view it and for expanding the state's goals to
accord some subsidiary weight to the interests of parents. With these
goals in mind, it then sought to identify some factors that might so
regularly advance children's interests (or both children's and one par-
ent's interests) that legislatures might wisely create new general pre-
sumptions and thus reduce to some degree the difficulties courts face
in making case-by-case determinations. To this end, this Article re-
viewed available research to learn whether or not it supported judicial
preferences for joint custody, for mothers, for parents of the same sex
as the child, and for primary caretakers. Perhaps all of these should
have been recognized as unpromising from the outset, but, with the
exception of letting the children choose for themselves, they were
about the only considerations that could provide the basis for rules
that would apply in all or nearly all cases. In any event, the inquiry
largely failed to unearth sturdy empirical support for new rules. At
most it offers a weak but defensible basis for a preference for primary
caretakers for children five and under and a basis for encouraging
wholly voluntary joint-custody arrangements.
Yet our inquiry can still provide a basis for some wan smiles. One
ble of making reasoned decisions together in the best interests of the child; and (4) joint custody
would disrupt the parent-child relationship less than other custodial alternatives." Id. at 579.
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reason why case-by-case inquiries are difficult and one reason why it is
difficult to commend new preferences is that, as recent research has
confirmed, in most families both parents develop strong ties to their
children, ties important to the child and to the parents, and either
parent seems likely to do a reasonably competent job of childrearing.
Thus the urgency for new rules may be less than we suggested at the
beginning. Courts may lack bases for principled choices but even their
"bad" choices may still usually turn out reasonably well for children.
The smile is still a weak one. Litigation imposes heavy emotional
and financial costs on families. Unlike most other forms of litigation
the parties to this dispute generally continue to deal with each other
after it is over: the "loser" is entitled to visitation over a long period of
years. Parents who fight through an angry trial are likely to poison
even the good aspects of their prior relationship. If parents viewed
trial judges' decisions as the voice of the oracle - right merely be-
cause it was uttered by a sacred voice - it would make little difference
if judges had principled bases for making choices. In this country,
however, the losing parent is likely to condemn the judge's decision as
stigmatizing, discriminatory, and arbitrary.
What this suggests in the end is the continuing need to search for
alternatives to litigation, for ways to help parents resolve these cases
for themselves. Encouraging forms of negotiation likely to lead to vol-
untary resolution rather than trial and providing mediation services
are each attractive possibilities, though each has its own possible ad-
verse costs. In the meantime, a preference for primary caretakers in
cases of young children seems at least a modestly better rule for resolv-
ing disputed cases than the current open standard.
December 1984]
